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Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future.
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This book emerged from an undergraduate course we have been teach-
ing together for several years— Alternatives: Modeling Choice Across 
the Disciplines. One of our favorite topics is the examination of different 
approaches to predicting the future and to understanding the past. We 
thank our students and our exceptionally talented teaching assistants for 
inspiring us to produce this volume.
We received great advice and assistance from the staff at Northwest-
ern University Press, and we single out in particular its director, Jane 
Bunker, and assistant director, Henry Lowell Carrigan Jr., along with 
three anonymous referees who reviewed the volume with uncommon 
insight. We thank also the wonderful people in the Northwestern Presi-
dent’s Office— Judi Remington, Lindsay Rathert, and Paula Peterson— 
for help in many ways, and especially Geneva Danko, who masterfully 
organized draft after draft in the most cheerful and efficient manner 
imaginable. Provost Dan Linzer provided helpful comments on our pen-
ultimate draft.
Finally, we thank the editors and authors of the classic 1955 book The 
Fabulous Future: America in 1980. While it is easy to scoff at so many of 
their predictions, we fully expect that, decades from now, much of what 
is written here will seem as hopelessly misguided. How could they, and 
we, miss the obvious? It certainly wasn’t because either volume suffered 
from the selection of the wrong authors. As was the case in the 1950s, 
we have here a collection of some of the most thoughtful and influential 
thinkers in the world. The problem, of course, is that the future remains 
as unimaginable as ever.
One thing we can know is that the future is not a given— it depends 
on what we do. It does not just happen to us. We make it.







The Future of Prediction
Gary Saul Morson and Morton Schapiro
Among all forms of mistake, prophecy is the most gratuitous.
— george eliot, middlemarch
Everyone questions his memory, but no one questions his judgment.
— la roChefoUCaUld
The future just won’t stay still. We imagine we can predict it, that we can 
diminish or erase its uncertainty, and that we can mitigate the power of 
the radically unknown. Almost always, events prove us wrong. Then we 
forget these mistakes and go on making predictions with undiminished 
confidence.
As Barry Glassner observes in the present volume, predictions of 
disaster seem to exercise special attraction, as if the more critical the 
problems we face, the more significant are our lives.1 Today, the media 
report a wealth of catastrophes. Oil may run out, but no one predicts the 
end of terrifying predictions: new microorganisms, produced naturally 
or in some laboratory, and circulating accidentally or by design, threaten 
the human race; the more nations that have nuclear weapons, the more 
possible nuclear war becomes. Will the Cuban missile crisis look quaint 
some day? The older nuclear technology gets, the easier it will become to 
acquire it. The rise of powers more dangerous, because less given to self- 
preservation, than the former Soviet Union makes the old strategy of 
deterrence look less and less viable. So does the rise of terrorists without 




The technology that improves our lives also threatens to destroy them. 
The more dependent we become on GMOs (genetically modified or-
ganisms), the more destructive a disease affecting them might prove. 
Recent violations of civil and political liberties by the NSA and IRS, as 
well as corporate spying, suggest the possibility of a new totalitarianism. 
In 1984, the ubiquitous “telescreens” destroyed privacy, but that image 
seemed like a paranoid fantasy on Orwell’s part. The cameras everywhere 
in London, government tracing of emails, and the use of computers to 
do analysis that only recently required human beings may soon make 
privacy as outmoded as monks copying manuscripts.2 And what if we are 
on the verge of reading people’s minds by brain scans?
Many kinds of environmental disaster threaten. We read more and 
more predictions about the effects of climate change, which give us a 
spectrum of catastrophes. The very actions we take to forestall a disaster 
may make it more likely (an example given is the use of ethanol) or cre-
ate new ones. Some predictors take it for granted that we will run out of 
natural resources, since the supply of anything is by definition limited.
Even when a problem seems to be advancing gradually, it is possible 
to draw a curve showing rapid acceleration to come. No one ever raised 
money to solve a problem that wasn’t urgent. We may be at a “tipping 
point.” How can we tell?
Indeed, the very popularity of new terms like “tipping point” and “in-
flection point” testify to our recent attitude to the future.3 Even where 
things seem benign, they may be on the verge of horror. Right or wrong, 
many people still feel as if the present moment is especially urgent.
But might it not be that our view of the present is mistaken, the prod-
uct of our temporal and temperamental egoism? Surely the 1930s and 
1940s gave more reason for fearing the future than the present does. Is 
it possible to compare our attitude toward the future with that of earlier 
times? Every age has its “futuribles” (set of anticipated futures that could 
happen), so wouldn’t some sort of comparative futurology give us per-
spective on our own obsessions about what is to come?4
In 1955, Fortune magazine marked its twenty- fifth anniversary by 
publishing The Fabulous Future: America in 1980, which brought together 
some of the smartest and most influential Americans to speculate on the 
world to come.5 Contributors included John von Neumann, who not 




founded game theory and cybernetics; David Sarnoff, chairman of RCA, 
then synonymous with technological progress; Crawford Greenewalt, 
president of Du Pont; Adlai Stevenson, who was the Democratic can-
didate for president in 1952 and would be again in 1956; Chief Justice 
Earl Warren; AFL- CIO president George Meany; Treasury Secretary 
George Humphrey; Harvard president Nathan Pusey; and several oth-
ers. Their contributions both reflected and shaped the wisdom of the 
times.
They weren’t entirely mistaken. As they guessed, the pace of techno-
logical change sped up, polio was conquered, and “calculating machines” 
were invented. But in detail and in broad conception they were almost 
comically off the mark. Von Neumann foresaw a world in which “energy 
would be free— just like the unmetered air.” Sarnoff deemed it indis-
putable that ships, aircraft, locomotives, and even automobiles would 
be atomic- powered. Houses and industrial plants would run on small 
atomic generators, and so coal, oil, and gas would be displaced as fuel. 
We would all commute in personal helicopters. Guided missiles would 
deliver intercontinental mail. We would have the capacity not only to 
predict the weather far in advance but also to change weather and cli-
mate. Naturally, we could foresee the effects of any such intervention.
Society would also improve. The workweek would continue to shorten. 
Soon we would be worrying not about how to create jobs but about how 
to spend all our leisure time. The economy would no longer be subject 
to serious recessions. Scientific discoveries would strengthen our faith in 
the Creator. War would cease to be an instrument of national policy, and 
as communication (especially television) improved, nations and individ-
ual people would understand one another better and grow less hostile. 
We would have a world police force.
Almost as remarkable is what was not foreseen. No one, not even von 
Neumann, who did so much to lay the groundwork for it, anticipated 
the information revolution. Neither did anyone imagine the biological 
revolution or nanotechnology. The future of science seemed to lie in the 
study of atomic power. Islamism was not mentioned, and authors still 
assumed that time was on the side of the Soviet Union.
Understandably enough, the writers tended to draw straight lines 
from the present. In their view, past predictions had proven wrong 




the future as surprising, they usually referred to the pace, not the nature, 
of change. The idea of radically contingent events altering the whole 
direction of change was underestimated. Progress, speed, continuation 
of present trends: these were the guiding assumptions.
As it happened, the volume was prophetic in another way. It exempli-
fied a growing trend of failed predictions made with supreme confidence. 
To be sure, not all of these predictions were to be unreservedly optimis-
tic. Perhaps the most widely read economist of his day, John Kenneth 
Galbraith predicted in 1967 that large corporations would be able to in-
sulate themselves from competition and insure their dominance.6 These 
supposedly invincible corporations have mostly been replaced by others, 
which— like Apple, Microsoft, and Walmart— did not exist or had just 
been founded in 1967.
Still more famously, Paul Ehrlich— in his 1968 best seller The Popula-
tion Bomb, testimony before the U.S. Senate, commentary on television 
talk shows, and countless other appearances— predicted that overpopu-
lation would cause a billion people to starve to death within a decade. 
He foresaw the rapid exhaustion of natural resources. Along with the 
Club of Rome, Zero Population Growth, and books such as The Limits 
to Growth,7 he argued that humanity was exhausting limited resources 
and had already reached the point where catastrophe was unavoidable. 
The New Republic proclaimed that “world population has passed food 
supply. The famine has begun.”8
In fact, the exact opposite was the case. Food supply per capita was 
growing, and starvation was soon to be a rare problem caused not by un-
dersupply but by government mismanagement and by a lack of income 
needed to buy existing produce. All the same, the predictions seemed 
impervious to counter- evidence. “How often does a prophet have to be 
wrong before we no longer believe that he or she is a true prophet?” 
asked economist Julian Simon.9
Reasoning that if resources were to be exhausted, their price would 
rise, in 1980 Simon challenged Ehrlich in Social Science Quarterly to a 
thousand- dollar bet. Ehrlich could pick five metals he expected to grow 
increasingly scarce. If their price rose in ten years, Ehrlich would win the 
bet and Simon would pay Ehrlich the actual purchase price for those 
metals; if they fell, Ehrlich would pay Simon a thousand dollars. Ehrlich 




jump in.”10 Because Ehrlich got to choose the metals, and because the 
most he could lose was the initial thousand- dollar stake while sufficient 
price rises made Simon’s potential losses illimitable, the terms seemed to 
favor Ehrlich. By 1990, all five metals had declined in price, and Ehrlich 
wrote Simon a check. It would be hard to imagine a clearer test of a pre-
diction, but Ehrlich still refused to admit he had been mistaken.
For his part, Simon had reasoned that Ehrlich’s Malthusianism, based 
on a comparison of people to butterflies, overlooked the “ultimate re-
source” humans possess: ingenuity. Substitution effects, technological 
innovation, and efforts directed by a price mechanism could alter trends 
for people as they could not for butterflies. Resources tended to expand, 
not diminish, as new sources became technologically accessible and new 
productive methods could use different materials. But the rhetorical 
power of straight lines, especially if one has staked a great deal on pre-
dicting their continuation, is hard to overcome.11
It seems that neither the optimists nor the pessimists escape the trap 
of drawing straight lines and the temptations to see only what supports 
their views. One has only to program a computer to draw them in order 
to make one’s projections seem “scientific.”
* * *
Have we grown any smarter? It is easy enough to disparage the wisdom 
of 1955 (or any other year), just as we look down on earlier social views. 
Somehow history’s most enlightened people are always ourselves at the 
present moment. The contributors to The Fabulous Future made fun of 
the wrongheadedness of past predictions, such as the 1844 declaration by 
the U.S. commissioner of patents that “the advancement of the arts from 
year to year taxes our credulity and seems to presage the arrival of that 
period when further improvements must end.”12 But they did not foresee 
how wrongheaded their own predictions would prove. If extrapolating 
from the past shows anything, it shows the hazard of extrapolating from 
the past. Perhaps the easiest thing to predict is the failure of widely ac-
cepted predictions. Astrology never dies, it only changes shape.
Surely it would be hard to assemble a group any smarter than these au-
thors of sixty years ago. If they were wrong, it was not because of a lack of 
brain power. And so it is reasonably safe to assume that our best guesses 




more so, if the pace of change accelerates. After all, changes interact un-
predictably with other changes in an ever- broadening spiral.
* * *
And yet, we cannot not predict. It is impossible to focus only on the pres-
ent. We have to allocate our resources somehow, and if we are not to rely 
on pure chance, we must guess where they will be most needed or most 
productive. Every plan contains a prediction.
What’s more, humanness itself entails anticipating a future. That is 
how we experience time. People live each moment as a step to moments 
to come. Every present contains multiple possible futures to which we 
orient ourselves; suspense is always with us. What’s more, life would 
seem pointless otherwise, because unless the future is uncertain, unless 
it depends in part on what we do, human effort wouldn’t matter. Action 
has meaning only if it can make a difference, and it can make a difference 
only if the future hangs in the balance.
For this reason, Dostoevsky argued that the real cruelty of capital 
punishment lies in its certainty. Its greatest horror resides in what hap-
pens to the condemned before the execution, at the sentencing. From the 
moment the prisoner hears he must die and no longer can entertain any 
hope, he surrenders the sense of a future in which effort matters. Before 
losing his life, he loses his humanness. Dostoevsky concluded that “mur-
der by legal sentence” is far worse than murder by brigands, from which 
there is always hope to escape.13
We can learn a lot about people or cultures from their sense of possi-
ble futures. They are in part defined by the futures they entertain. Even 
ill- grounded predictions reveal the horizon of expectations of the people 
who make them. To understand their choices, one needs to know the dan-
gers they deemed likely and the achievements they thought possible. The 
common wisdom in 1955, however mistaken, illuminates what life felt like 
then.
To live in 1955 meant presuming that atomic physics, if it did not 
lead to annihilation, would provide endless supplies of power. It entailed 
anticipating inequality to lessen; the workweek to shorten; and war, dis-
ease, and natural disasters to disappear, or all but disappear, in the face 




the future— call them “futurisms”— which do not seem naive precisely 
because they are ours.
If we are to understand the past, we must imagine past futures, those 
shadowy might- bes anticipated at earlier moments. Every past was an 
earlier present, and it looked out on apparently likely futures. The history 
of humanity includes all those futures that never were. Even in our per-
sonal lives, we can best recall our earlier selves by evoking that to which 
we once looked forward. Just as respect for human difference involves 
seeing the world as other cultures do, so it involves seeing it as earlier 
ages did.
If we neglect to do so, we are bound to smile complacently at those 
who did not foresee the world we experience today. How could they 
have been so stupid as not to have guessed what was so plainly bound 
to happen! We have a natural tendency to think that because the past 
did lead to us, it had to. We forget, or do not wish to consider, that what 
happened could easily not have happened, that the world could have 
been entirely different, and that current conditions are perhaps the result 
of successful efforts to avoid a much more likely outcome. It is unsettling 
to think that, but for all sorts of contingencies that easily could not have 
happened, we would not be here at all.
Wisdom begins when we surmount our own perspective and see what 
seems plausible to someone with experiences different from our own. 
Once we realize that history did not lead infallibly to ourselves, we are 
less likely to succumb to the hubris of the present moment, the sense 
that, unlike all those fools of the past, we have freed ourselves from prej-
udice and can see facts clearly.
* * *
How should predictions be assessed? And how can we learn from the 
failure of earlier predictions?
The fact is, most people make sure not to learn. No one likes to admit 
he or she was badly and publically mistaken, and so no matter what 
happens, people assure themselves that they were— or soon would be— 
proven correct. We have never seen a New York Times or Wall Street Jour-
nal editorial admitting that the people it criticized as “in denial” turned 




The English poet Sir John Harrington famously remarked in 1618:
Treason doth never prosper. What’s the reason?
For if it prosper, none dare call it treason.14
In much the same spirit, we could add:
No forecasts ever err. And why not some?
For if they err, success is still to come.
If what we predicted didn’t happen, we can always imagine it still 
might.
In his magnificent study Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? 
How Can We Know? Philip Tetlock catalogs a variety of excuses given 
by predictors in the face of evident failure.15 Ehrlich famously compared 
Simon to “a guy who jumps off the Empire State Building and says how 
great things are going as he passed the tenth floor.”16 Thirty years after 
the bet, it is now abundantly evident that food production per capita has 
not collapsed but dramatically risen. Technological innovation has led 
to previously impossible extraction of oil and gas (as well as new sources 
of green power). Nevertheless, in a sequel to The Population Bomb, The 
Population Explosion (1990), Paul and Anne Ehrlich claimed complete 
vindication: “Then the fuse was burning; now the population bomb has 
detonated.”17 And in 2013 Ehrlich told an interviewer that The Popula-
tion Bomb had proven “much too optimistic.”18
In resisting disconfirming evidence, and in his repeated reference to 
opponents who cite such evidence as idiots and ignoramuses in denial, 
Ehrlich is far from alone. In their classic study of religious movements 
that forecast the imminent destruction of the world, When Prophecy Fails, 
Leon Festinger, Henry Riecken, and Stanley Schachter demonstrate that, 
often enough, the reaction to disconfirmation is to double down on the 
original beliefs. Indeed, the more thoroughly people have staked their 
reputations on a prediction, the less likely they are to reverse themselves 
no matter how incontrovertible the unwelcome facts turn out to be.
Suppose an individual believes something with his whole heart; 




he has taken irrevocable actions because of it; finally, suppose 
that he is presented with evidence, unequivocal and undeni-
able evidence, that his belief is wrong; what will happen? The 
individual will frequently emerge, not only unshaken, but even 
more convinced of the truth of his beliefs than ever before. 
Indeed, he may even show a new fervor about convincing and 
converting other people to his view.19
Recalculation of the date is far from the only way to rescue a failure. 
Forecasters can always claim the predicted event almost happened. Sure, 
Canada didn’t break up by 2000, but someone who assured us it would 
can protest that it came awfully close to doing so. Or that person can say 
that the prediction would have come true if not for the warning in the 
prediction itself— an excuse we might call “the self- defeating prophecy.”
Often enough, people maintain that in spite of an outcome the exact 
opposite of what they forecast, the prediction was confirmed anyway. If 
an economic or social policy supposed to dramatically decrease crime, 
unemployment, or inflation is actually followed by no change or even by 
an increase, well, the problem would have been still worse without the 
policy! While in some instances they might actually have a case here, it is 
especially difficult to prove such a counterfactual. Alternatively, one can 
adjust the prediction by finding some other problem that did improve 
and claim credit for that. No one determined not to be wrong ever thinks 
he or she is.
In August 2000, the quantitative modelers of presidential elections at 
the American Political Science Association were unanimous that elec-
tion campaigns did not matter and that in November Al Gore would 
certainly and decisively defeat George W. Bush.20 Almost no one in the 
Slavic or Sovietology professions predicted the fall of the Soviet Union, 
but at conferences afterward speaker after speaker responded with out-
rage to the suggestion that perhaps professionals had left something out 
of their models or needed to rethink their methods.
There is no shortage of loopholes. Luck is a vastly more popular ex-
planation when one has been proven wrong. It is also always possible to 
argue that one’s opponents proved right for the wrong reason. One can 
apply laxer standards to one’s own predictions than to those of others. 




were minor compared to the disaster had they proven right. As Tetlock 
observes, “political belief systems are at continual risk of evolving into 
self- perpetuating worldviews, with their own self- serving criteria for 
judging judgment and keeping score, their own stock of favorite histori-
cal analogies, and their own pantheons of heroes and villains.”21
Tetlock concedes that sometimes explanations of apparent disconfir-
mations might be persuasive. Sometimes one does fail by luck and some 
predictions turn out right for the wrong reason. But if we always argue 
that way, if we never seriously entertain counterevidence or admit our 
mistakes, we condemn ourselves to never learning from experience. And 
we commit a form of intellectual dishonesty.
If one is to avoid such dishonesty, it is important to practice what Tet-
lock calls “the art of self- overhearing.”22 One must train oneself to listen 
to one’s rationalizations and ask how one would respond had one’s oppo-
nents used one’s preferred loophole. Specifying in advance what would 
prove one’s prediction wrong also helps. It is hard to admit that one’s 
judgment has failed, but it is even more difficult to learn unless one does.
Tetlock’s study concludes that how one thinks makes more of a 
difference than what one thinks. It does not matter much whether 
someone is a liberal or conservative, doomster or boomster, realist or 
institutionalist. Neither does one’s field of expertise. What turns out to 
make a difference is one’s style of thought. To explain his point, Tetlock 
borrows Isaiah Berlin’s famous distinction between “hedgehogs” and 
“foxes,” terms drawn from the ancient Greek poet Archilochus: “The 
fox knows many things, the hedgehog one big thing.”23 Hedgehogs are 
the grand and bold systematizers, who identify a comprehensive expla-
nation for everything, like Hegel, Spinoza, Marx, or Freud. Foxes, by 
contrast, tend to find contradictory forces, irreducible complexity, and 
the need for multiple perspectives. And, by and large, Tetlock argues, it 
is the foxes that prove more accurate and more capable of learning from 
experience.
* * *
In assessing predictions, it is important to distinguish three sorts of 
claims.
First, there is the prediction itself, the content of the forecast. Sec-




possible results. Third, and most often overlooked, it can be offered with 
different degrees of confidence.
Suppose we imagine that a social process resembles flipping a coin. 
It has two equally likely outcomes. We might predict that in a thousand 
flips, heads will come up “about 500 times.” If we know probability the-
ory, we might allow for a degree of uncertainty and assign a percentage 
likelihood that the outcome would be in a given range, say, between 400 
and 600. Finally, we might be more or less confident of this prediction. 
How sure are we that the process really does resemble a coin flip? Could 
there be more than two outcomes, some not specifiable in advance? Is it 
possible that early results could constrain later ones? Could exogenous 
forces upset the entire system? To the extent that we answer these ques-
tions affirmatively, our degree of confidence should diminish.24
One ought to have supreme confidence regarding astronomers’ pre-
dictions about the orbit of Saturn. To the extent one imagines social 
sciences to resemble astronomy, one will have similar confidence in its 
predictions. Conversely, to the extent that one thinks that too many fac-
tors, some not even imagined, could have concatenating and unpredict-
able effects, one’s degree of confidence ought to be considerably less.
Overconfidence often results from not recognizing the possibility that 
a model adapted to fit some circumstances may have strayed into others. 
Ehrlich’s certainty depended on his confidence in his field of expertise, 
ecology, but his prediction involved factors studied by economists, who 
were more likely to question his model. It is one thing to predict global 
climate change but quite another to maintain that a given treaty will be 
worth the cost of implementing it.
Degree of confidence makes a big difference. One bets the farm on an 
outcome that can’t fail to happen. But one bets a lot less, and continually 
monitors results, when one expects the unexpected.
A prediction can be reasonable when overconfidence in it is not. It is 
obvious that one cannot devote 20 percent of one’s resources to prevent-
ing each of a hundred predicted disasters, so one needs to know not only 
how likely a predicted disaster is, and how disastrous it would actually be 
if it happened, but also the degree of confidence we should have in our 
predictions.
Sometimes it is difficult to assess the prediction but easy to tell that 




might be claiming knowledge no one has ever had. Or be extending the 
model far beyond its proper domain. Or be making predictions exces-
sively precise, as if more decimal points signaled greater accuracy. Or, out 
of a sense of urgency, be exaggerating his or her confidence to inspire 
action.
One can state as a rule of thumb that the more a prediction accords 
with what one would be inclined to believe for other reasons, the more 
suspect it is. We do not trust polls undertaken by a political party or an 
organization allied with it. Groups that have a financial stake in wide-
spread fear of a given disaster risk exaggerating their evidence. It is usu-
ally shepherds who cry wolf.
* * *
Some contributors to The Fabulous Future wrote as if no reasonable 
person could question their predictions. Sarnoff declared that “it can be 
taken for granted that before 1980 ships, aircraft, locomotives, and even 
automobiles will be atomically fueled.”25 He was doubly wrong, mis-
taken not only in his prediction but also in his assurance that he simply 
had to be right. Explaining how he had given his engineers orders for 
seemingly impossible inventions that they succeeded in creating, Sar-
noff concludes that “there is no longer margin for doubt that whatever 
the mind of man visualizes, the genius of modern science can turn into 
functioning fact.”26 “Taken for granted,” “no margin for doubt,” “every 
educated person agrees”: these are phrases to be used with caution and 
are almost never justified when applied to social or political affairs.
By contrast, von Neumann was much less confident. He was often 
wrong, but not doubly so, in the way Sarnoff was.27 Experience, he 
warned, teaches that future technological and social changes “are not a 
priori predictable and that most contemporary ‘first guesses’ concerning 
them are wrong.” It follows that “one should take neither present dif-
ficulties nor proposed reforms too seriously.”28 Crawford Greenewalt 
began his essay explaining that prediction is hazardous, in part because 
small changes may lead in many directions and interact in unforeseeable 
ways. What Greenewalt calls “bit- by- bit research . . . the day- to- day ef-
fort that produces results which over a short period seem inconsequen-
tial, but which over the long run are extraordinarily important,” makes it 





The present effort differs from The Fabulous Future in a number of ways. 
First, the contributors are for the most part less optimistic. The future 
may not be so fabulous. In 2040, Americans may very well envy previous 
generations. Second, the 1955 contributors speculated on any topic that 
struck them. They went far beyond their field of expertise. By contrast, 
we asked the authors to write about topics both specific and grounded 
in their specialized knowledge. Third, as the volume’s changed subtitle 
suggests, our perspective is less U.S.- centric. In 1953 Charles E. Wilson, 
the president of General Motors, told Congress:  “For years I thought 
that what was good for our country was good for General Motors and 
vice versa. The difference did not exist.”30 By the same token, it was taken 
for granted that what was good for the USA was good for the world. To-
day, the future importance of the United States is much more of an open 
question. Finally, the volume reflects a greater awareness of the limits of 
even the best- informed people’s ability to predict. By and large, we are 
less sure of our prophetic abilities. We don’t think we are any smarter 
than our predecessors and expect that, decades hence, when people look 
back on this volume, its predictions will seem as wrongheaded as those 
of its predecessor. But perhaps it will seem less brazenly confident. Hu-
mility, history suggests, is a great virtue when imagining the future.
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Organization of the Volume  
and List of Contributors
Instead of selecting individual authors first, as was the case back in 1955, 
we began by selecting topics and then enlisted experts to reflect on them. 
It was no easy task limiting a discussion of the future to just a dozen 
areas. We made our selections after vigorous debate, and our choices un-
doubtedly reflect our own backgrounds and interests, as well as our ex-
perience coteaching an undergraduate course on modeling choice across 
the academic disciplines. Morson, a literary critic and an influential 
commentator on Russian literature and thought, is the Frances Hooper 
Professor of the Arts and Humanities at Northwestern University. He 
is the author of ten books, including the award- winning Narrative and 
Freedom: The Shadows of Time. Schapiro is professor of economics and 
president of Northwestern University, after serving in a similar capacity 
at Williams College. The author or coauthor of five books and the co-
editor of two others, he is among the nation’s leading authorities on the 
economics of higher education, with particular expertise on trends in 
educational costs and student aid. Morson and Schapiro are members of 
the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
Part 1 of the volume deals with three of the basic aims of any soci-
ety: wealth, health, and happiness. Economic scenarios are considered by 
Robert J. Gordon, Stanley G. Harris Professor of the Social Sciences at 
Northwestern University, a macroeconomist with a particular interest in 
unemployment, inflation, and both the long- run and cyclical aspects of 
labor productivity. His textbook in intermediate macroeconomics, now 
in its twelfth edition, has educated generations of economics students. 
He is a distinguished fellow of the American Economic Association, 




Academy of Arts and Sciences. For more than three decades, he has 
served on the National Bureau of Economic Research’s Business Cycle 
Dating Committee, which determines the start and end dates for re-
cessions in the United States. His recent work on America’s declining 
economic prospects has provoked worldwide commentary.
Health prospects are discussed by Eileen M. Crimmins, AARP Pro-
fessor of Gerontology at the University of Southern California, where 
she directs the USC/UCLA Center on Biodemography and Population 
Health, a Demography of Aging Center supported by the National In-
stitute on Aging. Much of her work has focused on changes over time 
in health and mortality. She recently served as co- chair of a committee 
of the National Academy of Sciences on changes in life expectancy. She 
is a member of the Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of 
Sciences.
The section concludes with a chapter by Richard A. Easterlin, Uni-
versity Professor at the University of Southern California, who is widely 
recognized as one of the most influential and innovative economists of 
his generation. A distinguished fellow of the American Economic As-
sociation and a member of both the National Academy of Sciences and 
the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, he is past president of 
both the Population Association of America and the Economic History 
Association. He is perhaps best known for his work on the “Easterlin 
Paradox”— that is, that happiness at a national level does not in general 
increase with wealth. His topic is the course of individual satisfaction in 
the United States and abroad.
We turn in part 2 to politics, religion, and human rights. Discussing 
prospects for peace and war is Robert L. Gallucci, Distinguished Pro-
fessor in the Practice of Diplomacy at Georgetown University. He pre-
viously served as president of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur 
Foundation and as dean of Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh 
School of Foreign Service. His governmental service includes positions 
as both ambassador at large and special envoy for the U.S. Department 
of State. He was chief negotiator with North Korea under President 
Clinton. He is the author or coauthor of a number of publications on 
political- military issues, including Neither Peace Nor Honor: The Politics 
of American Military Policy in Vietnam and the award-winning book 




Writing about religion is Eboo Patel, founder and president of the In-
terfaith Youth Core and a key member of President Obama’s Inaugural 
Advisory Council on Faith- Based Neighborhood Partnerships. A Mus-
lim of Gujarati heritage and a former Rhodes Scholar, he has devoted his 
career to the cause of interfaith cooperation. His recent book is Sacred 
Ground: Pluralism, Prejudice, and the Promise of America.
The section concludes with a discussion of the future of civil liberties 
by Wendy Kaminer, a lawyer and social critic, who writes about law, 
liberty, feminism, religion, and popular culture. Her latest book is Worst 
Instincts: Cowardice, Conformity, and the ACLU. A former Guggenheim 
fellow and recipient of the Smith College Medal, she is the author of 
seven previous books, including Free for All: Defending Liberty in Amer-
ica Today and A Fearful Freedom: Women’s Flight from Equality. She is an 
ardent civil libertarian.
Part 3 deals with science, technology, and the environment. It be-
gins with an essay by Mark A. Ratner, one of the world’s preeminent 
theoretical chemists, who serves as Lawrence B. Dumas Distinguished 
University Professor at Northwestern. With his son Daniel Ratner, he is 
the author of Nanotechnology: A Gentle Introduction to the Next Big Idea 
and Nanotechnology and Homeland Security: New Weapons for New Wars. 
A member of the National Academy of Sciences, he is the recipient of 
the Irving Langmuir Award in Chemical Physics for outstanding inter-
disciplinary research in chemistry and physics.
The future of technology is the topic for John Kelly III, senior vice 
president and head of IBM Research, where he oversees three thousand 
scientists and technical employees at twelve laboratories in ten coun-
tries around the world. His top priorities are to stimulate innovation in 
key areas of information technology, to bring those innovations into the 
marketplace, and to create the new businesses of IBM’s future. He is a 
member of the National Academy of Engineering.
The section ends with a chapter by Mark R. Tercek and Jimmie Pow-
ell on the environmental future of the planet. Tercek is president and 
CEO of the Nature Conservancy, the world’s largest conservation or-
ganization with more than one million members and over $5 billion in 
assets. A former partner and managing director of Goldman Sachs, he is 
the coauthor of the best seller Nature’s Fortune: How Business and Society 




ship of nature is of the utmost importance to businesses, governments, 
and societies. Jimmie Powell is the team lead for Energy Strategies at the 
Nature Conservancy. Previously, he worked in several capacities during a 
twenty- year career with the United States Senate, concluding as the staff 
director of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, 
where he worked for its chairman, Senator John Chafee. After leaving 
the Senate, he served for two years as the executive director of the Pew 
Oceans Commission and was also a member of the board of directors of 
the League of Conservation Voters.
Part 4, the final part of the book, addresses education, communica-
tion, and society. We have assigned ourselves the task of discussing the 
future of higher education in the United States and the world.
Our chapter is followed by that of Arianna Huffington, who consid-
ers the changing face of media. She is the chair, president, and editor- 
in- chief of the Huffington Post Media Group, a nationally syndicated 
columnist, and the author of fourteen books, including biographies of 
Maria Callas and Pablo Picasso. In 2005 she launched the Huffington 
Post, a news and blog site that quickly became one of the most widely 
read, linked to, and frequently cited media brands on the Internet. In 
2012, the site won a Pulitzer Prize for national reporting.
Finally, Barry Glassner, professor of sociology and president of Lewis 
& Clark College, considers which of the usual societal worries are ac-
tually cause for alarm, which are not, and whether it is possible to tell 
the difference. He has written nine books on contemporary social issues, 
including the much-acclaimed best seller The Culture of Fear, in which 
he argues that many of Americans’ concerns and fears are largely un-
founded. His other books include The Gospel of Food and Bodies.
By design, the chapters are short and nontechnical enough that we 
see no reason as editors to provide extensive summaries. However, in 
the conclusion, we examine how the various predictions on widespread 
topics interrelate. How do they converge and diverge? And what do they 






















The Future of Economic Growth: 
Slowing to a Crawl
Robert J. Gordon
Stanley G. Harris Professor of the Social Sciences,  
Northwestern University
Fortune in 1955 forecast a fabulous future for the subsequent twenty- five 
years, and it was right. Real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita 
between 1955 and 1980 grew at 2.15 percent per year, enough for the 
standard of living to double in a mere thirty- two years. Americans have 
become used to a doubling of the standard of living every generation, but 
future growth will be much slower. Today’s American youth will struggle 
to achieve the standard of living of their parents.
Future Growth in the Context of  Three Industrial Revolutions
The gloomy forecast for the next twenty- five years— between 2015 
and 2040— recognizes that there is no law of history that economic 
growth must continue at a constant rate. There was virtually no eco-
nomic growth between the time of the Roman Empire and around 
1750, when peasants tilled their land with tools and equipment little 
different from Roman times. Over the past two and a half centuries, 
life has been utterly transformed by three industrial revolutions, and to 
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forecast out to the year 2040, we need to understand what these revo-
lutions contributed and where we now stand in the arc of the history of 
technological progress.
Economists conventionally distinguish among three industrial revo-
lutions. The first (IR1) began around 1780 and consisted of steam, cot-
ton spinning, railroads, and steamships. The second (IR2) began in 1875 
and included electricity, the internal combustion engine, running water 
and sewers, communication and entertainment, and the conquest of in-
fant mortality. The third (IR3) began in 1960 and included the impact 
of computers, electronics, and digitalization, often abbreviated “ICT” for 
information and communications technology. The first two revolutions 
required at least one hundred years for the subsidiary inventions that were 
made possible by the initial discoveries to become pervasive. The jury is 
still out on how long the benefits of IR3 will persist, and this question is 
at the heart of debates about the future state of technology in 2040.
The nineteenth century began with travel limited to the speed of the 
“hoof and sail,” whereas it ended with relatively rapid travel by train and 
steamships by 1900. More than a century after James Watt’s workable 
steam engine, invented in 1781, the effects of IR1 were still benefitting 
humankind. For instance, 85 percent of American railway mileage was 
built between 1860 and 1910.
IR2 was the most transformative of the industrial revolutions.  Within 
a few weeks in 1879 three of the most fundamental “general purpose 
technologies” were invented, later to spin off scores of world- changing 
inventions, including electric light and power, the internal combustion 
engine, and wireless transmission. Between 1890 and 1930 the Amer-
ican urban household became fully “networked,” replacing its previous 
isolation by five types of connections— electricity, gas, telephone, run-
ning water, and sewer pipes. Running water and sewers in turn con-
tributed not just to the first phase of female liberation but also to the 
conquest of infant mortality.
The third industrial revolution (IR3), involving everything about elec-
tronics, computers, and the digital age, has also been transformative, but 
along only one dimension compared to the multiple dimensions of IR2. 
The initial applications of the mainframe computer for bank statements, 
telephone bills, airline reservation systems, cash- dispensing automated 




terval 1960 to 1990. Then came the invention of the personal computer, 
email, the Internet, and e- commerce during the period from 1980 to 
2000. By 2000 the nature of office work had been transformed, and pa-
per catalogs at libraries, mail order vendors, and automotive parts de-
partments had disappeared, to be replaced by networked flat screens.
A simple piece of evidence demonstrates that IR2 was more important 
than IR3. Output per hour (labor productivity) grew at an annual rate of 
2.3 percent between 1890 and 1972, but it registered a lower growth rate 
of 1.6 percent during the four decades since 1972. This is our starting 
point for a prediction that future growth will be slower than in the past.
Innovation and the Headwinds
Will the American standard of living in 2040 double from that of 2015, 
or will the ratio of future to present rise by 50, 30, or perhaps only 10 
percent? The answer depends not only on the future pace of innovation 
but also on four “headwinds” that are currently in the process of slowing 
American economic growth— demography, education, inequality, and 
government debt.
The scope of this chapter is necessarily limited to the United States. 
Don’t other countries matter? The future of U.S. growth matters for 
everyone else because the United States has been the technological leader 
since 1875— other nations, such as China, may grow faster as they catch 
up to the standard of living that Americans have already achieved, but 
any faltering of growth at the U.S. frontier would diminish opportunities 
available for the rest of the world. Subsequently, we discuss the worrying 
possibility that by 2040 other nations may have already moved ahead of 
the United States, ending its long- standing position at the frontier of 
technology.
Future Innovation as Viewed from 1955 and 2015
Some economic historians scoff at the notion that it is possible to predict 
future innovations, but they are wrong. There are many historical prece-
dents of correct predictions made fifty or one hundred years in advance. 
Will these examples of accurate forecasting allow us a glimpse of eco-
nomic life in 2040?
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An early forecast of the future of technology is contained in Jules 
Verne’s 1863 manuscript Paris in the Twentieth Century, in which Verne 
made bold predictions about the Paris of 1960.1 In that early year, be-
fore Edison or Benz, Verne had already conceived of the basics of the 
twentieth century. He predicted rapid-transit cars running on overhead 
viaducts, motor cars with gas combustion engines, and streetlights con-
nected by underground wires.
Much of IR2 was not a surprise. Looking ahead in the year 1875, 
inventors were feverishly working on turning the telegraph into the tele-
phone, trying to harness electricity coming from batteries as the power 
source to create electric light, and trying to find a way of using the power 
of petroleum to create a lightweight and powerful internal combustion 
engine. The 1875 diaries of Edison, Bell, and Benz are full of such “we’re 
almost there” speculation. Some of the most important sources of human 
progress over the 1890– 1930 period were not new inventions at all, in-
cluding running water and sewer pipes.
A remarkable forecast was published in November 1900 in an un-
likely publication medium, the Ladies’ Home Journal.2 Some of the more 
interesting predictions in this 1900 article include the following:
• Hot and cold air will be turned on from spigots to regulate the 
temperature of the air just as we now turn on hot and cold water 
from spigots to regulate the temperature of the bath.
• Ready- cooked meals will be purchased from establishments much 
like our bakeries of today.
• Liquid- air refrigerators will keep large quantities of food fresh for 
long intervals.
• Photographs will be telegraphed from any distance. If there is a 
battle in China a century hence, photographs of the events will be 
published in newspapers an hour later.
• Automobiles will be cheaper than horses are today. Farmers 
will own automobile hay- wagons, automobile truck- wagons . . . 
automobiles will have been substituted for every horse- vehicle 
now known.
• Wireless telephone and telegraph circuits will span the world. We 
will be able to telephone to China just as readily as we can now 




The Jules Verne 1863 and the Ladies’ Home Journal 1900 visions of 
future technological progress were true leaps of imagination. Somewhat 
less challenging were predictions of the future made at the 1939– 40 
New York World’s Fair. By 1939– 40, IR2 was almost complete in ur-
ban America, so it is no surprise that the exhibits at the fair could pre-
dict quite accurately the further complements to IR2 inventions, such 
as superhighways and air- conditioning, that came into fruition in the 
twenty- five- year period after 1940.
What was missing at the 1939– 40 New York World’s Fair was any 
vision of the computer revolution that created IR3. But Norbert Wiener, 
a visionary, in a 1949 essay that was ultimately rejected by the New York 
Times, got a lot of the future of IR3 right. Among his 1949 predictions:
These new machines have a great capacity for upsetting the 
present basis of industry, and of reducing the economic value 
of the routine factory employee to a point at which he is not 
worth hiring at any price. . . . If we move in the direction of 
making machines which learn and whose behavior is modified 
by experience, we must face the fact that every degree of inde-
pendence we give the machine is a degree of possible defiance 
of our wishes. The genie in the bottle will not willingly go back 
in the bottle, nor have we any reason to expect them to be well- 
disposed to us.3
Just as some future inventions have been a surprise, other anticipated 
inventions never came to pass. The cartoon Jetsons’ vertical commuting 
car/plane never happened, and in fact high fuel costs caused many lo-
cal helicopter short- haul aviation companies to shut down in the early 
1970s. In the famous quip of Peter Theil, “we wanted flying cars, and 
they gave us 140 characters.”4
Just as it was easy for visitors to the 1939 World’s Fair to foresee the 
future, so it was to the contributors to the Fortune forecasts of 1955. By 
then the adoption of modern home appliances and air- conditioning was 
far along and could easily be predicted to become pervasive. Limited- 
access highways, such as the Pennsylvania Turnpike and Merritt Park-
way, had been started before World War II, and so it was easy to forecast 
in 1955 that the interstate highway system was just over the horizon, 
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making possible travel from coast to coast without encountering a traffic 
light. Transcontinental nonstop piston aircraft flights had been intro-
duced in 1953 and the first (British) commercial jet airliner in 1954, and 
so the future of commercial air transport was easy to foresee. Network 
live television was already in most living rooms, and color TV had al-
ready been invented, as had antibiotics.
Important for our forecasting challenge is to reflect on those aspects of 
future growth that could not have been correctly predicted in 1955. One 
involves innovation— in the primitive early years of mainframe comput-
ers, it was difficult to foresee much if any of the computer revolution that 
would by 1980 bring us electronic terminals and personal computers.
Several other “misses” for 1955 forecasters involved concepts that com-
prise today’s “headwinds.” In that year the fertility rate was near its post-
war peak of 3.7, and it was hard to foresee that soon the birth rate would 
plummet as women moved from housework to market work. That influx 
of women raised hours per capita and allowed real gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita to rise faster than productivity. Also, 1955 marks the 
peak of income equality, with the income share of the top 1 percent of 
the population at its lowest point of the twentieth century. It was hard 
to foresee the inexorable rise of inequality that began in the late 1970s.
What Has Been Achieved in the Past Forty Years?
Thus far we have concluded that the electronic IR3 has been less im-
portant than IR2, as measured by productivity growth of 2.3 percent per 
year before 1972 and just 1.6 percent since 1972. Put another way, the 
level of productivity has increased by a factor of twelve since 1891, and 
of that a factor of nine had already been achieved by 1972.
While my basic growth forecast assumes that innovation will perco-
late along in the next twenty- five years as in the last forty, caution is war-
ranted. It just might be that the most fruitful applications of ICT tech-
nology and digitalization have already occurred. In 1970 the electronic 
calculator had just been invented, but the computer terminal was still 
in the future. Starting from this world of 1970, by the year 2000 every 
office was equipped with a web- linked personal computer that could do 
word- processing and spreadsheet calculations and gather information 




productivity of office employees closely resembles that of a decade ago, 
with little further improvement since then.
The scope of the electronic IR3 over the past forty years sets a hurdle 
for the next twenty- five years that is dauntingly high. The list of achieve-
ments extends outside the office as well and includes the following:
• Bar code scanning, ATM banking, cable and satellite TV
• Internet, email, web browsing, e- commerce
• Google, Amazon, Wikipedia, LinkedIn, Facebook
• Mobile phones, smartphones, iPads
• CDs, DVDs, iTunes, Netflix, movie streaming
• Airline reservation systems, supply- chain monitoring systems,  
electronic library catalogs
The Future of Innovation
The big question is: how important will innovations be over the next 
twenty- five years and how much will they impact future growth in pro-
ductivity and the standard of living? Future advances that are widely 
anticipated can be grouped into four main categories— (1) medical and 
pharmaceutical advances, (2) small robots, artificial intelligence, and 3- D 
printing, (3) big data, and (4) driverless cars. It is worth examining the 
potential of each of these categories of future innovation.
Medical and Pharmaceutical Advances
Future advances in medicine related to the genome have already proved 
to be disappointing. The most important sources of higher life expectan-
cy were achieved in the first half of the twentieth century, when infant 
mortality was conquered by the discovery of the germ theory of disease, 
the development of antitoxins for diphtheria, and the near elimination 
of air- and waterborne diseases through the construction of urban sani-
tation infrastructure.5
Many of the current basic tools of modern medicine were developed 
between 1940 and 1980, including antibiotics, heart procedures, chemo-
therapy, and radiation. The current status of science in medical treatment 
and pharmaceutical advance is well described by Jan Vijg.6 Progress on 
physical disease and ailments is progressing faster than on mental dis-
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ease, so that we can look forward by 2040 to an exponential rise in the 
burden of taking care of elderly Americans who are physically alive but 
in a state of mental dementia. Pharmaceutical research has reached a 
brick wall of rapidly increasing costs and declining benefits.
Small Robots, Artificial Intelligence, and 3- D Printing
The lack of multitasking ability is a current defect of robots. No current 
robot can drive the UPS truck, choose the correct package, and run up 
to your front porch, knowing exactly where to leave it. Surely multiple- 
function robots will be developed, but it will be a long and gradual pro-
cess before robots outside of the manufacturing and wholesaling sectors 
become a significant factor in replacing human jobs.
Most jobs are not going to be replaced by robots anytime soon, or even 
in 2040. Supermarket shelves are still stocked by hand, and although 
self- checkout has been offered in some areas, it has not been widely em-
braced by consumers. There will be little replacement by robots of the 
vast majority of jobs in the service sector, including waiters, bartenders, 
cooks, cashiers, pedicurists, barbers, educators, nurses, doctors, dentists, 
janitors, TV anchors and producers, and many more.
3- D printing is another revolution described by the techno- optimists, 
but its potential impact is limited. Recent reports suggest that 3- D 
printing is best suited for one- off customized products. 3- D printing 
represents custom production rather than mass production, and thus it 
retreats from the economies of scale and efficiency of Henry Ford’s 1913 
assembly line. Doubtless it will raise productivity in design labs that cre-
ate models of new products, but it has less potential to raise economy- 
wide productivity growth.
Big Data
Optimists about future progress often point to the exponential explo-
sion of digital data. What is lost by the enthusiasts for big data is that 
most of it is a zero- sum game because the vast majority of big data is 
being analyzed within large corporations for marketing purposes. The 
Economist reported recently that corporate information technology 
(IT) expenditures for marketing purposes were increasing at three times 
the rate of other IT expenditures. The marketing wizards use big data 




from one category to another, and why they move from merchant to 
merchant.
The quantity of electronic data has been rising exponentially for de-
cades. But diminishing returns have set in. The sharp slowdown in pro-
ductivity growth in recent years has overlapped with the introduction 
of smartphones and iPads, which consume huge amounts of data. These 
sources of innovation have disappointed in what counts: their ability to 
boost output per hour in the American economy.
Driverless Cars
This category of future progress is demoted to last place because it offers 
benefits that are minor compared to the invention of the car itself, or 
the improvements in safety that have achieved a tenfold reduction in 
fatalities per vehicle- mile since 1950. The most important distinction is 
between cars and trucks. People are in cars to go from A to B, mainly 
for essential aspects of living such as commuting or shopping. Current 
drivers can already talk on the Bluetooth phone and listen to iPod music; 
only a minor increment in consumer surplus is provided by a driverless 
car that would allow passengers to surf the Web or watch movies. Driv-
erless trucks and taxis are likely to become common by 2040 but will be 
handicapped by the difficulty that robot designers have faced in building 
multitasking ability into robots, since most truck drivers and taxi drivers 
don’t just drive but also load and unload cargo and luggage.
The Headwinds Contribute to Slower Growth
The “headwinds” are an independent set of concerns about the future; they 
are like the biblical Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse, wrestling down 
the rate of growth no matter how inventive society may be in the future. 
Recall that growth in the standard of living equals growth in productivity 
plus the growth rate of hours worked per person. The first headwind con-
cerns the inexorable downward pressure on hours per capita that will cause 
future growth in the standard of living to fall short of productivity growth.
Headwind 1: Demography
Forecasters have long recognized that the retirement of the baby boom 
generation will reduce hours per capita. Whenever a person retires, he 
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or she remains in the population while making a transition from pos-
itive to zero hours of market work. But that is not all. Hours per em-
ployee have been pushed down in part by the dysfunctional traditional 
American medical care insurance system, which ties medical insurance 
to employment rather than providing it as a right of citizenship. Firms 
have forced employees into part- time status to avoid paying medical 
insurance costs.
A unique feature of the slow 2009– 2014 economic recovery has been 
the fact that the unemployment rate has been steadily improving (from 
10.0 percent in November 2009 to 5.7 percent in January 2015), while 
the participation rate has been declining as fast, so that there has been no 
improvement in the employment- to- population ratio. In fact, over the 
4.5 years of recovery between April 2010 and January 2015, that ratio 
barely budged from 58.7 to 59.3 percent, compared to its prior peaks of 
64.4 percent in 2000 and 63.0 percent in 2007.7 Because jobs have been 
so scarce, many job seekers have given up and have dropped out of the 
labor force, making the official unemployment rate an increasingly mis-
leading measure of labor market distress.
The decline in the participation rate involves more than just baby 
boomers’ retirement. The devastating effect of manufacturing plant 
closures throughout the Midwest is captured by remarks of the newly 
appointed British consul general in Chicago, who toured the Midwest 
during the autumn of 2013 in the first three months of a four- year 
term. Asked for impressions of his travels, he said that “what surprised 
me most was the utter devastation and decay of the former one- factory 
small and middle- sized manufacturing towns.”8 Often people cannot 
move due to family ties or financial restrictions, and so they stay in 
the town with no jobs, and if they are lucky they will qualify for Social 
Security disability.
Headwind 2: Education
Since Edward Denison’s first attempt in 1962, experts on economic 
growth have recognized the role of increasing educational attainment 
as a primary source of growth.9 Goldin and Katz in 2008 estimated that 
educational attainment increased by 0.8 years per decade over the eight 
decades between 1890 and 1970.10




to secondary education and the other relevant for higher education. The 
surge in high school graduation rates— from less than 10 percent of 
youth in 1900 to 80 percent by 1970— was a central driver of twentieth- 
century economic growth. But the percentage of eighteen- year- olds re-
ceiving bona fide high school diplomas had fallen to 74 percent by 2000, 
according to James Heckman.11 The United States currently ranks elev-
enth among the developed nations in high school graduation rates and is 
the only country in which the graduation rates of those aged twenty- five 
through thirty- four is no higher than those aged fifty- five through sixty- 
four.12 The role of education in holding back future economic growth is 
evident in the poor quality of educational outcomes at the secondary 
level. The international PISA tests of fifteen- year- olds in 2013 rated the 
United States as ranked seventeenth in reading, twentieth in science, and 
twenty- seventh in math.13
At the college level, long- standing problems of quality are joined with 
the newer issues of affordability and student debt. In most of the post– 
World War II period, a low- cost college education was within reach of a 
larger fraction of the population of the United States than in any other 
nation, thanks to free college education made possible by the GI Bill, 
and also minimal tuition for in- state students at state public universities 
and junior colleges. The United States led the world during most of the 
last century in the percentage of youth completing college. The percent-
age of twenty- five- year- olds who have earned a B.A. degree from a four- 
year college in the United States has inched up in the past fifteen years 
from 25 to 30 percent, but that percentage is now ranked twelfth among 
developed nations.14
Even when account is taken of the discounts from full tuition made 
possible by scholarships and fellowships, the current level of American 
college completion has been made possible only by a dramatic rise in 
student borrowing. Americans owe $1 trillion in college debt. While 
a four- year college degree still pays off in a much higher income and 
lower risk of unemployment than for high school graduates, still about 
one- quarter of college graduates will not obtain a college- level job in the 
first few years after graduation, leaving them to face their future as an 
indebted taxicab driver or barista.
To place the historic contribution of education to economic growth 
in perspective, Goldin and Katz have calculated that during most of the 
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twentieth century, education’s contribution to economic growth was 
around 0.35 percent per year. Estimates by Harvard’s Dale Jorgenson 
suggest that education’s growth contribution will decline by 0.27 percent 
in the future as compared to the past.15
Headwind 3: Inequality
What matters for most Americans is not average growth in real GDP 
per capita but the growth rate in the portion available to the bottom 99 
percent of the income distribution. The Berkeley website of Emmanuel 
Saez reports that between 1993 and 2013, the average growth rate of real 
income for the bottom 99 percent of the income distribution was 0.35 
percent slower than for the average of all real income.16 Another indica-
tor of the sharp divide between median and average real income growth 
is provided in the U.S. Census series on median real household income. 
Expressed in 2011 dollars, median real household income in 2012 was 
$52,100, below the 1998 level of $53,700.17 Real income growth in mid-
dle America has already reached zero.
Will inequality continue to increase until 2040? Holding down wages 
is an explicit corporate strategy at retail firms like Walmart, which hires 
only temporary workers to fill job openings and forces many of its work-
ers onto part- time shifts.18 The Caterpillar corporation has become 
the poster child of rising inequality. It has broken strikes to enforce a 
two- tier wage system in which new hires are paid half of what existing 
workers make, even though both groups are members of the same labor 
union. In contrast, there was an 80 percent increase over two years in the 
compensation of Caterpillar’s CEO, whose quoted mantra is “We can 
never make enough profit.”19
Similarly, Boeing has threatened to move the manufacturing of its 
latest 777- X model from the unionized Seattle area to some other low- 
wage location. Only after facing an explicit threat that their jobs would 
be eliminated, members of Boeing’s union in the Seattle area reluctantly 
agreed to a new contract that offers virtually no increases in real wages 
over the indefinite future as well as reductions in medical and pension 
benefit contributions.
The future of inequality is closely linked to the social breakdown in 
the bottom one- third of the income distribution, as family breakups 




household. Charles Murray’s Coming Apart (2011) carefully documents 
the decline of every relevant social indicator for the bottom third of the 
white U.S. population, which he calls “Fishtown.”20
The Murray charts uniformly cover the five- decade interval from 
1960 to 2010 and exhibit a consistent record of social breakdown and 
decay. The most devastating statistic of all is that in Fishtown for moth-
ers age forty, the percentage of children living with both biological par-
ents declined from 95 percent in 1960 to 34 percent in 2010. Children 
living in a single- parent family, usually with the mother as the head of 
household, are more likely to suffer from poverty and are more likely to 
drop out of high school.
The steady rise in the inequality of the American income distribution 
shows no sign of ending. Many of the new jobs created during the recent 
economic recovery have been low- paying jobs, often part- time. The push 
by employers to force employees into part- time jobs is accentuated by 
the increasing burden of medical insurance. Other countries avoid the 
destructive effect of rising medical care costs on insurance premiums 
and indirectly on job creation by making medical care coverage a right of 
citizenship paid for by a value- added tax that no one can avoid.
The rise of inequality shifts the forecasting task from a prediction of 
average income per capita in 2040 to the average income of the bottom 
99 percent of the income distribution. Continuing trends of wealth ac-
cumulation at the top, a wage squeeze for the rest, and continuing pres-
sure for shorter hours, lower benefits, and reduced pension plans all sug-
gest that the rise of inequality will continue. Between 1993 and 2013 the 
growth of real income in the bottom 99 percent has been 0.35 percent 
per year slower than for the nationwide average. The growth of the “great 
divide” may even accelerate as the result of millions of fatherless children 
being unable to complete high school or make the transition to college.
Headwind 4: Repaying Debt
The future covered by these forecasts over the next twenty- five years 
includes the need to stop the rise of indebtedness of government at the 
federal, state, and local levels. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
projects that trouble lies ahead beyond 2020. An inexorably rising debt- 
to- GDP ratio will be caused by the exploding costs of Medicare and 
Social Security. Many states also face large unfunded pension liabilities. 
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This is the fourth headwind, the near inevitability that over the next sev-
eral decades taxes will rise faster and transfer payments rise more slowly 
than in the past. I estimate that the disposable income of the bottom 99 
percent of the income distribution will decline by 0.2 percentage points 
per year relative to the before- taxes- transfers income of the same group.
Conclusion: Economic Life in 2040
When the post- 1972 decline of innovation is combined with the four 
headwinds, the implication of this chapter is that future growth in the 
real disposable income of the bottom 99 percent of the income dis-
tribution between 2015 and 2040 will be about 0.2 percent per year, 
as compared to 2.0 percent in the 116 years before 2007. In 2040 the 
United States will be a more stratified society than today, with greater 
wealth among the top 1 percent and lower relative incomes and wealth 
for the bottom 99 percent. This implies that the standard of living of the 
bottom 99 percent will stagnate, rising by only 5 percent cumulatively 
over twenty- five years instead of the 64 percent cumulative increase that 
would have been made possible by a hypothetical future growth rate of 
2.0 percent, the historical pre- 2007 average.
There will be many new innovations, and the easiest to predict are a 
continuation of miniaturization made possible by advances in semicon-
ductor technology. By 2040 our automobiles may contain hundreds of 
tiny computer devices instead of twenty to thirty on a current vehicle. 
There will be many sensors throughout our houses, and possibly robot-
like vacuum cleaners. Home temperature and burglar alarm status will 
also be remotely viewable, including whether the dogs are sleeping or 
awake. Ever more sophisticated and inexpensive robots will replace hu-
man workers, especially in manufacturing and the wholesale sector, and 
robotic snowblowers may clear our driveways while we remain warm 
inside. Medical diagnosis equipment may become so much cheaper that 
doctors can administer computed tomography (CT) scans in their of-
fices just as dentists can now create crowns on automatic computer- 
driven milling machines in their offices. Human- driven taxicabs may be 
partly replaced by driverless taxis summoned by smartphone.
Compared to the great leaps forward in the century before 1972, the 




twenty- five years to 1990, our life is very similar with the exception of 
web- and smartphone- related inventions. Our houses have been net-
worked since the 1920s, except for the recent additions of cable TV and 
Internet. There have been no important new kitchen inventions since 
the microwave. We drive to work and shop using the same local streets 
and expressways as we did twenty- five years ago, and it is unlikely that 
this aspect of daily life will differ much in 2040. Improvements have 
mainly taken the form of more variety— more organic produce, more 
TV channels, more sports and movies, the vast variety of facts and in-
formation available on the Internet, and the alternative of e- commerce 
to traditional brick- and- mortar stores or mail- order catalogs with items 
ordered by phone.
Our retrospective on the 1955 Fortune predictions highlights the fact 
that technology was easier to forecast back then than demography, edu-
cation, or inequality. The same may be true on the road to 2040. By 2040 
the baby boomers will all have retired, reducing downward pressure on 
hours per capita. Some of the decline of the labor force due to giving up 
and dropping out may turn around. But the blight of children growing 
up in fatherless homes will erode U.S. academic performance at both the 
high school and college level, and the dream of college attainment will 
become ever more elusive as the inexorable machine of college cost infla-
tion and exploding student debt continues. A vicious spiral of downward 
mobility, due to the interaction of college debt, delayed household for-
mation and childbirth, and declining population growth, could further 
the economic and social decline of the bottom 99 percent relative to 
other nations.
This leaves the last and most difficult questions about 2040. Will the 
United States by then have lost its position as the nation with the high-
est per capita real GDP?21 By that year nations ranking high on in-
ternational tests of student achievement and with more social equality, 
which allows all students to complete college instead of only a minority 
as in the United States, may well have caught up and surpassed the U.S. 
standard of living. Leading candidates are South Korea and the Nordic 
countries, and perhaps even Canada. The current socioeconomic decay of 
the United States would be hard to turn around even with a benevolent 
dictator carrying out the most effective policies that emerge from aca-
demic research. The current paralysis of the U.S. political system suggests 
20 robert j. gordoN
 
MORSON&SCHAPIRO_P4_20
that any such set of reforms may lie too far in the future to boost the U.S. 
standard of living by the year 2040.
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Longer and Healthier Lives?
Eileen M. Crimmins
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at the University of Southern California
We can say with confidence that American health and life expectancy 
are likely to improve somewhat over the coming decades; but we can also 
be confident that there will be no tremendous breakthroughs leading to 
dramatically extended lives during this period or in the number of years 
people will live in good health. We can also safely predict that the United 
States is unlikely to regain the relative prominence it held at the middle 
of the twentieth century among the world leaders in life expectancy and 
other health indicators.
The twenty- five years between 2015 and 2040 are a period where we 
should focus on increasing the length of our healthy life; however, there 
are a number of disquieting trends in the United States that indicate 
accomplishing such a goal will require concerted effort. In fact, current 
trends suggest that changes in individual behavior and social policy will 
be needed to address the American “health problem.” Otherwise, we 
are likely to have a difficult time maintaining even the current length of 
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Life Expectancy Increase in Recent Decades
The increase in human life expectancy was probably the greatest ac-
complishment of the twentieth century— almost doubling in the Unit-
ed States, from around forty to seventy- eight years. This increase was 
accomplished by initially increasing the likelihood that children born 
would survive to old age and, only more recently, that people who survive 
to old age will survive to very old age.
Demographers routinely project life expectancy and disability seventy 
years ahead, so the twenty- five- year focus of this book is a relatively short 
demographic projection about which one can be relatively confident. We 
do not expect the coming decades to be like the mid- twentieth- century 
period when the earlier version of this book was written— a time of 
impressive increases in longevity and health. Instead, we can expect to 
add only a couple of additional years of life expectancy in the next few 
decades, but not more than that. While there are researchers who be-
lieve that life expectancy for those born now can reach one hundred (see 
Christensen et al., for example),1 my view is that this is highly unlikely 
to occur even a century into the future. The only way this extreme life 
expectancy can be achieved is by almost entirely eliminating any deaths 
before age one hundred, which is unlikely for a number of reasons: at 
present only a small percentage of people live to become centenarians; 
the speed of decline in mortality that would be required to produce such 
increases in life expectancy at older ages has never been experienced; the 
trends in recent decades do not indicate that such a decline in mortality 
is currently happening; and there is no scientific advance on the imme-
diate horizon that could result in such dramatic change in the next few 
decades. Therefore, I expect any increase in life expectancy to be modest 
in the years leading up to 2040.
U.S. Life Expectancy Trends in International Perspective
Trends over thirty years in life expectancy at birth— from 1980 to 
2010— in the United States are shown in figure 2.1 for males and figure 
2.2 for females. There have been relatively modest but continuous in-
creases for men, but only very slow increases for women, including years 




Figure 2.1. Life expectancy at birth, trends for U.S. males relative  
to 21 other OECD countries
Figure 2.2. Life expectancy at birth, trends for U.S. females relative  
to 21 other OECD countries
Each dot represents life expectancy in one country among those in the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The large circles represent the 
United States. The rest represent Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and West Germany.
Source: E. M. Crimmins, S. H. Preston, and B. Cohen, eds., Explaining Divergent Levels of Longev-
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women relative to men is reason for some concern, but it is the trends in 
the United States relative to other countries that raise the most serious 
issues among Americans about both our current health situation and the 
outlook for the future. As indicated in the two figures, the relative rank 
of U.S. life expectancy has dropped markedly. The United States has fall-
en well behind leaders such as Japan, Australia, France, and Italy, and to-
day the United States has levels of life expectancy similar to the eastern 
European countries. These differences between the United States and 
other countries were first clarified in a National Research Council report 
that focused on the population age fifty years old and older.2 Addition-
al work focusing on the relative health of those younger than age fifty 
found that the United States fared even more poorly at younger ages.3 In 
a comparison of the ranking of mortality at each age among seventeen 
peer countries, the United States ranks worst or second to worst at every 
age up to seventy- five. As indicated in figure 2.3, only at the oldest ages 
do Americans compare relatively well.
This poor performance in life expectancy for the United States is due 
to a set of wide- ranging causes. Some of these causes are clearly rooted 
in social or political values. For example, it is not surprising that violent 
deaths— particularly those involving firearms— are a significant cause of 
international differences at younger ages. But deaths from transporta-
tion accidents are also an important cause of international differences. 
The reasons behind high levels of transportation- related mortality are 
not immediately obvious. More miles are driven in the United States 
than in most peer countries, particularly by teenagers; affluence may be 
the reason teenagers drive more, but the relative lack of availability of 
public transportation may also be a factor. In turn, the availability of 
public transportation may be linked to the particular geography of the 
country. Deaths from automobile accidents may also be related to the 
level of drinking alcoholic beverages, particularly among the young, and 
the level of enforcement of laws against drinking and driving. Then there 
are additional deaths from drug usage, infant mortality, and maternal 
mortality. All of these factors differ across countries. In sum, the causes 
of lower life expectancy and higher mortality in the United States before 
old age are wide ranging.




tes, account for most of the difference in life expectancy beyond middle 
age between Americans and people in other countries. Americans have 
smoked more in the past on average than people in other countries; they 
are more likely to be obese than people in most countries; and they may 
be more likely to be sedentary than people in other countries. Americans 
reach old age with more risk factors for cardiovascular disease than peo-
ple in Europe and elsewhere, and they have higher mortality.
The United States is the only one of the peer countries examined in 
these studies without universal health insurance, so Americans, particu-
larly those younger than age sixty- five, are more likely to be without 
a regular source of health care than people in other countries. Recent 
Figure 2.3. Ranking of U.S. mortality rates at each age among  
17 peer countries, 2006– 2008
Rank of mortality rate of the United States compared to 16 other countries; 17 indicates 
the highest mortality rate at a given age and 1 the lowest mortality rate. Countries include 
the United States, Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom.
Source: S. H. Woolf and L. Aron, eds., U.S. Health in International Perspective: Shorter Lives, Poorer 
Health (Washington, D.C.: National Research Council, National Academies Press, 2013).
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changes in the availability of health insurance may reduce the role of this 
factor in causing differences between the United States and other coun-
tries, but the reasons underlying these health differences are only partly 
related to differences in health care.
Differentials within the United States
It is useful to consider differences within the United States as well as 
differences between the United States and other countries. The Unit-
ed States has long had differentials by socioeconomic status in average 
length of life and in most health indicators. People who are wealthier or 
who have more education live longer on average, and that difference has 
been growing over time as increases in life expectancy are increasingly 
concentrated among those with the highest education. Between 1990 
and 2008 life expectancy among women with less than a high school 
education actually declined by about five years.4 It is also true that a large 
number of U.S. counties, primarily in the South, experienced declining 
life expectancy among women over the twenty- five- year period from 
1985 to 2010.5
Declines in life expectancy are certainly not something that we ever 
expected to observe. So while our overall progress has been modest, our 
disparities have been growing. Relative to Europe, socioeconomic differ-
ences in health appear to be wider in the United States. However, it is 
important to note that these differences are not the reason Americans 
are less healthy than Europeans: even nonminority Americans with rela-
tively high education do poorly relative to their European counterparts.6
Diseases and Conditions Causing Health Problems
One of the reasons that we can be fairly confident about only modest life 
extension in the relative short term is that the United States and other 
high- income countries are now places where people die of chronic dis-
eases, the course of which are many decades long. Many of these diseases 
have their roots in earlier life circumstances and lifestyles. In the 1955 
edition of The Fabulous Future, likely cures for polio and tuberculosis 
were predicted. The source of these optimistic projections was the science 




infectious diseases that took place after World War II. These successes 
gave us great confidence that we could do the same for other diseases 
and conditions. After we developed the antibiotics to virtually elimi-
nate deaths from infection, deaths became most likely the result of heart 
disease or cancer. Assuming our ability to cure diseases would continue, 
we began “wars” on heart disease and cancer in the 1960s. As with other 
wars undertaken during this time period, these have neither been won 
nor totally lost. They have been long, drawn- out campaigns with some 
successes obtained at great cost.
Reducing mortality from heart disease has been our greatest success 
story of the last half of the twentieth century. Heart disease death rates 
have tumbled; they are now only about 50 percent of what they were 
in 1950. We did not accomplish this reduction in mortality the way we 
expected, by understanding the causes of heart disease and eliminating 
it from our population, as we had with most infectious diseases. Rather, 
our success has been due to some combination of improved behaviors, 
such as a reduction in smoking and fat consumption, and better medi-
cal and pharmaceutical interventions. We have also probably received a 
largely unrecognized benefit from the long- term development of health-
ier and stronger bodies, reflecting the long- term decline in infectious 
illnesses and better nutrition over the human life cycle. These two factors 
have resulted in people reaching older age with less organ damage.
We have been successful in preventing the progression of heart disease 
to disability and death among people who have it, but we have done little 
to prevent the onset of heart disease. In fact, the number of people with 
heart disease has been increasing over time. If we look at the numbers of 
people with risk factors for heart disease— diagnosed hypertension, high 
cholesterol, overweight— we also see increases in recent decades. How-
ever, we have had some successes, particularly after people have been 
diagnosed with hypertension and cholesterol risks, as they have experi-
enced impressive increases over time in treatment and control. The use 
of prescription drugs has markedly reduced the number of people who 
have uncontrolled hypertension and high cholesterol. It is likely that the 
use of these drugs has also resulted in a reduction in the mortality risks 
associated with obesity.
While we began a war on cancer at the same time we began our at-
tempt to put a man on the moon, it was more than twenty years after 
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men walked on the moon in 1969 that we began to see some decline in 
overall cancer death rates. However, we had some interim successes, par-
ticularly in childhood cancers. In the twenty- first century we have seen 
some reduction in cancer death rates, which has resulted from the earlier 
diagnosis occurring with increased screening and the development of 
multiple new approaches to treatment. Such success is based on scien-
tific foundations that are likely to continue and be the source of some 
improvement in life expectancy. Changes in behavior can also lead to 
reductions in cancer onset. Lung cancer rates are closely related to smok-
ing behavior, and they have declined with decreases in smoking. Reduc-
tions in the use of hormone replacement therapy have also resulted in 
some decrease in breast cancer incidence. It is hard to predict changes in 
cancer onset due to other environmental exposure, since causation is still 
not well understood.
Type II diabetes is a disease with worrisome trends; rates have been 
increasing for decades along with the increase in obesity. While survival 
rates for those with diabetes have risen, the increase in onset, especially 
at younger ages, has resulted from increases in obesity among young 
people. Obesity trends appear to have leveled off in the last few years, but 
we have never before had generations of people living with obesity for so 
many years before reaching the older ages. Mitigating this effect will be 
one of our major health challenges going forward.
What Do We Predict from the Joint Trends in Life Expectancy  
and Health?
In recent decades the concept of healthy life expectancy (expected years 
in good health) has joined that of life expectancy (total expected length of 
life) in evaluating health changes and policy. It is the combination of rates 
of onset and recovery from disease and disability, along with mortality 
among the sick and disabled and those free of such conditions, that de-
termines the average length of healthy life. Empirical evidence indicates 
that since 1980 we have managed to increase the length of life without 
severe disability enough that it has exceeded the increase in overall life ex-
pectancy.7 That is extremely good news. However, the bad news is that the 
length of life with disease has also increased, so that a greater proportion 





The outlook presented here is unfortunately rather negative. But giv-
en the current situation and recent trends, it seems realistic. We will 
be fortunate to continue to add even modestly to our current levels of 
life expectancy. It is a lot harder to increase life expectancy when, as is 
currently the case in the United States (and in many other developed 
countries), most people die in their eighties. Life expectancy was more 
easily increased in the twentieth century, when death rates for babies and 
children could be reduced.
It will be difficult to increase the relative length of healthy life expec-
tancy without some major changes in the incidence of chronic health 
problems. While survival among those with health problems is likely 
to improve somewhat as we learn to treat our current conditions better, 
the relatively poor status of younger persons makes it hard to project 
great improvements in health. The key toward increasing the length of 
healthy life is to improve health by delaying to older ages the onset of 
health problems, and this will require major behavioral changes as well 
as scientific advances.
Improving health and life expectancy does not rest simply on increas-
ing expenditures. If it did, there would be a plausible solution to in-
creasing years of healthy living. Presently, Americans spend about twice 
as much on health care as do people in peer countries that rank above 
the United States in life expectancy. It would be possible, perhaps, to 
improve health through a redistribution of some of this spending. Funds 
could improve health more if reallocated toward preventative care, men-
tal health, and greater access to care for those who do not have it. While 
the United States ranks first among nations in expenditures on health 
care, rankings on social service expenditures lag far behind. Some real-
location of funds from health care to social services might improve U.S. 
health by improving people’s well- being and levels of stress. Behavioral 
changes are also required for Americans to see improved health. Individ-
uals choose to eat more than they should, be less physically active, drink 
alcohol and then drive, possess firearms, and use illicit drugs and misuse 
prescription drugs. While people certainly have the right to do some of 
these things, there are social costs to having these rights. Understanding 
how to incentivize behavior to improve health may prove to be an even 
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more important source of progress over the next twenty-five years than 
either scientific discoveries or improving access to health care.
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University Professor, University of Southern California
In 2003 at a conference in Milan, Italy, I sat around a table with a half 
dozen leading scholars in the “economics of happiness.” The question 
came up: Does “happiness” have a future in economics? In the world? Of 
those assembled, I was the most pessimistic. Indeed, virtually everyone 
else thought happiness was going to blossom. That was only about ten 
years ago, and I have already been proven wrong. So here I am now writ-
ing about the outlook for happiness twenty- five years down the road, in 
2040. As far as my predictions go, I think you know what to expect.
In what way was I wrong? Well, in economics, happiness is now a 
recognized subject of study with its own category included in the Amer-
ican Economic Association’s Journal of Economic Literature classification 
system. And while there are few courses on happiness included in eco-
nomics curricula, publications on the subject by economists in the last 
few years numbered several hundred. On the world front, international 
agencies such as the United Nations and the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) are now promoting the collec-
I am grateful to Robson Morgan for help in the preparation of this manuscript and to 
the University of Southern California for financial support.
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tion of happiness data. The governments of the United Kingdom, France, 
the Netherlands, Italy, Poland, New Zealand, Australia, and Canada are 
considering or have started collecting official statistics on happiness. 
Even the United States has dipped a toe in the water. There is currently 
a National Research Council panel charged with determining whether 
research has advanced to a point that warrants the federal government 
initiating the collection of statistics on a subset of happiness data relating 
to momentary emotions. In The Fabulous Future of 1955, the subject of 
happiness is not even mentioned. And now it warrants a full chapter.
So here are the predictions for twenty- five years hence of a somewhat 
more positively minded student of the subject:
1. People will, on average, be happier than at present.
2. The reason for the increase in happiness will not be economic growth 
(though this almost certainly will continue); rather, it will be that many 
governments have recognized that full employment policies and a univer-
sal social safety net significantly increase people’s feelings of well- being.
My reasoning and some of the evidence on which it is based follow. But 
first, a few words about the concept of happiness.
Concept
“Happiness” as used here and in the social science literature more gen-
erally is the response to survey questions of the following type asked in 
the World Values Survey:
Taking all things together, would you say you are:
1 = Very happy; 2 = Quite happy; 3 = Not very happy;  
4 = Not at all happy
A closely related measure is “life satisfaction”:
All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a 
whole these days? Please use this card to help with your answer.




The distribution of responses on life satisfaction is similar to that on hap-
piness. The two measures are highly correlated and are commonly used 
interchangeably by analysts as indicative of “subjective well- being” (the 
rubric under which such measures fall).
Clearly in this survey approach, each individual responds based on his 
or her own notion of happiness, and these notions could conceivably differ 
widely among individuals. If one puts together the answers of a nationally 
representative sample of the American population and computes an “aver-
age” value of happiness, is the result meaningful?
There are two ways of answering this question. The first is by appeal to 
authority. In 2008 then- president Sarkozy of France appointed a twenty- 
five- member Commission on the Measurement of Economic Perfor-
mance and Social Progress to propose more meaningful measures of well- 
being than the traditional indicator, gross domestic product (GDP) per 
capita. The commission members were almost entirely economists, and 
their ranks included five Nobel Prize winners. The commission’s judg-
ment, based on a review of the literature that had accumulated on meas-
ures of subjective well- being, was as follows:
Research has shown that it is possible to collect meaningful and 
reliable data on subjective as well as objective well- being. . . . The 
types of questions that have proved their value within small- scale 
and unofficial surveys should be included in larger scale surveys 
undertaken by official statistical offices.1 [emphasis added]
This judgment is not a casual one. The commission members were from 
an economics cohort trained in the view that measures of one’s observ-
able external circumstances, especially income, are sufficient to assess 
well- being and that self- reports of feelings such as happiness should be 
summarily dismissed. The commission’s judgment in 2008 that personal 
statements about one’s feelings of well- being were meaningful represents 
a revolutionary change in the attitude of the economics discipline— a 
willingness to pay attention to what people say, not just observe what 
they do.
A second way to assess the meaningfulness of happiness responses is 
by considering what people report when asked what makes them happy. 
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Although conceivably the sources of happiness might be quite different 
among individuals, it turns out that the happiness of most people every-
where— in rich and poor countries, communist and noncommunist— 
depends mainly on the same set of concerns, such as material living 
conditions, family life, health, and work. When one thinks about it, 
this worldwide similarity in responses makes sense. The time of most 
people everywhere is spent chiefly on these concerns, and people tend 
to think they have some control over them; that is, that they can do 
something about their income, health, family circumstances, and job. 
It is this similarity among people in the underlying determinants of 
happiness that makes it meaningful to average the individual responses 
and to compare the changes in happiness over time and the differences 
among countries. This is not to say that individuals’ happiness can be 
compared on a person- to- person basis, but comparisons of groups are 
meaningful.
It is important to note that happiness as measured here is a state-
ment about “what is”; that is, how happy people say they are. It is not a 
statement about “what should be.” Until a half century ago, the subject 
of happiness was the province of philosophers who sought by deductive 
reasoning to identify what should make people happy, the “good life.” 
This approach resulted in numerous plausible but different concepts 
of happiness. The social science approach followed here relies not on 
such a priori judgments— what should be— but simply on what people 
personally report about their feelings of well- being— what is. Thus, the 
social science approach is describing what people say about their happi-
ness, not prescribing what they should do to be happy. Nor is the social 
science approach saying that people should pursue happiness. It is sim-
ply trying to find out how happy people are and what is responsible for 
these feelings. But if individuals or governments want to measure and 
pursue happiness, the findings of social science research should provide 
a useful guide.
Economic Growth and Happiness
Economic growth has been spreading throughout the world, particularly 
since around 1950, when marked increases in the growth rate of GDP 




of this chapter I suggested that economic growth does not in itself raise 
happiness. The evidence for this comes from comparing growth rates of 
GDP per capita, the common index of economic growth, with growth 
rates of happiness. If economic growth has a positive impact on happi-
ness, then one would expect that countries with a higher growth rate 
of GDP per capita would also typically have a greater improvement in 
happiness.
In fact, the evidence is that there is no statistically significant associ-
ation between the growth rates of GDP per capita and happiness. My 
colleagues at the University of Southern California and I have assembled 
data for thirty- seven countries worldwide.3 For each country the happi-
ness data are for the longest periods we could find, a minimum of twelve 
years but in most cases more— the average is twenty- two years. We com-
pared growth rates of GDP per capita and happiness, first for a group 
of seventeen developed countries, then for eleven countries of eastern 
Europe transitioning from socialism to capitalism, and finally for nine 
developing countries scattered across Asia, Latin America, and Africa. 
The pattern was the same in each of the three groups— countries with 
high rates of economic growth had, on average, no greater improvement 
in happiness than countries with low rates of economic growth. When 
we analyzed all thirty- seven countries together, there was still no asso-
ciation between economic growth and happiness. In short, for richer, 
poorer, and transition countries, whether pooled or analyzed separately, 
there is no time-series evidence that a higher rate of economic growth 
leads to a higher rate of improvement in happiness.
I have noted that we sought to analyze as long a time series as pos-
sible— at least twelve years but preferably more. The reason for this is 
that in the short run, as the economy goes up and down with recession 
and recovery, so too does happiness. The long- and short- run association 
between economic growth and happiness is illustrated schematically in 
figure 3.1. In the figure, the short- term ups and downs in GDP per cap-
ita are accompanied by corresponding movements in happiness— this is 
illustrated by the solid lines. But the long- term trend of GDP per capita 
is upward while that of happiness is flat— compare the broken lines. An-
alysts who study time series spanning periods of only a few years observe 
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Figure 3.1. Schematic Illustration of Short- Term Fluctuations and  
Long- Term Trends in Happiness and Gross Domestic Product Per Capita
Reasonably comparable time-series data on subjective well- being 
(SWB) in less- developed countries are in short supply. In Easterlin et 
al. (2010), the World Values Survey (WVS) was the principal source, 
and only nine less- developed countries were available with reasonably 
long time series data that were comparable across the years.5 Fortu-
nately, the annual Latinobarometer surveys, covering seventeen Latin 
American countries since 1994, provide a new and additional body of 
data on the experience of lower- income nations. The life satisfaction 
question in the Latinobarometer surveys changes too frequently to be 
used, but the question on one’s current economic situation is the same 
from 1994 to 2006: “How would you define, in general, the current 
economic situation of yourself and your family? Would you say that 
it is . . . 
1 = Very bad; 2 = Bad; 3 = Regular; 4 = Good; 5 = Very good”
One would expect that the responses to this question would be even 
more closely linked to economic growth than life satisfaction, because 




an increase would presumably lead directly to greater satisfaction with 
one’s economic situation. Hence, one might expect that countries with 
higher growth rates of GDP per capita would have greater increments in 
people’s satisfaction with their economic situation.
In fact, there is no evidence that a greater increase in satisfaction with 
one’s economic situation accompanies more rapid economic growth. As 
in the earlier analysis of WVS data, there is a nil relationship. The results 
from the Latinobarometer buttress those from the World Values Survey.
If there is any less- developed country where one would expect a pos-
itive impact of economic growth on SWB, it is China, whose growth 
since 1990 from an initially very low value has been at the highest 
rate ever recorded, a fourfold multiplication of real GDP per capita in 
two decades.6 Household appliances such as refrigerators and washing 
machines— quite rare in 1990— are now commonplace in urban areas. 
Color television sets currently average over one per household. By 2008, 
almost one in ten urban households owned a car and China had become 
the world’s leading automobile producer.
Yet, the combined evidence from six happiness surveys is that life 
satisfaction in China has not improved and, if anything, may have de-
clined somewhat.7 Life satisfaction appears to have followed a U- shaped 
trajectory, bottoming out in the first part of this millennium and then re-
covering by 2010 to a value somewhat short of its initial level. The result 
for China is similar to the previous findings for developed, developing, 
and transition countries— economic growth does not result in greater 
happiness.
Happiness, Employment, and a Social Safety Net
If economic growth does not increase happiness, what does? The answer 
suggested by the evidence is a high level of employment and a substantial 
social safety net. The evidence for this is of three types— first, previous 
findings reported in the literature; second, a comparison of European 
welfare states; and third, the experience of countries transitioning from 
socialism to capitalism.
There is extensive evidence in the happiness literature that unem-
ployment has a significant and sizable negative impact on SWB.8 This 
negative effect of unemployment is felt by employed as well as unem-
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ployed persons, presumably because of increased anxiety as coworkers 
are laid off, as reported by DiTella, MacCulloch, and Oswald (2001).9 
The policy implication is straightforward— full employment policies 
increase happiness.
The positive effect of safety net policies on happiness is suggested in 
another study by DiTella, MacCulloch, and Oswald (2003).10 In a mul-
tivariate analysis they find that among workers who are laid off those 
with greater unemployment insurance benefits are significantly happier. 
The political science literature on SWB also provides statistical support 
for the positive impact of safety net policies on SWB. Among devel-
oped countries, those with a more comprehensive social safety net are 
happier.11
In what follows, I present additional evidence on the positive re-
lation between happiness, on the one hand, and full employment and 
safety net policies, on the other, based on recent collaborative research 
(reported in Easterlin 2013).12 First, I compare two sets of European 
countries with the same GDP per capita but different socioeconomic 
policies to see whether there is any difference in happiness. Second, I 
examine the course of happiness in China and a European transition 
country (the former German Democratic Republic, or East Germany) 
in the period when employment and safety net policies were effectively 
abandoned.
European Welfare States
For simplicity, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland are grouped together here 
as “ultra welfare states” and France, Germany, Austria, and the United 
Kingdom as “semi welfare states.” In 2007, macroeconomic conditions— 
GDP per capita and rates of inflation and unemployment— in the two 
groups were virtually identical. Public policies in the ultra welfare states, 
however, were more generous and comprehensive than in the semi wel-
fare states. Although wide- ranging summary measures of such policies 
do not exist, there is a close approximation in the “benefit generosity 
indexes” created by political scientist Lyle Scruggs (2004), who, in turn, 
built on the earlier work of Gøsta Esping- Andersen (1990).13 Scruggs’s 
indexes take account of income replacement rates and the scope and 





Scruggs’s estimates indicate that the ultra welfare states are considera-
bly more generous than the semi welfare states in each of the three policy 
areas examined. This difference in public policies between the two sets 
of countries is reflected in people’s satisfaction with their lives. When 
asked about their satisfaction with various aspects of their lives, such as 
work, health, and family, respondents in the ultra welfare states said they 
were, on average, more satisfied in all three domains than those in the 
semi welfare states, and they also reported greater satisfaction with life 
in general.
The correspondence between the satisfaction and public policy dif-
ferences for the two sets of countries is consistent with the findings in 
the SWB literature that there is a causal connection running from full 
employment and safety net policies to happiness. But, as a check, we 
investigated whether people give any evidence that they are aware of 
and responsive to these policy differences. One indication is provided by 
respondents’ ratings of public services. On average, those in ultra welfare 
states gave consistently higher ratings of a wide range of public services: 
health, education, care of children and the elderly, and public pensions. 
They also consistently expressed greater trust in the political system. 
These survey results suggest that, in general, people are aware of and re-
sponsive to more generous economic and social policies and, because of 
these policies, are more satisfied with their lives. Although the ultra and 
semi welfare states have similar macroeconomic conditions, happiness 
is higher in the set of countries where socioeconomic policies are more 
generous and comprehensive.
Transition Countries
The second piece of new evidence that happiness is positively related to 
full employment and safety net policies comes from the experience of 
the transition countries. In countries moving from socialism to capital-
ism, there has been a substantial retreat from these policies. Hence one 
would expect an adverse impact on happiness, which is in fact what the 
evidence suggests.
Prior to the transition, the typical situation in these countries was 
one of full employment and a comprehensive social safety net. Here 
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China
Job rights have until very recently been firmly entrenched in 
urban China. . . . State- owned enterprises have . . . supplied exten-
sive welfare benefits, including housing, medical services, pen-
sions, childcare, and jobs for [grown] children. . . . Almost all state 
employees, and many in the larger collectives, have thus enjoyed 
an “iron rice bowl” . . . lifetime tenure of their job and a relatively 
high wage in the enterprise representing a “mini welfare state.”14
East Germany
Over the 40 years of its existence, the DDR [Deutsche 
Demokratische Republic (East Germany)] had developed as 
a completely different state from the BDR [Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland (West Germany)]. There was no unemployment, 
no (open) inflation, low work intensity, free medical services, 
[and] low prices for housing and public transport.15
Soviet Union
Before 1989, Russians lived in a country that provided eco-
nomic security: unemployment was virtually unknown, 
pensions were guaranteed and provided a standard of living 
perceived to be adequate, and macroeconomic instability did 
not much effect the average citizen.16
The similarity among these descriptions in three separate studies is 
striking— clearly full employment and a comprehensive safety net were 
the norm in these countries prior to the transition.
The movement from socialism to capitalism brought an end to full 
employment and the social safety net. Unemployment rates rose from 
near zero to two- digit levels. Safety net benefits, which were typically 
provided through state- owned enterprises, disappeared as workers lost 
jobs and/or shifted to private firms. The severity in China of the effects 
of this “restructuring” of the economy are suggested by the following 
quotations from a World Bank document:
By all measures, S.O.E. [state- owned enterprise] restructuring 




and the welfare of millions of urban workers. Most urban 
centers experienced a sharp rise in unemployment and a large 
reduction in labor force participation as many older and dis-
couraged workers left the labor force.17
S.O.E. restructuring . . . mark[ed] the end of the “iron rice 
bowl” of guaranteed lifetime employment and benefits for 
urban workers.18
As has been seen, life satisfaction in China over the last two dec-
ades remained constant or perhaps even declined, despite a more than 
fourfold multiplication of output and incomes. It seems reasonable to 
infer that with the emergence and rise of unemployment and breakdown 
of the social safety net, new concerns arose among workers about such 
things as jobs and income security, the availability of health care and 
pensions, and provision for care of children and the elderly. Rapid eco-
nomic growth may have partially alleviated these concerns by providing 
employment opportunities, but the net effect was no gain in happiness.
The survey data for East Germany, the former German Democratic 
Republic (GDR), provide specific evidence of the emergence of job and 
safety net concerns. The East German surveys ask about satisfaction not 
only with life in general but also about satisfaction with various aspects 
or domains of life, data not available for China.
Between June 1990 (just prior to the transition) and 2004, East Ger-
mans’ satisfaction increased with a number of material aspects of life 
(as shown in the following table, Positive Changes section). Particularly 
noteworthy is the marked increase in satisfaction with the environment 
and availability of goods. These are two features of life in the GDR that 
were often spoken of disparagingly by contemporary observers. All of 
the other material dimensions of life in the table also show at least mod-
est improvement.
Counterbalancing these improvements, however, are sizable decreases 
in satisfaction with health, work, and childcare (Negative Changes sec-
tion of the table). Prior to the transition, people were assured of jobs and 
substantial social support. With the retreat from full employment and 
a social safety net, concerns regarding these important aspects of life 
mounted, and satisfaction correspondingly declined. The outcome, as in 
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the case of China, was a negative impact on happiness, and there was no 
improvement in overall life satisfaction.
Satisfaction with various life domains,  
East Germany, 1990 and 2004 (scale 0– 10)
Domain 1990 2004 Change 1990 to 2004
Positive Changes
Environment 3.11 6.47 +3.36
Goods availability 3.16 6.20 +3.04
Dwelling 6.93 7.36 +0.43
Standard of living 6.34 6.63 +0.29
Household income 5.52 5.61 +0.09
Negative Changes
Health 6.62 6.20 - 0.42
Work 7.23 6.48 - 0.75
Childcare 7.54 6.48 - 1.06
Overall life satisfaction 6.57 6.55 - 0.02
Source: J. P. Haisken- DeNew and J. R. Frick, Desktop Companion to the German Socieo- Economic 
Panel (SOEP), Version 8.0 DIW (Berlin: German Institute for Economic Research, 2005).
The general conclusion is that full employment and safety net policies 
increase happiness. This is suggested, first, by prior studies in the happi-
ness literature. It is seen here in the comparison of two sets of European 
welfare states, where, controlling for GDP per capita, people in countries 
with more generous and comprehensive socioeconomic policies reported 
greater happiness, and give subjective evidence that it is such policies 
that are responsible for their happiness. Finally, it is evidenced in the ex-
perience of two transition countries examined here, China and the for-
mer GDR. Despite a marked difference in their output trajectories, the 
two countries exhibit a similar life satisfaction pattern of no long- term 
improvement, resulting from a common retreat from full employment 





Since the 1990s there has been a retreat from “welfare state” policies of 
the sort shown here to increase happiness. Why, then, would one predict 
a “happier world” twenty- five years hence?
The answer is premised on the growing interest in measures of hap-
piness among the general public and their governments and a faith that 
in the long run, advances in knowledge result in better government pol-
icies. As data on subjective well- being continue to accumulate, increas-
ingly under official auspices, awareness will grow of the findings already 
emerging in the scholarly literature on the relation between public policy 
and the improvement of happiness. In the leading welfare states these 
policies already have widespread public support,19 and the mounting 
demonstration of their value is almost certain to increasingly capture the 
attention of policy makers throughout the world. And, as governments 
respond to their constituents with appropriate public policies, there 
should emerge, in the course of time, a happier world.
And if this doesn’t come to pass? Well, I warned you of my record for 
prediction.
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The purpose of this brief chapter is to offer thoughts about what the 
world of international affairs will look like in twenty- five years. This has 
been tried before with mixed results, at best. Predictions about what’s 
in store for us seem to fail most often in one of two ways: they project 
current trends as continuing apace, producing, after a quarter century 
of evolution, an entirely new landscape which, in fact, never emerges; 
or they predict little change, based upon the apparent weight of current 
conditions, a welcome or regrettable stability to the international scene, 
which proves to be unimaginative in the wake of surprising, singular 
developments of major importance. Recognizing that philosophers have 
spent a good bit of time contemplating the implications of free will and 
determinism, it still seems as though we should be better at predicting 
the future, if we truly understood the present and how we got here.
Aside from being humbled by the task, then, what does this obser-
vation suggest about what would be most useful to include in this chap-
ter, to speculate about, recognizing how inaccurate a picture is likely to 
emerge? Perhaps the best that can be done is to first identify qualities of 
the current landscape that we expect to continue essentially unchanged, 
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then trends that we expect to continue, and to so change the scene in im-
portant, predictable ways, and finally those “black swans” that we know 
are out there and would have a hugely disruptive impact on the picture in 
the next twenty- five years, if they were actually to cross our path.
While we are at it, though, we should also be mindful of what sorts 
of developments it would pay us to know of in advance. Bad things, for 
example, we might want to try to prevent or mitigate, or, considering 
the consequences, figure out ways to adapt to, if they are in fact inevita-
ble. Knowing some of the characteristics of our situation in 2040 now 
could also create opportunities to take advantage of developments, not 
just guard against negative ones. So the plan is to note what is likely to 
stay the same in international politics, what we should expect to change 
slowly, what might really surprise us, and finally where our country is 
likely to fit into the picture that emerges. Clearly we may be humbled by 
the task, but we are not discouraged.
The System
The most fundamental, defining feature of the international system is 
that it is ungoverned. In twenty- five years, it will still be so. Called by 
some theorists a “self- help system” and by others a “state of nature,” a 
large number of mostly sovereign states will make up the international 
system in 2040, and they will have to look after their own security to 
ensure their survival.1 Virtually all states will continue to acquire weap-
ons to defend themselves and their interests from other states, and they 
will declare that they do so for self- defense. Since the first duty of the 
state will always be to provide for the security of its citizens, all this 
armament, increasingly sophisticated and lethal in so many hands, will 
continue to “make sense.” This, again, as long as there is no world gov-
ernment with an armed police force to provide security, which there will 
not be during the first half of the twenty- first century.
One may ask, if the use of force is going to continue to be one op-
tion states will be free to elect to achieve their goals, should we expect 
efforts at arms control, disarmament, and peaceful resolution of conflicts 
to inevitably fail? The answer is, of course, no. But the availability of the 
option to resort to military force will remain the key conditioning factor 




at achieving agreed limits on the development, deployment, or use of the 
weapons of warfare.
This realist, or even structural realist, view of the world will be seen 
by many as atavistic and not at all sensitive to trends in globalization, 
democratization, and the increasingly important role of nonstate actors, 
multinational corporations, and international institutions. Add here 
the emerging class of superwealthy global plutocrats— influential, even 
powerful in political and commercial areas but patriots of no nation in 
particular. Critics are more likely to see the international system in 2040 
defined by these relatively recent trends and not the actions of govern-
ments driven by the classic security dilemma. The middle ground be-
tween these divergent views of what will matter in the future is reached 
by recognizing that, in general, only in matters of vital interest to gov-
ernments should resort to military force be expected, and therefore it 
should not be a common occurrence.
Indeed, many of the interactions between people around the world 
will not involve governments at all, and when they do, government’s 
role may be limited to regulating and facilitating. And when the state’s 
interests are involved, the most salient measure of a government’s ability 
to achieve its objectives may be in what has been called its “soft power” 
assets.2 But that said, when the stakes are critical for a government, and 
the dispute sharp, it will be hard power, not soft, that antagonists will be 
measuring.
Warfare
Figuring out exactly how technology will impact the conduct of military 
operations when war does occur is no less challenging and arguably a 
lot more important than predictions in other areas of human endeavor. 
Anyone who has participated in war games with the American military 
lately will have been struck by at least two phenomena that will plausibly 
persist for decades to come.
The first is the continuing importance of traditional elements of mil-
itary strategy, such as logistics; mobility; lethality of weaponry; achiev-
ing air superiority; control of the seas; stabile deterrence at the strategic 
level; flexibility and resilience in command, control, and communication; 
maintaining awareness of events at the tactical and operational levels of 
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engagement; and the availability of intelligence from a variety of sources 
on the political and military activity of an adversary, usefully analyzed 
to support decision making. This has been true for centuries of modern 
warfare and will certainly remain so for the foreseeable future.
The second phenomenon is the way new technology, at critical mo-
ments, may create unexpected opportunities and vulnerabilities, particu-
larly for adversaries who lack all the traditional assets that are desirable in 
large, protracted engagements. Think particularly about cyber and space 
warfare. Indeed, we have been thinking about both for decades, but we 
have not truly integrated that thinking into our planning, partly for bu-
reaucratic reasons and partly because they present moving targets, hard 
to take account of. What is most disturbing about these technologies, as 
compared to other innovations, such as stealth and perhaps drones, for 
example, which create marginal and often temporary advantages, is that 
so much else in traditional military strategy depends on space and cy-
ber assets performing as expected. And if governments decide to protect 
these assets by deterrence rather than genuine defense, as they appear to 
be doing by default, they then risk “hardwiring” dramatic escalation into 
their planning, particularly against an adversary whose own planning is 
asymmetrically focused on attacking those assets. Another way to capture 
this situation is to appreciate, first, the relative weakness of an adversary 
who, in the midst of a conflict, has no choice but to attack America’s 
connective tissue; and second, the unwise decision on our part to promise 
crippling retaliation if so attacked, rather than to mount a defense. In 
other words, we are planning for disastrous escalation. This is not good.
Turning briefly to the causes of war, we should expect that the tra-
ditional sources of conflict between nations— that is, territorial acqui-
sition, religious and cultural differences sharpened by historical antago-
nisms, and desire for regional dominance, among other causes— will still 
provoke armed conflict. We should add, however, that a new, intensified 
competition for resources may lead to war as population growth adds to 
demand and the effects of climate change reduce supply. Freshwater is 
often identified as a likely resource over which people may fight in the 
future, but others, from food to minerals to energy, may push nations 
into conflicts as well.
Finally, if we were to live through the next twenty- five years without 




are other regions where “war is always possible,” such as the Middle 
East, Northeast Asia, or even between China and the United States, but 
South Asia is different. In political and military terms, there is greater 
risk because of unique conditions. The history of Hindu– Muslim hos-
tility, the circumstances of the creation of Pakistan, multiple wars, terri-
torial loss, intermittent military engagements, significant terrorist inci-
dents, and the simmering status of Kashmir set an unstable scene. With 
the Pakistani view of India as presenting a mortal threat to its existence, 
and an asymmetrical conventional force imbalance favoring India, Paki-
stan’s growing nuclear weapons capability makes not just war but nuclear 
war plausible. For many who witnessed the evolution of NATO nuclear 
strategy in the 1950s, intended to counter the Warsaw Pact’s perceived 
conventional advantage by the first use of “tactical nuclear weapons,” 
Pakistan’s declaratory policy today is eerily familiar and scary. The way 
out of this frame is through a change in the Pakistani view of India from 
its greatest threat to its best chance for economic development. But as 
long as the Pakistani military remain the dominant political force in that 
country, there will be little incentive to change the national narrative. 
This is a space to watch.
Power and Condition
We are inevitably attracted to two kinds of generalizations about the 
distribution of power in the international system: those that predict the 
decline of the United States and those that describe the latest rising 
power. In the past, these predictions have been more wrong than right. 
By most measures, the United States is still the greatest world power, 
and neither Japan nor Iran has risen as many expected some decades 
ago. That said, the United States is, in fact, declining, relative to a clearly 
rising China. If one were interested in the distribution of power in the 
future, beyond the question of who occupies the number one position, 
a simple characterization might be that Asia— from India to the Re-
public of Korea, to include China and Japan— will come to have more 
of the world’s wealth and productive capacity than Europe and North 
America combined. That will be a change. Sub- Saharan Africa, portions 
of South Asia, and Latin America will continue to claim the world’s 
poorest citizens, though their absolute level of poverty should not be as 
 
MORSON&SCHAPIRO_P4_54
54 robert l. gallUCCi
bad in the future as it has been in the past. Decades of effort in private 
sector investment as well as development assistance from governments, 
international organizations, and regional development banks aimed at 
improving infrastructure, health, and educational outcomes will contin-
ue to make a difference.
How exactly the shift to Asia is experienced in the West, and how 
dramatic it is, is yet to be determined. If India and China can sustain 
both solid, if not phenomenal, growth rates and a high degree of political 
stability— the second depending a great deal on the first— the picture 
is bright. The situation in the West is different, where innovation and 
growth need to be spurred and economies energized. Government effec-
tiveness rather than stability is the issue, but no obvious solutions appear 
on the horizon.
However power is distributed in 2040, three trends likely to be im-
portant to the quality of life for large numbers of citizens in coming de-
cades are urbanization, aging populations, and advances in information 
technology. By 2040, per the United Nations Population Division, 86 
percent of the American population and 60 percent of the world’s pop-
ulation will live in cities. That’s about six billion people, or twice today’s 
urban population. The magnitude of the implications that are expected 
to follow from such concentration is understood to be significant, but 
there is quite a difference in view over the “sign”; that is, whether the 
implications will be positive or negative for the earth’s inhabitants. Vir-
tually every aspect of life will be impacted— our security, privacy, access 
to food, health care, jobs, transportation, energy, environment, and recre-
ation. Indeed, they will all be “driven” by the phenomena of urbanization. 
That said, the integrated study of the process has only just begun.
And if the first thing one notices about the world in twenty- five 
years is that its citizens live in the cities, the second thing is likely to be 
that so many people will be old. We are already aware of the impact on 
economies and questions of intergenerational equity arising from demo-
graphic change in developed countries, but the greatest stress will be felt 
in the less- developed world, where the population will grow old before it 
becomes well off and the burden of supporting the old will be felt by the 
young in disproportionate ways. As one study of aging put it, we will be 
seeing more walkers than strollers.3 Those societies whose governments 




for starters, will have only painful options from which to choose in deal-
ing with the consequences.
A third piece of the picture we will see emerge in a couple of de cades 
will follow from continued technological advance in the collection, trans-
mission, and analysis of information. There will be dramatic change in 
the global availability of what we now consider “news,” in commercially 
useful data and communication, in access to personal interactions of all 
kinds, and in that which facilitates governance. Much of this we will ap-
preciate because it will make life easier and more entertaining and make 
business and government more efficient and potentially more respon-
sive. The international and the domestic context will continue to merge, 
and we will have the opportunity to appreciate developments anywhere 
in the world as local to us. But privacy in our actions and communica-
tion, as we had come to know it until the beginning of the twenty- first 
century, will be gone. This is a trend to watch and to manage.
Finally, with somewhat less enthusiasm than we might have expected 
to accompany this prediction only a few years ago, it seems entirely likely 
that the “wave of democracy” will continue to wash over the shores of 
more and more countries in the coming years. The level of enthusiasm 
one has for the growing numbers of democracies in the world, following 
the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of so many command economies 
run by authoritarian governments, depends greatly on one’s expectations. 
If having relatively “free” elections is considered the essential indicator 
of democracy, without as much concern for freedom of expression, rule 
of law, and respect for individual rights, then the trend is entirely pos-
itive. If, on the other hand, the expectation is that liberal democracy 
is spreading as a durable phenomenon, along with responsive, effective 
governance in the best interest of citizens, and that some version of a 
“democratic peace” will follow, to mean conflict resolution without resort 
to force, then one might be quite disappointed. The current situation 
in Russia, the recent experience with the Arab Spring, and the uneven 
course of events in Latin America and Africa come to mind. In short, 
a cautious view would have us acknowledge the positive aspects of the 
disappearance of communism as a coherent, political- economic model 
competing with a democratic, market- oriented system of government. 
But, it would also have us not be so quick to exclude backsliding and 
shortfalls in the outcomes for citizens internally, and nations externally, 
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of the democratic trends. The landscape in these terms in 2040 will prob-
ably not look dramatically different from the way it looks today.
Black Swans
To refer to black swan events at all rigorously is to identify a truly sur-
prising event, with major impact, that may seem easily explained only 
after its occurrence. The impact or consequences may be bad or good, 
as long as they are in some sense significant. Almost by definition, then, 
making a list of genuine black swan events that have not yet occurred 
should not be possible. Undeterred, I offer here three such events that 
could occur over the next twenty- five years.
First, China may disintegrate as a national state rather than rise to 
become the world’s preeminent power. The centrifugal forces that would 
pull China apart would be driven by a dramatic drop in the rate of growth 
of its economy. In the absence of any ideological or religious bonds or an 
external threat to provoke an impulse to binding nationalism, together 
with the burden of a dramatically aging population, the willingness of 
the people to accept centralized, authoritarian government may evap-
orate. This would leave a decentralized political entity that would be a 
good deal less than the sum of its parts. The basic assumption here is that 
China as a nation is substantially more fragile than most analysts believe. 
Of course, the Chinese government could be expected to respond with 
economic and political moves to mitigate the impact of any destabiliz-
ing activity before irresistible momentum could build. Interestingly, such 
action could include manufacturing an incident or set of incidents with 
the United States or Japan to create a threat intended to stimulate a na-
tionalism that would otherwise have remained dormant. War might be 
chosen over internal instability. More likely, of course, China will remain 
whole and continue its rise, with the key question becoming whether 
the United States and China can accommodate each other’s interests in 
the Asia- Pacific region, embracing competition while avoiding conflict.
A second black swan event would be the simultaneous detonation of 
ten- kiloton nuclear explosions in, say, four American cities— notionally 
New York, Washington, Chicago, and Houston. While nuclear terrorism 
has been called the number one external threat to the nation’s security by 




that could be taken to reduce the risk of a terrorist attack have not been 
taken. This is because such an attack is generally regarded as having a very 
low probability of occurrence, as well as catastrophic consequences. The 
argument here, however, is that large amounts of plutonium are main-
tained both in weapons stockpiles and in active energy programs, and 
that highly enriched uranium continues to be produced. Moreover, the 
prospects for secret transfer of such fissile material by a rogue state, or 
leakage from a state with an advanced but not perfectly secured energy 
sector, are real. Over decades, then, such transfer or leakage could easily 
provide a terrorist group with the necessary fissile material to overcome 
the single greatest obstacle to making an improvised nuclear explosive 
device.
Perhaps even more interesting, though, is the proposition that the 
probability that four American cities will be destroyed one morning 
is not much less than that only one city would be struck. If this were 
to happen, roughly a million Americans would die relatively promptly 
from blast, fire, and radiation following the detonations. And attacking 
multiple cities is something terrorists like to do to terrorize a nation. 
It becomes a plausible scenario because the quantity of fissile material 
needed to produce a yield a bit less than Hiroshima- size is so small as 
compared to the amount that may be accessible to terrorists. In other 
words, the number of cities attacked may not be sensitive to the amount 
of fissile material required for each weapon. If this most horrendous of 
events should occur in the coming decades, it would appear, after the 
fact, as having been “overdetermined,” with hardly anyone being sur-
prised, except possibly by the number of targets and the fact that it had 
not happened sooner: a true black swan event.
It is worth noting here that in the world of catastrophic events of low 
probability but high consequence, certain biological events could dwarf 
even the multiple nuclear terrorist attacks in terms of casualties. A repeat 
of the flulike pandemic that occurred one hundred years ago comes to 
mind, as does the release of an engineered, highly communicable, and le-
thal virus for which no vaccine was available. But more thought has gone 
into planning for, mitigating, and preventing such events so that they 
seem less like true black swans than does the nuclear terrorist scenario.
The third event that could surprise us would be the resolution of the 
Palestinian– Israeli conflict. This would not be the same as the outbreak 
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of peace in the Middle East. It would be an acceptance by most Pales-
tinian factions of the resolution of the three principal issues— the status 
of Jerusalem, the right of return of refugees, and a territorial settlement 
on the West Bank— that have for so long been claimed to be the basis 
for the hostility of Arabs to the state of Israel and the rejection of its 
right to exist.
There have been moments when this outcome seemed to be at hand, 
perhaps most notably in September 2000, when failure was snatched 
from the jaws of success. It is plausible that so long as efforts continue, 
those representing Palestinians in Gaza and on the West Bank will come 
together with an Israeli leader who has the essential domestic support 
to reach a durable agreement. Many observers would see such a historic 
breakthrough in the seemingly never- ending “peace process” as funda-
mentally changing the face of Middle Eastern politics forever. It would 
not. The unwillingness of the fabled Arab “street” to reverse its view of 
Israel’s legitimacy should not be underestimated, nor should the contin-
uation of division among the Arab states of the Gulf and the Levant, 
between Arabs and Persians, between Sunni and Shia Muslims. Peace 
between major factions of the Palestinians and Israel would be a surpris-
ing and welcome development, but it would fall far short of “changing 
everything” in the Middle East.
The United States in the World of 2040
It is now commonplace for experts in American foreign policy to charac-
terize the threats from within our country as having a greater likelihood 
of damaging the nation’s security than threats from abroad. This reflects 
a recognition, broadly shared, that the American political system is dys-
functional, lacking the basic capacity for compromise that is essential 
for effective governance, and that the nation’s competitive position in 
economic and political terms has suffered and will continue to decline 
unless remedies can be found. First references are usually to budget and 
fiscal issues, which have become chronic problems in the absence of the 
necessary political consensus for resolution. Just below the surface of 
these policy disputes lie fundamental differences in the country over the 
proper role of government and how best to protect the individual while 




and income, together with loss of economic and social mobility across 
generations, has undercut the presumption of fairness and equality of 
opportunity, historically so important to the American narrative. And 
finally, the intensity and anger manifest in political debate have been 
magnified by media that thrive on the polarization and rhetorical ex-
tremes of their daily product.
The electorate has been driven to new levels of cynicism, compounded 
by ignorance, creating little opportunity to persuade through evidence but 
an irresistible audience for “bumper sticker” arguments. At the same time, 
there is ample reason for cynics to thrive in light of the role that money 
has come to play in elections and the policies made by those who prevailed 
at the polls thanks to our primary system and gerrymandered districts, as 
well as to the largesse of the most wealthy few in American society.
In short, the first observation to make about the place of the United 
States in the world of 2040 is that, absent a serious adjustment in im-
portant elements of our political system that somehow provides new 
incentives for government at all levels to act in the best interests of the 
Republic, the country will increasingly become far less desirable in terms 
of social justice and quality of life in the eyes of its own citizens and not 
much of an example for the rest of the world.
That said, if we were to consider the power of the United States, judged 
primarily in military terms, twenty- five years hence, we would find our 
country still uniquely capable of projecting force with great lethality and 
impressive precision virtually anyplace on earth. This will be the result of 
the continued enthusiasm of the U.S. Congress to fund the development 
and deployment of the most technologically advanced weapon systems 
in the world and, by and large, the popularity of such systems with the 
American people. In short, we may fall way behind many countries in 
social and economic opportunity, quality of public education, basic in-
frastructure, competiveness, and productivity but, ironically, maintain 
our position as the world’s number one military power.
This leads to the inevitable next question of just what the American 
people will be prepared to do with that power in twenty- five years. Fol-
lowing more than a decade of war, will the U.S. enthusiasm wane for 
finding vital interests far from our shores, or humanitarian interests any-
where as being any of “our business,” if intervention involves significant 
cost in lives or treasure?
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There is a connection, certainly, between perceived economic capacity 
for intervention and the political will to intervene, but too much should 
not be made of the nation’s economy as limiting its capacity to act, as the 
determining factor in any embrace of isolation. Much more important 
will be the psychological impact of the economy; the nation’s perceived 
economic health; and the openness of its people to rhetoric from politi-
cal leaders that resonates with Americans’ values, sense of responsibility 
for others, and place in the world, as well as their fundamental optimism 
that what we do can make a difference. Belief in American exception-
alism can motivate truly regrettable policies, but it can also be the base 
from which the United States can prudently intervene, ideally in coali-
tion with others, to discourage aggression and stop atrocities.
All in all, we have painted a picture with significant risk along with 
some opportunities to mitigate harmful developments and promote pos-
itive outcomes. We can influence that picture by the policies we adopt or 
fail to embrace. Realism about the choices ahead will help us toward bet-
ter outcomes; cynicism will not. Credible leadership will be in demand 
at home and abroad, but particularly at home. More than anything else, 
the United States needs an interested and informed citizenry, responsive 
and effective governance, and a sophisticated and subtle appreciation in 
its leadership of the risks and opportunities open to the nation.
Notes
1. The phrase “state of nature” has deep roots and differing meanings in the 
writings of several seventeenth- and eighteenth- century political philosophers, 
but here we mean what Hobbes meant in applying it to the character of rela-
tions between independent nation- states, where only the laws of nature apply. 
“Self-help,” in this context, is a term used as a defining characteristic of the 
international political system, and a tenet of twentieth- century international 
relations theory, which leaves each nation- state on its own to find the means to 
survive. The relevance is that, according to some classical and modern political 
theory, the essential anarchy of the international system guarantees the perma-
nent possibility of armed conflict between nation- states. The best discussion of 
this point is still found in Kenneth N. Waltz’s enduring work, Man, the State, 
and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), first published in 1959.
2. The term “soft power” has come to mean a way of influencing the behav-




position, rather than moving them to it by coercion or inducement. See Joseph 
S. Nye Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public 
Affairs, 2004).
3. The MacArthur Foundation’s “Research Network on an Aging Society” 










The Future of American Religion
Eboo Patel
Founder and President, Interfaith Youth Core
For my money, the most penetrating insight into the future of religion 
in twenty- first- century America came from a Canadian scholar writing 
about South Asia in the 1940s. Wilfred Cantwell Smith was teaching 
at a Christian missionary college in Lahore (then a part of an undivided 
India under British rule, now located in Pakistan) and one day woke 
up to a realization both remarkable and obvious: most of his faculty 
colleagues were Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims, as were the majority of 
his students. For Cantwell Smith, both a committed Presbyterian and a 
budding scholar of comparative religions, it was an observation that set 
off a series of questions. How might frequent and intense interaction 
between people of various faiths impact everything from the religious 
identities of individuals to the theologies of religious traditions to the 
self- understanding and social cohesion of increasingly religiously diverse 
societies?
Such questions were underscored by the larger context in which 
Cantwell Smith lived. After all, it was not just the microenvironment of 
that missionary college in Lahore that was religiously diverse; the entire 
subcontinent was roiling with religious energies. Gandhi’s Hindu- based 




separate state for Muslims was gaining steam. Chapters of inspiring in-
terreligious cooperation alternated regularly with spasms of religiously 
motivated slaughter. The worst of the violence took place at the time 
of partition, when a million people murdered one another in hand- to- 
hand combat, most of them Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims, members of 
the very same communities teaching and studying together in Cantwell 
Smith’s college.
One of the most interesting parts of Cantwell Smith’s essay is the 
section he includes on the cities of North America. From his perch amid 
the diversity of 1940s Lahore, he couldn’t help but see Louisville and 
Los Angeles as an “oversimplified religious society . . . partial and unrep-
resentative.”1 He cautioned that they would not remain so for long. The 
seemingly exceptional diversity he was experiencing in the subcontinent 
would soon become the norm around the world. “The religious life of 
humankind from now on, if it is to be lived at all,” he wrote, “will be lived 
in a context of religious pluralism.”2
I thought of Cantwell Smith as I stood on the National Mall on a 
cold January day in 2009, listening to President Barack Obama declare 
in his first inaugural address:
For we know that our patchwork heritage is a strength, not a 
weakness. We are a nation of Christians and Muslims, Jews and 
Hindus, and non- believers. We are shaped by every language 
and culture, drawn from every end of this Earth . . . we cannot 
help but believe that the old hatreds shall someday pass; that 
the lines of tribe shall soon dissolve; that as the world grows 
smaller, our common humanity shall reveal itself; and that 
America must play its role in ushering in a new era of peace.3
The first African American president of the United States, staring 
out at the Lincoln Memorial as he addressed the nation and the world, 
chose to highlight the religious dimensions of the country’s diversity. 
He could have added to the list of American faith communities Sikhs, 
Jains, Buddhists, and practitioners of indigenous traditions. The United 
States has sizable communities of all of the above, and many more re-
ligious groups as well. In the words of Harvard scholar Diana Eck, 




giously diverse nation in human history. Much of this change has oc-
curred in the past fifty years and went largely unnoticed until the events 
of September 11, 2001.
Like Cantwell Smith’s Christian missionary college in Lahore, the 
United States is a relatively peaceful island in a world of clashing reli-
gious energies. Most certainly, faith- fueled violence has impacted these 
shores— 9/11, Fort Hood, the Boston Marathon, the murderous ram-
page at the Oak Creek Gurudwara— but it is a far cry from the regular 
violence that marks daily life in countries like Iraq, Egypt, Afghanistan, 
Syria, and even Northern Ireland and India. Yet diaspora groups from 
all sides of those conflicts live here in the United States, and American 
foreign policy has a hand (and in some cases an army) involved in each 
of the countries above. Our religious diversity can become barriers of 
division, bubbles of isolation, bombs of destruction, or bridges of co-
operation. This chapter explores what that broad religious diversity and 
intense interaction mean for the future of the United States. But be-
fore hazarding guesses about the quarter century ahead, I want to take a 
quick look back. The recent past presents the themes we ought to be ex-
ploring and the trend lines we should be watching. Good stuff, in other 
words, to argue about.
The 1950s and 1960s
One hallmark of the 1950s and 1960s was greater acceptance for Catho-
lics and Jews in American life. The notion of America as a “Judeo- 
Christian” nation was a creation of this period. In 1948, 20 percent of 
Americans told pollsters they would not want a Jew for a neighbor. By 
1959, that number had fallen to 2 percent. In 1960, the nation elected its 
first Catholic president in John F. Kennedy, and fears of the pope taking 
up residence in the White House did not come to pass. A central theme 
in Will Herberg’s 1955 book Protestant- Catholic- Jew, perhaps the era’s 
most influential work in the sociology of religion, was that the United 
States had become a nation of three religions, each viewed as equally 
American. It was a message reinforced by statements from President 
Eisenhower— “Whatever our individual church, whatever our personal 
creed, our common faith in God is a common bond among us”— and in 




It was not just the nation adapting to diversity: the church was 
changing as well. The early 1960s saw the most important theologi-
cal shifts in Catholicism in centuries. In the Second Vatican Council 
conferences that took place from 1962 to 1965, the Roman Catho-
lic Church (influenced in no small part by the American Jesuit theo-
logian John Courtney Murray) articulated clear support for religious 
freedom and highlighted its commonalities with other religious tra-
ditions. Georgetown scholar John W. O’Malley says that one of the 
main themes of Vatican II was reconciliation with other faiths: “For 
the first time, Catholics were encouraged to foster friendly relations 
with Orthodox and Protestant Christians, as well as Jews and Muslims, 
and even to pray with them. The council condemned all forms of anti- 
Semitism and insisted on respect for Judaism and Islam as Abrahamic 
faiths, like Christianity.”5
Just as the United States was growing comfortable with understand-
ing itself as a Judeo- Christian society, a whole new set of people were 
landing on these shores. The Immigration Act of 1965 opened Amer-
ica’s doors to immigrants from Asia, Africa, and Latin America. À la 
Cantwell Smith, Lahore was literally coming to Los Angeles and Louis-
ville. The people who arrived brought with them not only their advanced 
degrees in medicine and engineering (the law had strong preferences for 
people trained in the applied sciences) but also such Eastern religions as 
Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism. It’s interesting to note that significant 
Catholic and Jewish immigration to the United States occurred largely 
in the mid- to- late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It took 
American society approximately eighty years to fully adapt its national 
identity from a Protestant country to a Judeo- Christian nation. We are 
now at about the fifty- year mark from the beginning of large- scale im-
migration of Muslims and communities outside of the Abrahamic tradi-
tions to the United States.
Religion played a prominent role in the era’s politics in its influence in 
the civil rights movement. African American churches were central or-
ganizing hubs for demonstrators, and African American preachers were 
the movement’s most important leaders. Reverend Dr. Martin Luther 
King Jr. once said: “I am many things to many people, but in the quiet re-
cesses of my heart, I am fundamentally a clergyman, a Baptist preacher. 




The 1970s and 1980s
The 1950s was a high point for religiosity in the United States. Be-
tween 1950 and 1957, for example, weekly church attendance skyrock-
eted from 31 to 51 percent for young adults (in their twenties). Also in 
1957, 69 percent of Americans told pollsters that “religion is increasing 
its influence on American life” and presumably saw it as a good thing.7 
The crash came quickly. In 1962, the percentage of Americans who saw 
religion’s influence growing fell 24 percentage points from its high in 
1957 to 45 percent. In 1965, it was 33 percent; in 1968 it was 18 percent; 
in 1969 and 1970 it was 14 percent.8 No doubt such statistical trends 
encouraged a set of scholars to advance secularization theory (the idea 
that as societies modernize, they necessarily become less religious) and 
justified Time magazine’s famous “Is God Dead?” cover in 1966.9
American religiosity defied the predictions and made a comeback in 
the 1970s. The percentage of Americans who told pollsters that religion’s 
influence was growing jumped from the low of 14 percent in 1970 to 
44 percent in 1976.10 That same year the United States elected its first 
avowedly “born- again” Christian president, Jimmy Carter.
Two forms of evangelical Christian religiosity grew prominent in the 
1970s and 1980s. The first was the rise of “megachurches,” defined by 
sociologists as churches with more than two thousand members in aver-
age weekend attendance. The archetypal institutions of this movement 
include Willow Creek (founded in the suburbs of Chicago in 1975) and 
Saddleback (founded in the sprawl of Southern California in 1980). 
The second form that defined the religiosity comeback of the 1970s and 
1980s was the rise of the religious right. The archetypal figures here are 
Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson. They also ran huge and highly effective 
organizations, but were both more overtly political and gleefully polar-
izing than their megachurch brethren. The religious right’s biggest vic-
tory was helping to bring Ronald Reagan to power in the 1980s. Jimmy 
Carter, though born- again, was not sharply enough to the right for them.
Megachurch Christians smiled and hugged while religious right 
Christians scowled and scolded, but both leaned the same way on key so-
cial and political issues, especially issues that revolved around the politics 
and practice of sex. In fact, as social scientists Robert Putnam and David 




and politics of sexuality have been the key dividing line in American 
religion for the past half century.11 To put it somewhat crassly, a critical 
mass of young people rejected the traditional religious strictures around 
premarital sex in the 1960s and chose sleeping in each other’s beds on 
Saturday nights over sitting in the pews on Sunday morning. In the 
1970s, the pews fought back, reasserting their views around traditional 
sexual practice in the broader culture. They were especially galvanized by 
the 1973 Roe v. Wade ruling that legalized abortion, essentially angered 
into political action by their view that the Supreme Court was siding 
with the sexual libertines.
The prominence of sexual politics was the reason behind one of the 
most remarkable shifts in the socioreligious landscape in American his-
tory: the alignment of Catholics with evangelical Protestants. Evangeli-
cals had long been the loudest anti- Catholic voices in the United States. 
In the election of 1960, even such mainstream evangelical preachers as 
Billy Graham overtly organized against Kennedy. Starting in the 1970s, 
evangelicals and Catholics (the largest two religious communities in the 
country) decided to put aside their differences and past prejudices and 
made common cause on everything from abortion to homosexuality to 
the “coarsening” (read: too much sex) of Hollywood movies and rock 
music. It is a fascinating example of how shifting politics can catalyze 
interesting new alignments.
As religion’s influence in American politics grew in this period, so 
did its role in world affairs more generally. Pope John Paul II galva-
nized the Solidarity movement in Poland. Archbishop Desmond Tutu 
played a key role in the struggle against apartheid in South Africa. The 
Mujahideen (with U.S. backing) ejected the Soviets from Afghanistan. 
And, most remarkably, a movement of religious zealots overthrew the 
Western- backed dictatorship of the Shah in Iran and installed their ver-
sion of a Shia Muslim theocracy under Ayatollah Khomeini.
One of the hottest theories about religion in the 1980s is that it had 
become “privatized,” meaning essentially that faith might stay alive in peo-
ple’s hearts and homes but would no longer play a role in politics or the 
public square. Like the secularization theories of the 1960s, the facts on 
the ground simply spoke louder than the books of the scholars. The bot-
tom line was that religion refused to be quarantined. Instead, in various 




The 1990s to Now
Religion continued to play a powerful role in world affairs in the late 
twentieth and early twenty- first centuries, most prominently in the 
form of violence and conflict. The Taliban, a totalitarian Muslim group, 
emerged from the post- Soviet civil war in Afghanistan to rule that na-
tion, oppressing women and other Muslim groups along the way. One 
of their policies was to give shelter to the leadership of a global Muslim 
extremist movement called Al Qaeda, which, one year, nine months, and 
eleven days into the new century, changed the world in the most violent 
and vicious fashion. The attacks of 9/11 set in motion the American- led 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. They also made a clear statement about 
the continuing influence of religion in world affairs.
The international headlines of the past quarter century seem to be one 
long commercial for Samuel Huntington’s clash- of- civilizations theory 
(first advanced in a 1993 Foreign Affairs article), which posited that vi-
olence rooted in religious identity would play a key role in the post– 
Cold War world order.12 Slobodan Milošević’s Serbian army, holding up 
three fingers (meant to signify the Trinity), ran roughshod over Muslim- 
majority areas in Bosnia in the early 1990s. In 1998, India elected the 
Hindu- nationalist BJP, which tested a nuclear device and named it “the 
Hindu bomb.” Pakistan responded with its own nuclear test, dubbed “the 
Muslim bomb.” Homegrown Christian terrorists have murdered people 
in dramatic fashion in the United States, most prominently at the At-
lanta Olympics. The hope of the Oslo Accords for peace between Israelis 
and Palestinians dissolved in the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin and the 
disappointment at Camp David.
Some observers wondered whether there could be a clash of civili-
zations in the United States. Given the prevalence of Arabic prayer as 
the soundtrack to so much of the violence on the international news, 
the spotlight turned to Muslims in the United States. Was Islam— 
which Huntington famously said “had bloody borders”— a fifth col-
umn within the country? It was a question that many people were not 
too shy to ask. Conservative talk show host Glenn Beck’s opening line 
to his guest Keith Ellison, the first Muslim ever elected to the U.S. 





The concern around Muslims in the United States came to the fore 
when a prominent Sufi imam named Feisal Abdul Rauf tried to start a 
Muslim community center near New York City’s Ground Zero in 2010. 
Imam Rauf initially called the project Cordoba House, a name meant 
to evoke a Muslim civilization in medieval Andalusia marked by coop-
eration between different religions. He described it as a sort of Muslim 
YMCA with programs that would benefit the whole neighborhood. The 
growing U.S. anti- Muslim movement saw a ripe target. Imam Rauf and 
his supporters (of which I was one) found themselves under constant 
attack by claims that Cordoba House was intended as a victory mosque 
to honor the extremists of 9/11 and would be used as a terrorist com-
mand center. The “Ground Zero Mosque” story dominated the news that 
summer and became a prominent theme in many of the political races 
in 2010. Truth be told, the opposition won the battle. The grand designs 
for Cordoba House had to be shelved; its operations and programs went 
forward but are far more modest than originally hoped.
Partly as a result of controversies like the one surrounding Cordoba 
House and the rising prejudice against Muslims and other religious mi-
norities in the United States (Sikhs have experienced vicious attacks, 
with the turbans observant Sikh men wear often mistaken as a symbol of 
Islam), mainstream civic and political institutions have started engaging 
religious diversity in the United States. One part of this engagement is 
examining the sources of prejudice. The Center for American Progress 
issued a report entitled Fear Inc., which revealed that the anti– Cordoba 
House movement was not so much spontaneous citizen activism as a 
network of well- funded organizations waiting for a ripe opportunity to 
marginalize Muslims. Another part is promoting religious pluralism as 
a central American value. As think tanks such as the Aspen Institute 
issued reports calling the religious diversity of the United States an im-
portant national resource, scholarly research on religious diversity grew, 
as did the number of interfaith nonprofit organizations, and the White 
House got involved by launching the President’s Interfaith and Com-
munity Service Campus Challenge, which engaged five hundred college 
campuses in interfaith action.
The other big theme of the last quarter century was the sexual abuse 
crisis in the Roman Catholic Church. Not only was priest after priest in 




world over were involved in covering up the scandal, reassigning accused 
priests to other parishes rather than referring them to the civil authori-
ties. As might have been expected, the clerical abuse and cover- up crisis 
caused a drove of Catholics to leave the church. As people examined the 
exodus, they discovered that Catholics leaving the church was not just a 
recent trend, it was a consistent process that had been taking place since 
the 1960s. Since that time, 60 percent of white Catholics have either 
switched to another faith or lapsed. This means that roughly 10 percent 
of all Americans are former Catholics. Many of the pews abandoned by 
white Catholics have been filled by Latino Catholics, but even there the 
story is not all good for the church as an increasing number of Lati-
nos convert to charismatic Protestant communities or become “religious 
nones.”14
Catholics are not the only ones affected by decline. Roughly 60 per-
cent of mainline Protestants have switched or lapsed since the 1960s.15 
Unlike with Catholics, no new immigrant group is replacing the people 
who have left those Protestant churches. Jewish decline appears equally 
steep. While only 7 percent of “greatest generation” Jews (born between 
1914 and 1927) call themselves “Jews of no religion,” 32 percent of mil-
lennial Jews (born after 1980) say that’s the case.16
This growth in the category of “religious nones” is one of the most im-
portant religion stories of recent times. The number has risen in dramatic 
fashion in a brief period, from about 7 percent of the total American 
population in 1990 to about 20 percent today. Most alarming, one out 
of three eighteen- to twenty- nine- year- olds checks the “none” box on 
surveys of religion.17
There is a tendency to conflate the increase in religious nones with 
the growth of “aggressive atheist” voices in public life, but the data do 
not bear out such a connection. For all the attention that writers such 
as Christopher Hitchens and Sam Harris have gotten in the past few 
years, their views represent a fairly small percentage of Americans as 
a whole, including the “nones.” In the United States, it turns out that 
two- thirds of our self- described nonreligious people believe in God and 
about one- fifth report praying on a daily basis. Some even go to church 
on occasion.18
If a principled absence of religious belief does not explain the rise 




Campbell again point to sex. As culturally conservative religion flexed 
its muscles in public life in the 1970s and 1980s, a whole new genera-
tion of young people responded by leaving the pews. If religion meant 
condemning homosexuality and refraining from premarital sex, they de-
cided it was not for them.
The Future
If religion were a stock and you were the betting type in 1957, you would 
have probably bought. All signs pointed up. Ten years later, the last thing 
you would have wanted in your portfolio was religion. And so it goes in 
the volatile world of predicting religion. Sometimes the line goes straight 
and sometimes it zigzags. Before hazarding my guesses about the future, 
let me say that I’m a moderately progressive American Muslim who has 
a doctorate in the sociology of religion and runs an interfaith organi-
zation that works largely in higher education. I’m also an optimist. No 
doubt my predictions are colored by those various lenses.
As I said at the beginning of this chapter, I think the most important 
theme in American religion is wider religious diversity and more fre-
quent interaction between people who orient around religion differently, 
including the nones. That diversity can take four major forms: bubbles 
of isolation, barriers of division, bombs of destruction, or bridges of co-
operation.
I believe that in 2040 American religious diversity will be defined 
largely by bridges of cooperation. I also believe this will be fairly unique 
in the world. The reason for this is that the most organized groups in 
the large number of new democracies across the world (which includes 
not only majority- Muslim countries such as Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Af-
ghanistan but also countries such as Myanmar, where the Muslim mi-
nority faces violence from an extremist Buddhist movement) are organ-
ized along ethno- religious fault lines (Sunni/Shia/Kurd in Iraq, secular 
versus Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt). The battle for the levers of gov-
ernment in these countries is unlikely to be entirely peaceful for a long, 
long time. Whether another Osama bin Laden will emerge and build an 
Al Qaeda– like global network that tilts the axis of world affairs is not 
beyond the scope of possibility, but the fact that governments are now on 




Religious Diversity in the United States
I believe that by 2040 the United States will proudly view itself as an 
interfaith country, much the way we take pride in our multiculturalism 
today. History is a useful guide here. A century ago, the United States 
was both profoundly antisemitic and anti- Catholic. Today, Catholics 
and Jews are among the most favorably viewed religious communities 
in the country.
I think the same forces that propelled Catholics and Jews into the 
American mainstream are at work with newer religious minorities such 
as Muslims. The first is a growing interfaith movement in civil society. 
In the early twentieth century, organizations such as the National Con-
ference on Christians and Jews (NCCJ) ran programs and campaigns 
that helped create both the civic fabric and the public consciousness of 
the United States as a “Judeo- Christian” nation. The NCCJ emerged in 
large part to fight the anti- Catholic forces that came to the fore against 
Al Smith in the 1928 presidential campaign. As religious prejudice has 
grown in recent years, a twenty- first- century version of this movement 
is doing the same for the nation’s wider religious diversity. The general 
pattern in American history is that the forces of prejudice strike first and 
win a few battles, and then the forces of pluralism go into action and win 
the war. We are already seeing this pattern emerge once again.
Since the events of September 11, there has been a dramatic growth 
in interfaith activities and organizations. Generally speaking, there is lit-
tle quality control or sense of focus regarding these activities. That will 
change in the next twenty- five years. Civic sectors focused on education, 
public health, and poverty alleviation have been transformed by the sci-
entific use of data and the application of management techniques. As 
interfaith becomes a thriving sector, it will have to employ the same 
approaches— naming what it hopes to achieve and showing progress to-
ward specific goals.
The second force at work propelling Muslims into the American 
mainstream is the national narrative about integrating newcomers into 
the American fabric, welcoming their contributions and appreciating 
their differences. We take pride in the motto E Pluribus Unum— out of 
many, one. This narrative is deeply woven into the American psyche and 




presidential campaign. Ralph Ellison aptly captured this arc in the fol-
lowing way: “The irrepressible movement of American culture towards 
integration of its most diverse elements continues, confounding the cir-
cumlocutions of its staunchest opponents.”19
The final force at work is the Americanization of religious minority 
groups. I mean this entirely positively, and I see it happening with Mus-
lims in the United States in real time. When Muslims from South Asia 
and the Middle East started immigrating in the 1960s and 1970s, they 
largely balkanized along different ethnic, national, and theological lines 
(different mosques for different groups) and sought to bubble them-
selves off from American culture, just as recently immigrated Jews and 
Catholics did in their day.
And similar to the second and third generations of those communi-
ties, American Muslims are going from an attitude of balkanization to a 
“big tent” mentality and from trying to bubble themselves off from the 
culture to building bridges to the broader society. There might still be 
separate mosques for the first generation, but the children of Shias from 
Iran and Sunnis from Egypt pray together in the same campus Muslim 
student associations and, generally speaking, have two words for each 
other: fellow Muslims. Moreover, even as they were raised with stories 
(hugely mythologized) of their parents’ homelands, they cannot help but 
view the United States as the country where they will raise families and 
make careers, and so they begin to set about not only wholeheartedly 
building their lives here but also shaping their nation. We see this pro-
cess at work with the impressive growth in an American Muslim civil 
sector, with organizations such as the Inner City Muslim Action Net-
work in Chicago proudly declaring its Muslim inspiration to serve all. 
This process is accelerated by the fact that the most important scholars 
in American Islam are emphatic that it is a Muslim duty to enrich the 
society in which you live rather than focusing only on what is happening 
“back home.”
Religion, Sex, and Politics
The headlines of the day suggest the continued intersection of sexual pol-
itics and religion, especially with respect to gay marriage and contracep-




for the exodus of young people from religious communities over the past 
twenty- five years. This is one key reason that I don’t believe sexual issues 
will dominate religion’s role in politics in the next quarter century. Many 
of the older people who oppose gay marriage now simply will not be 
around. Those who are will find that they have a gay grandson or grand-
daughter whose wedding they would like to attend. My guess is they will 
go, party like rock stars, and change their minds about homosexuality.
I believe that in 2040 the big issues on which religious communities 
will carve out a major role will be climate change and poverty alleviation. 
I think there are several reasons for this. The first is that climate change 
and poverty alleviation touch on deep- rooted values across religious tra-
ditions (stewardship and justice, to name two), and in a quarter century 
they will be genuine social crises on which religious communities will 
have a powerful opportunity to cooperate and unique standing on which 
to speak.
The best recent example of this involvement is Pope Francis. The ap-
proach he’s carved out early in his papacy is the road that most American 
religious communities will be taking in a quarter century. In his own 
words, “it is not necessary to talk of these things [abortion, contracep-
tion] all the time.”20 He famously likened the church to a field hospital 
and said that when a doctor treats someone on the battlefield, it’s not 
the patient’s cholesterol level that is the doctor’s primary concern. Right 
now, religious communities are the walking wounded, and if they hope to 
thrive in the next quarter century, they will choose to emphasize matters 
of cosmic significance (as climate change and inequality are) without be-
ing flagrantly divisive, either between generations or between religions.
I think there is a larger lesson to the positive attention Pope Francis 
has received: religious figures still have remarkable power. If an ordinary 
person is asked how he or she feels about gay people and responds by 
saying, “Who am I to judge?” it is entirely forgettable. When a major re-
ligious leader says the same thing, it makes headlines for months. When 
a home health care aide washes the feet of his or her patients and the 
aide and the patient happen to be of different religions, it’s just a part of 
the job. When a pope washes people’s feet and two of those people hap-
pen to be Muslim, it changes the atmosphere between huge communi-
ties. There is a deep hunger, in the United States especially, for religious 





Will Pope Francis or anyone else shift what is probably the single largest 
religious phenomenon in the United States— namely, the blasé attitude 
toward faith communities? Religious innovators in the form of mega-
church pastors such as Bill Hybels of Willow Creek and Rick Warren 
of Saddleback emerged in the 1970s to recapture some of the religious 
nones of their era. I’m confident that the tradition of American religious 
innovation will continue, and new leaders and institutions will emerge 
to bring some of the nones back into various religious folds. However 
excellent these leaders may be, they will be battling the broader cultural 
wind. The growth of individualism, the continual erosion of confidence 
in institutional structures, the delaying of adulthood markers (such as 
marriage) associated with churchgoing, the ease with which one can sit 
in bed and get what one wants with the touch of a button (and soon, 
when Google Glass becomes standard, with the twitch of an eye) makes 
any kind of community that asks things of its members hard to form 
and maintain. My own guess is that, like today, there will be a lot of 
churn— switching between religious communities, leaving for a while 
and then going back, and so on. The upshot is that the number of nones 
will remain largely the same twenty- five years from now— 20 percent of 
Americans as a whole, 33 percent of younger people.
Frankly, this keeps me up at night, not out of concern for the souls 
of the nones (I believe God’s mercy and welcome are wider than we can 
ever imagine) or the moral character of the nation (I’ve met enough reli-
gious jerks to know that belief in God does not necessarily make a good 
person) but for the future of American social capital. In American Grace, 
Putnam and Campbell find that people involved in faith communities 
give money and volunteer time more frequently, to more places and in 
larger quantities, than their secular counterparts do. And they don’t just 
direct their energies toward their own faith communities but also to sec-
ular causes that benefit a broad range of people. In fact, at least half of 
American social capital— our volunteerism, our philanthropy, our civic 
institutions from hospitals to social service agencies— is related to reli-
gious communities. We take for granted the crucial role they play in our 
nation. As religious communities lose members and vitality, there seems 
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Lawyer and Social Critic
“I reckon I got to light out for the territory,” Huck Finn famously con-
cludes, considering the alternative: adoption by Tom’s Aunt Sally and 
submission to the restraints of “sivilized” society. Huck’s capture by cus-
tom and culture would have been metaphoric. Jim had been in chains. 
From his perspective, Huck had always been free. But Huck won’t settle 
(and we wouldn’t have him settle) for not being enslaved. Freedom is 
relative. For Jim it means, “I owns myself.” For Huck it requires escape 
from respectability— the religious and social norms of “sivilization.” He 
disconnects, lighting out for the West, alone.
Put community first, and you might see him lighting out for anar-
chy and anomie. Put freedom first, and you see him heading toward 
autonomy, recognizing in the relatively anarchic territories the prospect 
of self- invention. Put freedom first, and you might envy him his oppor-
tunities.
It’s not the loss of virgin territories that imprisons us today. The fron-
tier was settled long ago. It’s the loss of privacy and the anonymity that 
privacy enables. Huck can escape his past and the roles it thrust upon 





Try to imagine shedding your old identity and inventing a new one in 
an age of ubiquitous surveillance. To travel incognito, or communicate 
with anyone privately, without revealing your location, you’d need the 
resources and skills of Jason Bourne, who is, after all, a fictional char-
acter. Yet armed with multiple passports, fluent in multiple languages, 
even he couldn’t evade every surveillance camera on earth. How would 
you? Let’s say you undergo extensive facial reconstruction to fool facial 
recognition software. You’d still need a magic wand to erase the virtual 
profile of you compiled by government and corporate snoops. Even if 
you’ve never established a Twitter or Facebook account or engaged in 
any social media, you have an invisible but indelible digital shadow. You 
deepen it every day.
Freedom’s death may be greatly exaggerated, but its decline is indis-
putable and its future is in doubt. It will be expanded, restricted, or re-
defined by rapidly evolving technologies that make speculating about 
the next forty years like speculating about the next four hundred. It’s 
contingent as well on states of war, peace, and scarcity. Looking ahead, 
perhaps all you can say with relative certainty is that people who hold 
unchecked power will abuse it. Governments will seek to spy on their 
citizens, sometimes with “good” intentions, and always with the aid of 
new technologies. Looking ahead, we might look back to the warning 
Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis issued nearly one hundred years 
ago: in a famous dissent, he urged application of Fourth Amendment 
protections to telephones and other new communication technologies 
that arm governments with “subtler and more far- reaching means of in-
vading privacy. . . . The progress of science in furnishing the Government 
with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wiretapping.”1
As science progresses, the intrusive impulses of government officials 
will stay the same, Brandeis suggested. Plus ça change, you might say 
(unless you expect technology to alter human nature). Predictions seem 
infelicitous. Having failed to preserve our freedom, we first need to ac-
count for what’s been lost, to prepare for the possibility and formidable 
challenge of restoring it.
The Bill of Rights is not yet dead letter, but it does sometimes seem in 
danger of becoming a Bill of Right— the Second Amendment right to 
bear arms. First Amendment freedoms of speech and association, Fourth 
Amendment rights against unwarranted search and seizure, and Fifth 
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and Sixth Amendment due process and fair trial rights are all under 
assault and greatly diminished. Surveillance is a primary weapon in the 
war on rights, which means that regaining some measure of privacy is 
essential to any hope of defeating it.
Freedom, as many of us knew it, resided partly in a private sphere 
of thoughts and actions, not the business of the state. That sphere has 
been shrinking for years, as legal and regulatory regimes have grown, 
limiting speech as well as conduct; dramatic expansions of the federal 
criminal code have been especially corrosive. The war on drugs began the 
evisceration of Fourth Amendment rights that the war on terror seems 
intent on completing. 9/11 intensified an ongoing government assault 
on freedom, widening and deepening official intrusions into what were 
once our private lives.
Many of us have participated willingly, even enthusiastically, in the 
destruction of boundaries between private and public, trading privacy 
for the promise and pleasures of social media or embracing the exhi-
bitionism of celebrity culture and, in the process, acclimating ourselves 
to surveillance. Many have participated inadvertently as communica-
tion, business, and social relations have moved online. All of us have 
lost control, unwittingly. Even people who intentionally trade privacy 
for publicity probably don’t intend to trade control over what they reveal 
and conceal. Whether we welcomed or accepted life online, we were not 
necessarily welcoming or accepting the loss of agency and possibility of 
a personal life.
Still a majority of Americans did acquiesce in the creation of a secu-
rity/surveillance state, not because we were tempted by technology but 
because we were terrified. Fear has always been the enemy of freedom. 
The public’s fear of street crime helped enable a repressive, counterpro-
ductive war on drugs, characterized by increasingly violent, militarized 
police forces2 and a harsh mandatory sentencing regime that made the 
United States a leader in imprisoning its own citizens. The public’s fear 
of terror rationalized summary, indefinite detentions, the demonization 
of political movements, and crackdowns on political protests.3 Fear com-
bined with twenty- first- century technologies enabled unprecedented 
surveillance.
It’s an indirect, invisible, but hardly ineffective means of silencing 




(and perhaps intentionally) chills free speech. People are a lot less likely 
to voice opinions, disseminate information, or engage in conversations 
that would anger or merely displease a watchful, distrustful, and puni-
tive government. A 2013 survey by PEN America found that “American 
writers are not only overwhelmingly worried about government surveil-
lance, but are engaging in self- censorship as a result.”4
Political speech doesn’t require much courage or sacrifice in a genuine 
democracy. But silence is a rational, risk- averse response to an intrusive, 
authoritarian state, which instills, fuels, and feeds off fear, including fear 
of change wrought by social and political protests. It’s a familiar dy-
namic that enabled less comprehensive twentieth- century surveillance. 
The National Security Agency, created in 1952, began spying on Amer-
icans during the Cold War. Later, the FBI and CIA targeted civil rights 
activists and antiwar protesters. In the wake of Nixon Administration 
scandals, the Church Committee, led by Idaho Senator Frank Church, 
investigated, exposed, and limited these abuses, temporarily.5
Prospects for comparable congressional action in our post- 9/11 world 
can best be described as uncertain, but not entirely utopian. Even mod-
est reforms, however, depend on relative calm and an increased public 
sense of security, or a new willingness to tolerate risk. And if we don’t 
suffer another large- scale attack, members of Congress or the judiciary, 
inclined to restrict surveillance and contract the security state, would still 
face greater challenges in the twenty- first century than their twentieth- 
century counterparts might have imagined. The disregard for liberty of 
federal security agencies and the treacherous tendency of high- ranking 
officials to trust themselves with unaccountable power are unchanged, 
but technology is not, to say the least; and it will not easily be limited by 
law. J. Edgar Hoover launched his career in the 1920s armed with index 
cards targeting political dissidents. Law enforcement and national secu-
rity tsars today exploit digital surveillance tools that covertly see, hear, 
record, and store detailed information about virtually everyone. They 
have violated laws in the past and will violate them again in the future. 
If enacting substantive curbs on surveillance is hard, enforcing them is 
even harder. If Hoover were born again today, he’d think he’d died and 
gone to heaven.
While the future of freedom is in doubt, continued surveillance is 
assured. It will only “get worse,” Edward Snowden has warned:
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The storage capability of these systems increases every year 
consistently by orders of magnitude to where it’s getting to the 
point— you don’t have to have done anything wrong. You simply 
have to eventually fall under suspicion from somebody, even 
by a wrong call. And then they can use this system to go back 
in time and scrutinize every decision you’ve ever made, every 
friend you’ve ever discussed something with. And attack you on 
that basis to sort of derive suspicion from an innocent life and 
paint anyone in the context of a wrongdoer. . . . it’s gonna get 
worse with the next generation and the next generation who 
extend the capabilities of this sort of architecture of oppression.6
We are slouching toward totalism. It’s safe to say that Snowden un-
derstands this “architecture of oppression” much more than members of 
Congress who defend it. His warning that surveillance capacities will 
only expand, increasing the risk of persecution for innocent people in the 
future, should not be dismissed as alarmism— not when we’re under the 
paranoid eye of the surveillance state in the present.
Civil liberties groups chronicled and challenged war on terror excesses 
for years. Snowden and a few intrepid journalists exposed the depth and 
scope of domestic spying. The gratuitous abuses of counterterror ini-
tiatives, like torture and indefinite detention, have been regularly doc-
umented. (You could look them up.) For now, consider as an example 
just one, simple, relatively small and primitive branch of the surveillance 
state not dependent on a renegade National Security Agency (NSA)— 
state and local, post- 9/11 “fusion centers,” intended to collect reports 
of suspicious activity, in the interests of deterring terrorism. In 2010 a 
Senate subcommittee found that these centers were wasteful intelligence 
failures: they “often produced irrelevant, useless or inappropriate intelli-
gence reporting to (the Department of Homeland Security), and many 
produced no intelligence reporting whatsoever.”7 They did succeed, how-
ever, in curtailing civil liberty.
“Around the country, peaceful political organizations have been mon-
itored and labeled as ‘terrorist’ groups,” the ACLU of Massachusetts ob-
served. “In Virginia, it was historically black colleges and universities. 
In Maryland, it was Amnesty International and an ardent death penalty 




environmental and labor union activism ended up in terrorism related 
databases.”8
But you didn’t have to attend a political rally (or a historically black 
college) to end up in a terrorist database. You might simply have inno-
cently photographed a new building or bridge. In 2008, the Los Angeles 
Police Department issued policy guidelines on reporting legal activity 
that “could indicate” terrorism related activity. Allegedly suspicious be-
haviors included taking measurements or notes, or taking pictures or 
video footage “with no apparent esthetic value.”9 As these guidelines 
suggest, and a subsequent Brennan Center investigation of police intel-
ligence gathering found, “police are operating without adequate stand-
ards and oversight mechanisms, routinely amassing mountains of data— 
including personal information about law- abiding Americans— with 
little or no counterterrorism value.”10
Multiply the dangers of fusion centers and other local surveillance 
operations by a gazillion and you might approximate the reach of the 
post- 9/11 surveillance state, which may defy dismantling. It comprises a 
vast, shadowy, virtually unknowable network of government agents and 
private contractors, involving state and local as well as federal officials 
and including police forces, for whom wholesale, warrantless data col-
lection has also become a routine crime- fighting tool. The surveillance 
state is “a hidden world, growing beyond control,” the Washington Post 
reported back in 2010 (before the Snowden revelations).
Some 1,271 government organizations and 1,931 private com-
panies work on programs related to counterterrorism, home-
land security and intelligence in about 10,000 locations across 
the United States . . . The top- secret world the government 
created in response to the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, 
has become so large, so unwieldy and so secretive that no one 
knows how much money it costs, how many people it employs, 
how many programs exist within it or exactly how many agen-
cies do the same work.11
As our lives have become increasingly transparent, the government has 
become increasingly opaque. Privacy and the freedom it enables depend 
partly on reversing this trend. So, perhaps, does security. Secrecy shields 
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incompetence as well as abuse, and “top secret America” is a highly inef-
ficient and insecure security bureaucracy, as Snowden demonstrated. In 
some ways, everyone and no one, including the president, is in charge. You 
might find some cold comfort in this: a fragmented surveillance regime 
may, at the moment, be one of our best defenses against an omniscient, 
totalistic regime. But it is not a good defense against terrorism, much less 
a source of hope for freedom. If you’re always watched, you’re never free.
So I find it hard to be hopeful about the future of freedom while 
writing about it under surveillance, having surrendered the privacy of 
a typewriter for the convenience of computing long ago. You’re reading 
this under surveillance, if you’re reading a digital version or hard copy 
purchased with a credit card or other digital currency.
Do you care? Are you wary of being watched? Do you miss writing, 
reading, traveling, attending political rallies or social events in relative 
privacy, at least? Do you value privacy and imagine resurrecting it? Or 
are you resigned to its permanent loss and indifferent to the creation of 
a virtual panopticon? We can’t quantify the effect of cultural exhibition-
ism, pop therapeutic “sharing,” or the professional necessities of a social 
media presence, but we can safely assume that for many Americans an-
onymity is more unwelcome than publicity.
Consider our early twenty- first- century mantra: “If you have nothing 
to hide you have nothing to fear.” Don’t believe it. You have more to 
hide than you know. You expose more information about yourself than 
you intend. We’re all suspects or potential suspects when we’re all un-
der surveillance. When you’re under watch, you’re under guard. “Even if 
you’re not doing anything wrong you’re being watched and recorded,” as 
Edward Snowden stressed.
Everyone has something to hide, whether or not they’re engaged in 
wrongful, righteous, or morally neutral conduct. Privacy is not simply 
a shield for bad behavior, as surveillance hawks suggest. People seek it 
when they’re engaged in good works (such as donating to charities anon-
ymously) as well as bad. And those who don’t value privacy for its own 
sake might consider its practical uses.
Everyone has something to hide, partly because words and actions 
that are or seem legal today may be criminalized tomorrow. A volumi-
nous, vague, and elastic federal criminal code has enabled overzealous, 




most anyone they choose to target. This too is an old story (predating 
9/11), but it’s essential to any understanding of the freedoms we need 
to regain. As veteran defense attorney Harvey Silverglate demonstrated 
in Three Felonies a Day: How the Feds Target the Innocent, virtually “every 
citizen is vulnerable to prosecution and prison . . . it is only a slight exag-
geration to say that the average busy professional in this country wakes 
up in the morning, goes to work, comes home, takes care of personal and 
family obligations, and then goes to sleep, unaware that he or she likely 
committed several felonies that day.”12
The danger of being indicted for unwitting, questionable, technical 
“crimes” is practically impossible to measure. If a majority of us will not be 
prosecuted, virtually all of us remain at risk, because prosecutorial power 
may be exercised arbitrarily. Instead of choosing their cases, prosecutors 
sometimes choose their defendants. As a result “normal daily activities 
expose us to potential prosecution at the whim of a government official.”13
Don’t rest assured that presumptions of innocence will protect you 
from wrongful conviction of a relatively weak or even fanciful charge. 
The vast majority of cases are plea- bargained, in no small part because 
harsh mandatory sentencing laws effectively empower prosecutors to 
extort pleas: they “structure plea bargains in ways that make it nearly 
impossible for normal, rational, self- interest calculating people to risk 
going to trial.”14
The systematic abuse of plea bargaining has been a defining charac-
teristic of federal drug cases, in which defendants are routinely threat-
ened with decades- long, mandatory sentences for nonviolent crimes if 
they dare exercise the right to a trial. Not surprisingly, 97% of defendants 
charged with federal drug offenses plead guilty,15 although many of these 
pleas are not exactly voluntary:
“To coerce guilty pleas, and sometimes to coerce cooperation as well, 
prosecutors routinely threaten ultra- harsh, enhanced mandatory sen-
tences that no one— not even the prosecutors themselves— thinks are ap-
propriate,” Federal District Court Judge John Gleeson stressed in 2013, 
in U.S.A. v Kupa.16 “And to demonstrate to defendants generally that 
those threats are sincere, prosecutors insist on the imposition of the un-
just punishments when the threatened defendants refuse to plead guilty.”
Defendant Lulzim Kupa reluctantly agreed to a plea carrying an 
eleven- year sentence, Judge Gleeson stressed. He was initially offered a 
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plea carrying about a nine- year sentence (not including credits for “good 
time”), a plea he was given only one day to consider. Because he failed to 
accept it immediately, prosecutors increased the sentence they offered in 
a second, one- day- only deal. They increased it again a third time, when 
he failed to accept the second offer quickly. Not surprisingly, Kupa gave 
in and accepted the third plea deal carrying an additional two years over 
the first offer because, he told Judge Gleeson, he didn’t want to risk life 
imprisonment and he “wanted to plead guilty, before things get worse.”
This looks less like a justice system than a protection racket. Kupa was 
a drug dealer, but he seems less of a threat than his thuggish prosecu-
tors, who wielded formidable official power, unmitigated by fairness or a 
sense of proportion. Their abuses were normalized by the war on drugs 
and accentuated by gross racial disparities in drug war enforcement.17
Then came the war on terror. It brought us torture; a lawless, secret 
surveillance state; the summary, indefinite detention of people rightly or 
wrongly suspected of terrorism; increased racial profiling; blacklists of 
questionable accuracy that keep harmless people off airplanes or covertly 
deny them credit and employment;18 and criminal prohibitions on pure 
political speech reminiscent of early twentieth- century red scares.19 The 
war on drugs dramatically eroded civil liberty. The war on terror could 
deliver the coup de grace.
Can liberty be restored without a coup d’état? Perhaps, with a combi-
nation of technological defenses to surveillance20 and legal reforms, in-
cluding demilitarizing local police forces, curtailing prosecutorial power, 
and reinstating defendants’ rights. Reforms will depend on strengthening 
the nascent, left/right coalition of security/surveillance state critics and 
mobilizing a voting public that’s a lot less susceptible to fearmongering 
and a lot more alert to incursions on liberty. Civil libertarians can cite 
some reason to hope: the drug war has fallen out of favor, at last. It is a 
widely acknowledged, costly, counterproductive failure, and an unprec-
edented majority of Americans now favor legalizing marijuana.21 The 
Snowden revelations sparked awareness of surveillance that could even-
tually result in a few reforms.
But to date (October 2014) increased concern about privacy and mil-
itarized policing hasn’t inspired significant opposition to security state 
abuses or inefficiencies. Instead, renewed fear of terrorism, following the 




port for surveillance and decreased support for reform, predictably. Pub-
lic opinion on the balance between liberty and security is labile, shaped 
by the news of the day and the fear it inspires.
A year before ISIS dominated the news, the public desire for privacy 
seemed strong enough to challenge the need to feel safe and protected 
by government spies. A November 2013 Washington Post poll found that 
a majority of Americans (60 percent) believed that Edward Snowden 
“damaged national security,” at the same time that a slightly stronger 
majority (68 percent) believed that the NSA intrudes on some privacy 
rights. “Dueling concerns about privacy and national security are fueling 
a division over the NSA’s efforts,” the Post quite reasonably concluded.22 
A January 2014 Pew Research poll found the public evenly divided over 
whether Snowden’s actions served or harmed the public interest.23
Nine months later, however, the Pew Research Center found “a shift-
ing balance between concerns about civil liberties and protection from 
terrorism. In a reversal from last year after Edward Snowden’s NSA 
leaks, 50% today say they are more concerned that government anti- 
terrorism policies have not gone far enough to protect the country, while 
35% are more concerned that the policies have gone too far in restricting 
civil liberties.”24
Compare public support for government surveillance when fear 
predominates, or relative passivity in the face of surveillance in calmer 
times, with skepticism about big government and right- wing elegies for 
freedom. The cognitive dissonance wrought by attacks on Big Brother 
and demands for his protection is practically deafening. But it’s not hard 
to understand.
Electronic surveillance is a particularly insidious threat to liberty be-
cause it’s invisible and immaterial. We can’t see or feel it. If police officers 
broke into all our homes and riffled through our papers and personal 
effects, we’d be outraged. (If they were searching for illegal guns, the 
NRA would call for revolution.) But empower a huge, unwieldy, unac-
countable government bureaucracy to covertly compile digital profiles of 
our personal and professional lives? Many of us shrug and accept the loss 
of privacy as the price of feeling safe.
Still, the surveillance state doesn’t simply rely on our fear or indiffer-
ence. Its operation is a mystery to millions of people with relatively lim-
ited technological sophistication. The systems described in documents 
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released by Snowden are complicated and arcane, and, I suspect, beyond 
the ken of most of us. Barton Gellman, who covered national security 
issues for the Washington Post, stressed the difficulties of analyzing doc-
uments obtained from Snowden. “On first reading, I understood maybe 
half of any given memo or slide deck in the materials,” he told the New 
Yorker. “These are internal documents, dense with jargon and acronyms 
and references to things that are common knowledge at Fort Meade 
(NSA headquarters).”25
Gellman and others, notably Glenn Greenwald, broke the materials 
down for us. Still, the number of people who have followed their stories 
closely probably constitutes a small percentage of the population. The 
number who have followed their stories and accurately recall the details 
must be even smaller. Even if majorities are generally aware that the gov-
ernment is tracking us, only a relatively small minority of people seem 
likely to comprehend what that tracking entails. I doubt that many of 
our elected representatives are among them.
Do aging federal court judges understand the surveillance state? The 
Supreme Court is still grappling with email, according to Justice Elena 
Kagan. “The justices are not necessarily the most technologically sophis-
ticated people,” she acknowledged.26 In the short term at least, this does 
not bode well for liberty. These unsophisticated people are powerful ar-
biters (sometimes the final arbiters) of freedom in the digital age. Judges 
struggling to master email are probably flummoxed by an iPhone. How 
can they determine if complex systems that they don’t understand in-
trude gratuitously and unconstitutionally infringe on fundamental free-
doms?
We can look forward, perhaps, to the technological sophistication 
of older judges increasing over time. We know that a younger genera-
tion more at ease with technology will eventually dominate the federal 
bench, and we can hope that a critical mass of them will be solicitous of 
liberty. Is there reason for at least cautious optimism?
Younger Americans do tend to be more critical of the surveillance 
state, perhaps because they’re more sophisticated technologically (and 
more likely to live online). A majority of Americans age sixty- four and 
older condemn Edward Snowden as a traitor, according to a 2013 Rea-
son Magazine poll, while a plurality of Americans between the ages of 




Libertarians claim their movement is growing and attracting the 
young, and perhaps they’re right. Twenty- two percent of Americans 
harbor libertarian sympathies, according to a 2013 poll by the Public 
Religion Research Institute.28 Seven percent are “consistent libertarians” 
and 15 percent of Americans “lean libertarian.” Almost all are white, 
more than two- thirds are male, and nearly two- thirds are under age fifty. 
The CATO Institute, a libertarian think tank, has identified 14 percent 
of voters as libertarian and notes, “other surveys find a larger number of 
people who hold views . . . best described as libertarian. A 2009 Gallup 
poll found that 23 percent held libertarian views.” Acknowledging that 
young Americans “defy easy ideological categorization,” CATO found 
that “there is a large bloc of young people who can fairly be described as 
libertarian,” meaning they’re socially liberal and fiscally conservative.29 
According to a Pew Research Center survey on political rhetoric, “the 
word libertarian receives a very positive reaction from younger Ameri-
cans, older people tend to view it negatively.”30
Will a “rising tide” of young libertarians save us? We’re accustomed 
to pinning hopes for the future on the young. (What choice do we 
have?) Our hopes that they’ll succeed where their elders have failed 
in curbing surveillance with legal reforms, or thwarting it with new 
technologies (such as secure communications systems or privacy wear 
for you and your phone), may not be misplaced. But we shouldn’t as-
sume a generational commitment to liberty. CATO is probably right 
that a “large bloc” of young people skew libertarian, but I suspect that 
an equally large bloc are antilibertarian, considering attitudes toward 
free speech (and due process for students accused of sexual misconduct) 
that prevail on U.S. campuses and among many young, self- identified 
feminists.
It is conventional wisdom on college and university campuses (and 
off campus among many self- proclaimed progressives) that “free speech 
doesn’t include hate speech or a right to offend.” This is dangerous non-
sense. The purpose of free speech is the protection of speech deemed 
hateful or offensive by people who’d like to silence it. But this is popu-
lar nonsense too, reflected in campus speech and harassment codes that 
give administrators broad discretion to punish “bad” speech typically de-
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Students who identify as progressive tend to support and exploit these 
codes to protect an imagined civil right not to take offense, at the ob-
vious expense of a right to give it. A “large bloc” of young people have 
internalized the notion that speech they deem “bullying,” insulting, or 
demeaning— including speech that insults or demeans on the basis of 
race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, ethnicity, or vaguely defined per-
sonal and political characteristics, such as appearance, attire, and be-
liefs— is not speech but an actionable form of discrimination.
Colleges and universities are training generations of educated Amer-
icans (tomorrow’s leaders) to devalue our first, foundational freedom of 
speech, whether it protects insults, epithets, or unpopular religious ideals 
and political opinions. The belief that unwelcome speech is the equiv-
alent of unwelcome action, properly subject to equivalent regulation, 
is entrenched on American campuses and will not soon be dislodged. 
From this perspective, the First Amendment is a civility code designed 
to discourage or punish harsh criticisms and strenuous arguments that 
offend or upset people with diminished power. From this perspective, 
free speech is nice or, at worst, indifferent speech that supports social 
norms and the status quo instead of challenging them.
This is a therapeutic approach to democracy that’s fundamentally 
hostile to civil liberty. It effectively condemns freedom, especially free-
dom of speech, as the victimization of presumptively vulnerable people 
and a bar to equality. An approach conceived by the left, decades ago, it’s 
now mirrored on the right by religious conservatives who condemn the 
freedom for minority beliefs secured by separation of church and state as 
the victimization of Christians— the annual casualties of an imaginary 
war on Christmas.
Right and left, these therapeutic perspectives tend to confuse asser-
tions of power with demands for freedom. Pro- censorship progressives 
frame the power to suppress “verbal assaults” or harassment, vaguely de-
fined, as the exercise of their right to be free from speech presumed 
to retard equality. Religious conservatives frame the power to impose 
officially sanctioned sectarian prayer on participants in public events or 
students in public schools as exercises of their own religious freedom. In 
this view, freedom is a zero- sum game in which my freedom to speak 
offensively violates your freedom not to be offended, and my freedom to 




Whether it’s disingenuous or simply delusional, this characterization 
of power as an exercise or guarantor of freedom dangerously comple-
ments and supports the paternalistic post- 9/11 surveillance state. It too 
markets power (like the power to spy on us, trampling freedoms of asso-
ciation and speech) as an essential safeguard of freedom from terrorism.
“Freedom is about authority,” former New York City Mayor Rudy 
Giuliani explained. “Freedom is about the willingness of every single 
human being to cede to lawful authority a great deal of discretion about 
what you do.”32 NSA officials and others who exercise immense author-
ity, or crave it, probably agree. The disdain of people in power for indi-
vidual liberty is familiar and perhaps inevitable. Liberty is a leash on 
power, requiring a firm, fearless grip and a refusal to identify with “lawful 
authorities” in the mistaken belief that their interests reliably coincide 
with your own. “Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to 
protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent,” Justice 
Brandeis observed.33 In a relatively democratic society, liberty is most 
at risk when the subjects of power agree to unleash it for their own im-
agined good.
If a majority or influential minority of Americans adopts the author-
itarian definition of freedom as voluntary obeisance, then freedom’s fu-
ture as a rhetorical device is secure. This sad future, in which freedom is 
merely a word, is too easily imagined, considering the electronic “archi-
tecture of oppression” created since 9/11. Can we envision and establish 
an alternative, a country in which freedom is a state of being and we’re 
at liberty to choose relative autonomy, privacy, and self- expression over 
immersion in “sivilization” and submission to a government unbound? Is 
this a vision that many Americans embrace? It requires sacrificing the 
sense of security offered by an omniscient security/surveillance state and 
the comfort of belonging to an orderly collective. Liberty doesn’t just 
require eternal vigilance: It relies on individualism. It demands resilience 
and acceptance of risks that cannot be controlled.
For freedom to prevail, it must be fervently desired. How much, at 
what cost, do we want to be free? John Stuart Mill wondered, lament-
ing the “despotism of custom . . . a social tyranny more formidable than 
many kinds of political oppression.”34 Easy for him to say, you might re-
spond; Mill never experienced political oppression. But we are obviously 
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shaped and inhibited by custom, which, these days reflects the despotism 
of fear. Freedom’s fate depends on our escape. The future is our only un-
tamed territory.
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Especially about the Future
Mark A. Ratner
Lawrence B. Dumas Distinguished University Professor,  
Northwestern University
The great Danish physicist and philosopher Niels Bohr is credited with 
saying, “Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future.” In Den-
mark, this remark is usually attributed to Storm P, a creative newspaper 
cartoonist of the early twentieth century. When thinking about predict-
ing or even imagining the scientific advances by the year 2040, it is wise 
to remember that these remarks came both from a physicist/philosopher 
and from a newsman/cartoonist. While the word “science” has its roots 
in the Greek word meaning “knowledge,” much of science comes from 
the collaboration/conflict of knowledge and imagination. And it’s al-
most certainly true that in 2015 our imagination of where science will be 
twenty- five years out is going to be incorrect, unimaginative, and wide of 
the mark. It is a challenge, and an opportunity to have fun— what will 
science be like in 2040?
Looking Backward
One way to analyze looking forward is to take the Edward Bellamy ap-
proach and look backward first— if we go back, for example, some forty 
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years to 1975, we see some things that are highly familiar, and we mark 
the absence of great discoveries and advances that have occurred in the 
four decades between then and now. In 1975 there were no scanning 
tunneling microscopes, no analyses of the genome of any animal or plant, 
no observations of single molecule behavior, and no “big data.” There 
were no genetic synthesis methodologies (short strands of DNA could 
be made; sequencing the DNA of any species was thought about but 
certainly not yet possible). The Higgs boson was a concept, not a reality.
More strikingly, there were some now- accepted sciences that simply 
didn’t exist— or existed in a very jejune and halting way— including ma-
terials science, computer science, chemical biology, and nanoscience.
In 1975, wonderful science was being done outside of universities, 
academies, and not- for- profit laboratories. Great labs existed— Bell 
Laboratories, Xerox, Kodak, Exxon, Amoco, and a number of big 
pharma firms— and nearly every science was pursued by industries large 
and small.
In 1973– 74, Nobel Prizes in Physics were awarded for work in tunnel-
ing phenomena in semiconductors and superconductors, for radio astro-
physics, and for the discovery of pulsars. In chemistry, they were awarded 
for fundamental achievements in the physical chemistry of macro-
molecules and for organometallic sandwich compounds. In physiology 
and medicine, they were awarded for the organization of individual and 
social behavior patterns and for the structural and functional organi-
zation of the cell. These topics are still of substantial importance— the 
continuity of science, as it goes from focus in one area to focus in another 
but does not forget the first, suggests that we can indeed say something 
not too silly about what will happen in the next four decades.
There is another view. For example, the English physicist Paul Dirac 
wrote, “The fundamental laws necessary for the mathematical treatment 
of a large part of physics and the whole of chemistry are thus completely 
known, and the difficulty lies only in the fact that application of these 
laws leads to equations that are too complex to be solved.”1 The expo-
nential growth of computational capability over the last four decades has 
permitted use of the quantum mechanics (that Dirac helped invent) to 
predict, clarify, and understand all sorts of chemistry, from the color of 
dyes to the production of better magnets to the chemical properties of 




the chemical discipline by insights based on physics, and permits easier 
bridging of the chemical sciences to physics, materials science, biology, 
medicine, climatology, engineering science, and earth science.
John Horgan, a science writer and journalist, wrote a book in 1996 
called The End of Science. In his earlier article, entitled “The Death of 
Proof,” that appeared in the October 1993 number of Scientific American 
(Horgan apparently liked deaths and ends), he claimed that the tradi-
tional concepts of mathematical proof were being undermined by new 
complexity and by the application of computation. David Hoffmann 
said that this article had generated “torrents of howls and complaints 
from mathematicians.”2 The End of Science essentially claimed that we 
both knew too much and were (as a society) too timid. The book was 
actually brought on by the cancellation of the superconducting super-
collider, and a general feeling that support for scientific research in the 
United States was failing.
Horgan felt that such great advances as Darwin’s theory of evolution, 
the Watson- Crick structure of DNA’s double helix, and the major ad-
vances in physics, from relativity and quantum mechanics on, were great 
strides and were being replaced by strides that didn’t seem so great.
The response to Horgan’s book was pretty striking. Most scientists 
didn’t like it, and some highly articulate scientists responded quite neg-
atively. Philip Anderson, a distinguished solid state physicist and Nobel 
Prize winner, said, “The reason that Horgan’s pessimism is so wrong lies 
in the nature of science itself. Whenever a question receives an answer, 
science moves on and asks a new kind of question, of which there seem 
to be an endless supply.”3 Horgan and his book are important, because 
that endless supply isn’t always clear. Indeed, seeing that endless supply 
requires vision— vision that will often be rewarded by huge advances 
in experiment, in modeling, in understanding, and in imagination (and 
even by a home in Silicon Valley).
Questions, Answers, and More Questions
Science is in the business of asking these questions. I. I. Rabi (another 
thoughtful Nobel Prize winner in physics) relates the story that when he 
returned home from school, his mother didn’t ask him what he had learned 
today but rather “did you ask a good question today?”4 Asking the right 
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good questions, and answering them as best we can, is the hallmark of true 
science. And as humans we do question, and when we stop questioning, 
we stop learning. So it seems that the nature of the human being is going 
to result in vibrant, ongoing science four decades out, and far beyond.
Another way of seeing is technology. When I polled my undergradu-
ate students on what science is going to be like twenty- five years out, they 
wrote quite persuasively about the disappearance of computer screens, 
the omnipresence of communications, the biomedical devices that will 
make our lives far richer, self- driving and self- parking cars, and all the 
other advances that will certainly happen and will probably be dwarfed 
by other accomplishments of technology. But predicting technology 
twenty- five years out is even more fraught than doing that for science. 
Science depends on imagination, on experiment, and on the building 
of understanding. Technology is the powerful, lusty, productive, ungov-
erned love child of science and business. Advances in technology travel 
many roads, from the Edisonian approach of trying many things (which 
has now become, in slicked- up form, one of the ways of doing both mo-
lecular and materials discovery) to the computational data discovery and 
data mining that are one of the flavors of today. So our discussion here 
will exclude technology, because unlike science, it’s not so much about 
asking questions as about anticipating, answering, and creating demands 
and interacting with the requirements and desires of people.
Why, How, and Looking Forward
The drivers of scientific inquiry have varied over the years. The alche-
mists were driven by desire both for riches and for ways to interfere with 
the mortality tables. Despite this, they contributed tremendously to the 
growth of modern chemistry. For roughly the last 150 years, the major 
drivers for science were a combination of military (Rumford, Heisen-
berg, Haber, and others), curiosity (Faraday, Hilbert, Einstein, etc.), and 
nutrition (Borlaug, Haber, Carver, et al.). A great deal of science came 
from simple need for filthy lucre: while it didn’t pay very well in most 
cases, scientific endeavor was rewarded by the society, and some out-
standing scientists could attain unimagined status— excellent scientists 
such as Lavoisier, Rutherford, Gibbs, Crick, Langmuir, and many others 




The foregoing list is entirely male and entirely white. This homogene-
ity has begun to change, with huge advantages both for the creativity of 
science and for the ability of science to explain the universe. The scientific 
workforce of 2015 is more diverse in every area than it has ever been 
before— gender, race, age, residence, and social standing are less determi-
native of scientific success. In 2040, the scientific workforce will be driven 
by curiosity, by the wish for reward, and by human needs. Human needs– 
driven science is already important (National Institutes of Health!), but 
it will be more so twenty- five years out, when (provided diplomacy keeps 
up with science) the world will, for the first time, no longer have hunger 
as a cause of death. Human needs involving health, creativity, leisure, lon-
gevity, and the opportunity to create, to enjoy, and to savor the best parts 
of life will be principal drivers for scientific exploration.
In 2040 the interest in, and domination of, life sciences will be even 
greater than it is now. We will continue to seek understanding of bi-
ological processes, both synthetic and natural. One huge challenge in 
life science has to do with the enormous diversity that living creatures 
represent. This has generated a set of life sciences that are breathtaking 
in their breadth, depth, and importance. They are also balkanized in their 
rules and understandings.
Mathematics has crucially important theorems and methodologies, 
going back to Newton and Leibnitz and proceeding through Gauss, 
Hilbert, and many others. Physics has Newton’s laws and Einstein’s ex-
tension of them; it has the laws of thermodynamics (which it shares with 
chemistry) and the laws of quantum mechanics (which it shares with 
all the other sciences). Earth science has all of chemistry and physics 
to support it, in addition to the understandings of Wegener concerning 
continental drift that has dominated much of the evolution of and on 
the earth for the past few million years. Chemistry is the most syncretic 
and broad of all the sciences. It requires for its understanding all of the 
above, plus ideas and methods such as Faraday’s laws for electrochemis-
try, the quantum and statistical mechanics of physics, polymer science, 
and many other themes gathered from the knowledge that humanity has 
developed since the Greeks.
But biology is different. Published in 2015, the wonderful compen-
dium entitled Molecular Biology of the Cell (by Alberts et al.) contains 
twenty- five chapters.5 Written by some of the true leaders in the life 
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sciences, it describes issues ranging from antibodies to zooplankton. But 
overall integrating concepts and quantitative relationships are nearly 
lacking. Moreover, life science is more essentially compartmentalized 
than earth science, physics, chemistry, and others. The science required to 
understand the nervous system and the science required to understand 
photosynthesis are intrinsically different. DNA replication has little to 
do with kidney function; brain science and bone science rely on different 
interpretations of structure and behavior.
In 2040, the quest for more general organizing principles in the bio-
logical sciences will have advanced substantially. In 2015, the wonderful 
ability to maintain understandings by a series of well- defined equations 
(the cornerstone of physics) fails to describe biological structure and dy-
namics. Even twenty- five years out, it is not clear that those understand-
ings will have been completed in life science.
In 2015, we are aware of the existence of millions of exoplanets (planets 
circling stars that are not our sun), and it is probable that there are at least 
a million times (or a hundred million or a billion or . . .) that many. Cer-
tainly some of these planets have water on them, and the combination of 
the water and the sunlight, plus a nitrogenous atmosphere from historical 
times, strongly suggests that some sort of life might well have evolved on 
those planets. At some time in the future (unless the human inhabitants 
of Earth destroy it), there will be communication between Earth and one 
of these planets. That will be the most awesome (a word popular among 
young people in 2015) event in the history of humankind. Proof that we 
are not alone, that elsewhere in the universe there is life— and life that in 
some sense is akin to our own— would be the greatest news story ever, 
and it would arise from astrophysics. This will eventually happen. With 
advances in radio astronomy and detection, as well as our knowledge of 
the existence of exoplanets, it could well happen by 2040. Carl Sagan, 
using the Drake equation and some reasonable assumptions, deduced in 
the twentieth century that there are thriving civilizations in our galactic 
neighborhood. Making their acquaintance would be stupendous!
Some Actual Predictions
The late Irving Klotz, an articulate and distinguished faculty member in 




ing of many scientists that they were “frequently in error, but never in 
doubt.” Being in error— in an intelligent, creative, falsifiable, and combi-
native way— is a great accomplishment in science, and these predictions 
certainly demonstrate that.
Technology will continue, both unstopped and unstoppable. We will 
have universal connectivity among individuals worldwide, and we will 
have driverless cars. We may have fully renewable energy sources. We’ll 
have instant daily diagnosis of diseases, life expectancy will exceed one 
hundred years, and we will probably have many more artificial compo-
nents to our bodies than we do now. But these engineering accomplish-
ments, though they will certainly change our lives (and probably mostly 
for the better) are not disruptive at the level of the great inventions of 
the past. Those included tonal music, evolution, the classification of an-
imals and plants, calculus, relativity, thermodynamics, evolution, flight, 
the printing press, radio, the steam engine, fire, splitting atoms, anesthe-
sia, and quantum mechanics. But asking the right question is frequently 
the most important thing in science. New questions will be asked, and 
new conceptual breakthroughs— perhaps in a class with music, flight, 
and fire— will be born.
The growth of science is remarkable. It is estimated that more than 
50 percent of all the scientists who ever lived were born after 1900. In-
deed, the word “scientist” is relatively new— it was coined by William 
Whewell in 1833. In 2015, there are more scientists alive than there ever 
have been previously, and they are better supported by government, by 
individuals, by companies, and by philanthropy. This could not possibly 
have been imagined when Michael Faraday was supposed to have said 
to Gladstone (who had asked what good would come from electricity), 
“Why, sir, there is every probability that you will soon be able to tax it.”6
The philosopher of science Karl Popper claimed that a true scientific 
fact had to be falsifiable— that is, such statements as “this is a happy on-
ion” or “that rock is really distressed” are not scientific statements because 
they can’t be disproven. Accordingly, it has become a norm in experi-
mental science over the last century to publish results in open journals so 
that they can be reproduced or not. Quoting the Economist (October 13, 
2013), “The idea that the same experiments always get the same results, 
no matter who performs them, is one of the cornerstones of science’s 
claim to objective truth. If a systematic campaign of replication does not 
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lead to the same results, then either the original research is flawed or the 
replications are. Either way, something is awry.” The Economist goes on 
to say that because some experiments are extremely difficult, the statis-
tics are difficult to understand, and there are huge expenditures involved 
in making observations or measurements. Falsification is no longer a sig-
nificant activity. The Economist describes the current state of falsifiability 
as essentially irrelevant.
Bruce Alberts (the brilliant and prolific scientist mentioned earlier, 
who was both the editor of Science magazine and the president of the 
National Academy of Sciences) is quoted in the Economist as saying, 
“Scientists themselves . . . need to develop a value system where simply 
moving on from one’s mistakes without publicly acknowledging them 
severely damages, rather than protects scientific reputation.” The Econ-
omist finishes the discussion by saying that “this will not be easy. But 
if science is to stay on its tracks, and be worthy of the trust so widely 
invested in it, it may be necessary.”
Science is done by people. Often these people are extremely careful 
and painstaking; more often, these people are only as careful and pains-
taking as they feel it is necessary to be. Mistakes are made, and in various 
fields of science those mistakes can be falsified quite quickly— if a new 
molecule is made in a particular way and the preparation is published, 
other scientists can try to reproduce it— and if they can’t, the originator 
almost certainly has made an error. The search for novelty in science and 
the nature of the support of scientific research guarantee that game- 
changing ideas will be examined but do not guarantee that these ideas 
can be falsified or will be examined from the viewpoint of falsification. 
So the definition of truth in science will be based on the acceptance by 
scientific peers and not whether the idea can be falsified.
Science is certainly a healthy and growing subculture within society. 
Per the National Science Board, the United States publishes more sci-
ence and engineering articles than any other country, although the com-
bined output of the European Union is larger than that of the United 
States. Asia’s research article output is approaching parity with the 
United States and the European Union. Between 1997 and 2011, Asia’s 
output more than doubled, led primarily by China. In 2011, China pro-
duced 11 percent of the world’s science and engineering articles, more 




shows no signs of stopping, but it eventually must. I feel that it will slow 
down substantially over the next twenty- five years and become a crucial 
but no longer growing aspect of our global society.
The discovery of life outside of Earth will be (in my view) the greatest 
scientific/technological event ever, and there is a strong possibility that 
this will happen by 2040. There also might be a year in which human-
ity, by working hard to make this century different from all previous 
centuries, will conquer poverty and starvation, and control the nature 
of climate change. We have the science and technology to feed, clothe, 
and maintain all the people on Earth (provided the number of people 
on Earth doesn’t grow rapidly and eventually becomes constant). That 
would be an accomplishment which we would happily brag about to 
the new life that we have discovered in a different part of the galactic 
universe.
The 2015 world of experimental science will be completely revolu-
tionized in the next four decades by a combination of robotics and com-
puter simulation. Robots will do all sorts of things, ranging from complex 
chemical synthesis to materials testing, from manipulation of objects to 
tedious repetitive labors. They will do essentially all of the maintenance 
and machining necessary in physics and chemistry laboratories and in 
the commercial world, and they will use 3- D assembly to create (based 
on computer input) samples of materials, composites, blends, glasses, ar-
rested relaxation materials, and hybrid organic- inorganic entities. Light 
manipulation and lasers will also be used by robots and by the devices 
that they will prepare.
One prediction of which I’m reasonably sure is that coffee (or, in ex-
otic situations, espresso) will remain the fuel of science in 2040 and well 
beyond.
In life sciences, astonishing new knowledge will have been created. 
But major challenges will still remain, and new questions will be asked. 
Professor Cees Dekker of the University of Delft in the Netherlands is 
a distinguished physicist who, at the start of the twenty- first century, be-
came deeply interested in biology. He suggests that by 2040 brain scans 
will be routine and perhaps allow even science fiction– type abilities such 
as reading thoughts. This is a bit frightening. While information tech-
nology and governmental slipperiness have essentially removed the right 
to privacy in most countries in 2015, the last bit of privacy— thinking to 
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ourselves, talking to ourselves, and letting our brains invent and discover 
new things— will be no longer be limited to ourselves but might be read 
by using brain scans.
How to connect the concepts of the “mind” and “brain” will be un-
resolved, and the Sisyphean quest for understanding consciousness and 
mind will continue and remain one of the foremost questions in science 
(and in philosophy).
“Synthetic biology” will be a daily commodity, and microorganisms 
(because of their adaptive abilities) will be used for many practical appli-
cations, from sanitation to coloring paint to soothing mosquito bites to 
creating food. Synthetic biology will have provided artificial cells, whose 
major applications in the areas of drug delivery and regenerative med-
icine will have (together with robotics and new materials) completely 
changed the face of surgery and many other parts of medicine.
Some Thoughts to Consider
Erwin Schrödinger, one of the founders of quantum mechanics, wrote a 
book in 1944 entitled What Is Life? 7 He decided the simplest way that 
life could reproduce itself would be a solid material that is not periodic 
(that is, in which the same structure was not repeated next to itself time 
and again). This was one of the original thoughts that led to the develop-
ment and understanding of DNA in the 1950s. The fundamental entity 
in biology, the cell, will be built using synthetic biology. This capability to 
construct arbitrary cell structures will tremendously deepen our under-
standing of cellular phenomena and our ability to prolong life.
According to the “many worlds” theory/interpretation of quantum 
mechanics, each motion or selection or choice made by an entity re-
sults in at least two different universes being instantaneously created. 
The created universes evolve in space- time for whatever short period 
elapses before yet another motion is made, another bifurcation into two 
universes is caused, and we keep going on multiple, noncommunicating 
paths, less traveled by. This “many worlds” interpretation is one of many 
suggestions as to how time evolution occurs in systems with coherent 
quantum mixing. If that theory is right, then between 2015 and 2040, 
the number of new universes created will have increased exponentially. 




multiple new worlds to separate from one another, lost in space- time.
Given these possibilities for creating new worlds, I am somewhat em-
boldened. The unruly, brilliant offspring of this science is capable of amaz-
ing feats, of repetitive motions that seem useless, and of lightning-like 
understandings and predictions, whose grandeur and intellectual sharp-
ness are as exciting as going over the falls in a barrel.
So this short piece on what science— both physical and biological— 
might be like four decades from now is both detailed and playful, both 
serious and silly, both understood and questionable. Montaigne, in the 
third book of his Essays, said it better than anyone:
The lines of my portrait are never at fault, although they change 
and vary. The world is a perpetual see- saw. Everything goes 
incessantly up and down— the earth, the rocks of the Caucasus, 
the pyramids of Egypt— both with the universal motion and 
with their own. Constancy itself is nothing but a more sluggish 
movement. I cannot fix my subject. He is always restless, and 
reels with a natural intoxication. . . . It is a record of various and 
variable occurrences, an account of thoughts that are unsettled 
and, as chance will have it, at times contradictory, either be-
cause I am then another self, or because I approach my subject 
under different circumstances and with other considerations . . . 
I do not teach, I tell.
Afterword
Northwestern University is in the Midwest, and its faculty members are 
noted not only for their academic distinction and superb teaching but 
also for openness, candor, imagination, and a willingness to share. I asked 
some of my colleagues about what the world of science might be like in 
2040, and I got a number of quite striking responses. They’re reproduced 
here because we’ve already established that essentially nobody has any 
real clue as to what will have happened by then.
1. My vision for twenty- five years from now is truly grim. I fear that 
the current environmental crisis will have exploded into worldwide ca-
lamity. Coupled with human-induced atmospheric change, the alteration 
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of the earth’s oceans expands the threat to a global one. Humanity may be 
struggling to survive. So science in twenty- five years will be focused on 
survival and damage control. (Donna Jurdy, Earth and Planetary Science)
2. Stem cells will be viable for disease treatment. There will be more 
reliance on human tissue for testing compounds as there has been little 
or no translation from animal models to human disease in neurode-
generative diseases or cancer. More industry partnerships will form to 
attack diseases without treatments. (Richard Silverman, Chemistry)
3. A big question about what life will be like in twenty- five years is 
how good is simulation technology, as we can all imagine that this will 
be used before any experiments are done, at least in most fields. There is 
much that we might expect concerning designer devices and biomole-
cules. Many structural and device materials could be more interesting if 
we can make them without defects on the micron scale— this is unheard 
of in nature. (George Schatz, Chemistry)
4. Despite considerable research investment we will not achieve the 
dream of a practical computer based on quantum mechanics.  Such com-
puters are predicted to have enormous power and efficiency.  Nonetheless, 
from the effort we can anticipate a leap in scientific achievements gener-
ating  spin-offs of new electronic devices for processing information with 
applications to smart health care and facile forms of communication. 
(Bill Halperin, Physics and Astronomy) 
5. We will understand the design and operation of complex systems, 
whether those systems are signaling networks in cells, many- reagent 
chemical reactions, the air traffic control problem, or anything else. We 
will grow organs in the lab for transplantation, enabled by more un-
derstanding of the biology and material scaffolds. The protein folding 
problem will be solved, and we will be able to design from first prin-
ciples enzymes that catalyze any given reaction. Our understanding of 
chemical reactivity will allow us to create machines that both plan and 
perform synthesis of any molecule. (Milan Mrksich, Chemistry and Life 
Sciences)
6. Scientists will start to measure with some precision the cosmic neu-
trino background, which provides a snapshot of the universe when it 
was one second old. The explosion of a nearby type 2 supernova in 2037 
will lead to the observation of hundreds of thousands of neutrino events 




Chile/Argentina, finally providing enough information to allow us to 
understand in great detail how stars explode. (André Luiz de Gouvêa, 
Physics and Astronomy)
7. A major theme in science will be complexity. We’ll continue to 
better understand complex systems as presented by biology and the en-
vironment. We will assemble or synthesize complex systems with greater 
control over the structures that combine to make an overall complex 
system. Catalysts will be made this way using strategies similar to what 
is now done in microelectronics. (Peter Stair, Chemistry)
8. I predict that dark energy and dark matter will become as laughable 
as phlogiston and aether. We will have found exoplanets with life on 
them. We will have figured out how the first stars, galaxies, and massive 
black holes (greater than 10^5 x solar mass) formed and reionized the 
universe. (Melville Ulmer, Physics and Astronomy)
These visions from active and thoughtful scientists show how presci-
ent and spot- on Montaigne was. Science in 2040 will be powerful and 
vibrant, asking new questions, supporting and challenging society, mak-
ing mistakes, and following the shaky path toward greater knowledge.
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The Era of Answers
John Kelly III
Senior Vice President and Head of IBM Research
Nobody would be shocked to hear that technology can change radically 
in twenty- five years. All you have to do is look back twenty- five years 
from today to see the distance we have traveled. In 1989, cell phones 
were a new phenomenon and could only make static- filled voice calls, 
and almost no one bought anything online. In 2013, a billion smart-
phones were sold.1 They have become the door to a vast parallel land-
scape of commercial, personal, and societal life. Among millennials, 
these devices are used for only the occasional phone call.
Over the coming twenty- five years, from 2015 to 2040, technology 
will change more radically than ever before. Information technology is 
just beginning a historic transformation. We’re about to move to com-
puters that work differently from the way computers have worked since 
the 1950s. They won’t be programmed— they’ll learn on their own, and 
through data they will have an awareness of the world and events around 
them. More important, they will enable a new wave of digital services 
that fill gaps in our perception, improve our judgment, and magnify our 
cognition.
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We’re about to evolve beyond the information age to enter the age 
of insight. In 2040, value will come from readily surfacing connections, 
insights, and answers buried deep in a universe of data— natural and 
human- generated— as limitless, emergent, and difficult to penetrate as 
the physical universe.
The shift will gain momentum, so that by 2040 technology will play a 
role we can barely comprehend today. (Who in 1990 could have grasped 
that something called Twitter might help organize rebels in Libya so 
they could overthrow a dictator?) In the coming era, technology will al-
low us to see more clearly using data and to think completely differently 
about age- old problems both large and small.
The economic implications will be significant. Among them will be a 
changed purpose for the corporation. In the 1930s, the economist Ron-
ald Coase famously argued that corporations existed to reduce transac-
tion costs— the costs of putting together the right set of suppliers and 
people and facilities to produce something. That was the very reason for 
the rise of the large- scale, vertically integrated company. The rise of pro-
grammable computers supported that. Over the past twenty- five years, 
computing and networks have crushed transaction costs, speeding the 
dismantling of vertical companies and blowing up business models of 
entire industries.
If transaction costs no longer matter so much, why will next- 
generation enterprises exist?
The answer is answers. We will dramatically lower the cost and reduce 
the time to get answers or the insights that lead to them.
Already in 2015, we see a glimmer of this in the world of online 
search, social networks, and retailing. Their value comes from knowing 
things about customers and the market. It’s why Facebook’s insights are 
perceived as more valuable to the market than the massive operations of 
companies that produce more traditional products and services.
Over the next twenty- five years, this will no longer be the realm of 
the Internet start- up. Every industry and every profession will transform 
itself through data.
To explain the implications of the age of insight in a tangible way, I’ll 
go deeper into three other industries where change is afoot as answers 





In twenty- five years, it will seem almost medieval that you would take 
a pill or any treatment without already knowing exactly what it will do 
to your body. We will have systems that essentially build a virtual model 
of you, based on data ranging from your DNA, your family history, and 
medical records to your eating habits, sleep patterns, and work. Before 
taking any new medication, your doctor will be able to ask your virtual 
self: what will it do to you?
You will benefit from everything we know about the right treatment 
before you ingest anything— not after.
Education
In twenty- five years, it will seem mind- boggling that education was 
based mostly on time served— four years of college gets you a bachelor’s 
degree, another two gets you an M.B.A. Instead, technology will make it 
possible to build a lifelong education around every student individually. 
The technology will be smart, persistent, and aware enough to act as a 
tutor and adviser for every person, always knowing what the student is 
learning or not learning— and what he or she needs to study to reach 
specific goals.
A student will have personalized support, and educators will have a 
more nuanced view into whether a student is learning before that stu-
dent takes any tests.
Management
In twenty- five years, no decision maker will walk into a meeting with-
out his or her cognitive apps, or “cogs”— much as he or she would look 
to spreadsheets and reports today. Cogs will ingest millions of pages of 
documents related to the decision maker’s domain— more information 
than any human could ever get through in a lifetime. Cogs could act as 
an executive assistant or a sophisticated decision support system offering 
appropriate material, constructing scenarios, and helping model alter-
native arguments and evidence relevant to such complex questions as 
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whether a firm should acquire, organically develop, or partner to enter a 
new business segment.
Cogs will exist in the cloud, interact easily as in dialogue, and be ac-
cessible through anything from a mobile device to a smart tabletop or a 
tiny embedded earpiece.
They will help managers understand the possible outcomes of deci-
sions before those decisions get made.
Cognitive Computers
Technology is approaching a breaking point.
Torrents of data are flooding systems. Billions of people around the 
world are on the Internet, making transactions, posting on social net-
works, listening to music, and doing work— all of it generating data. 
By 2013, there were more than six billion mobile phone subscriptions 
globally, more than two billion of them with broadband capability add-
ing more data.2
On top of that, the physical world is becoming packed with sensors 
that digitize life— water flow in rivers, traffic on city streets, and the 
movement of goods and people and animals. There are already about a 
trillion connected devices generating data.
Computers won’t be able to keep up— at least not the programmable 
computers that have dominated for fifty to sixty years. Even if we can 
make those computers fast enough to crunch all that data, the software 
will be too inflexible to deal with the volume, speed, diversity, and uncer-
tain veracity of it all. As a result we will often get answers after they’re 
no longer valuable. We are like drivers of a car in a snowstorm who only 
have a sense of what we’re not seeing through the windshield.
Fortunately, we’re entering a new technology era. Let me explain.
The first era of computing— the tabulating era— began in the nine-
teenth century and continued into the 1940s. Tabulating machines were 
made up of a series of mechanical switches and were essentially elaborate 
adding devices, helping tally up a national census or a company’s payroll. 
This was an enormous advance, and it made possible the rise of the mod-
ern bureaucratic nation- state and the modern corporation.
The second era emerged in the 1940s— the programmable computing 




which got smaller and smaller and packed into microprocessors. The ma-
chines operate on an architecture described by mathematician John von 
Neumann: software programs tell the machines to carry out calculations 
in a series of steps, pulling in data stored separately from the programs. 
This is how most computers work today. While computers have gotten 
faster and faster, the von Neumann architecture means that all the work 
has to be lined up in the right steps as it flows through a machine’s pro-
cessors.
This, too, was a major advance in technology, business, and society. 
It made possible the multinational corporation— providing a common 
platform for everything from back office accounting to supply chains, 
ATMs, and travel reservation systems.
When the data is highly structured in understandable formats, such 
as tables in a database, programmable architecture does the job very well. 
But today, structured data is becoming a smaller and smaller fraction 
of what we are capturing. Most of what is known as “big data” looks 
more like life itself— full of images, sounds, patterns, language, and un-
certainty.
The new era of computing, just emerging, will be one of cognitive sys-
tems. Instead of being programmed by humans, computers will “learn” 
from their interactions with data and people, and they will adapt, like 
the brain, to many parallel connections among data streams at once, gen-
erating patterns, observations, and insights. These systems will draw on 
unimaginable amounts of information and also take into account what 
they “know” about the people asking the question and the environment 
around them. The machines will, for the first time, interact with us in 
ways that are almost human, bringing order to the chaos of free- flowing 
and diverse information— and do so in something like real time.
IBM’s Watson represents a starting point for a cognitive system.3 It 
shows what this kind of technology can do today, which helps us im-
agine what it will do tomorrow.
The original Watson, built on software called DeepQA and running 
on a room- size computer, beat two human champions on the TV game 
show Jeopardy! in 2011. The system ingested hundreds of millions of 
pages’ worth of material, from poems to Wikipedia entries to textbooks. 
The algorithms in the software broke down the material into categories 
and learned how words are used in various contexts. In this way, Watson 
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started “learning” from the data rather than processing it through a set of 
instructions. In a sense, it became expert in a domain— the game of Jeop-
ardy! It arrived at answers by coming up with numerous possibilities and 
ranking the certainty of each. Not only could Watson arrive at answers, 
it could leave a trail of breadcrumbs behind, showing how it came to the 
answers. And it became better through experience.
In the years since, Watson has been exploring applications in many 
domains from retail to financial services. But health care, where it has 
become impossible for physicians and even researchers to keep up with 
information, has become our grand challenge. Medical literature dou-
bles in size every few years, yet doctors say they have little time to read 
medical journals each month. For physicians, incorporating hundreds 
of thousands of articles into their practice and applying them to patient 
care— together with seemingly unlimited patient- specific information, 
as we plumb the possibilities of genomics— is a significant challenge.
Today, the first of these systems are being “trained” with data in real 
environments, essentially advising professionals by bringing an immense 
store of knowledge to bear on a problem. These machines can “under-
stand” spoken questions in natural language and logically arrive at pos-
sible answers. Watson in three seconds can sift through information 
equivalent to roughly two hundred million pages of data in natural lan-
guage and analyze it to help a doctor identify the most likely diagnosis 
and treatment options in complex cases.
But there is much work still to be done in many domains, which will 
contribute to cognitive computing— from voice- based interaction with 
smartphones to deep exploration in “artificial intelligence.” At the Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology, for instance, Rosalind Picard is studying 
the role emotions play in making more efficient decisions, working toward 
eventually building helpful emotions into cognitive machines. And in Sili-
con Valley, Jeff Hawkins, who invented the Palm computer, runs Numenta, 
which is developing software that can learn the way the brain learns.
The pace of development is breathtaking, and it’s impossible to predict 
the future with confidence, based on the work we do today. But our expe-
rience from working with clients and universities at IBM Research tells 
me that by 2040, we will have exponentially greater computing power 
and a new cognitive software model that will be trained with data. The 




Then the question is: what will we do with such magnificent tech-
nology?
Modeling a Human
Soon after computers were invented, scientists realized the machines 
could be used to simulate aspects of the physical world as a way to get 
faster or more cost- effective answers to difficult questions. During World 
War II, von Neumann and another mathematician, Stanislaw Ulam, de-
veloped a simulation method— the Monte Carlo method— that helped 
them understand the behavior of neutrons. That was pretty impressive, 
considering the day’s computers could do only about four hundred cal-
culations per second. The chip in a modern digital watch would put that 
to shame.
By the 1950s, scientists in the United States and Sweden began us-
ing computers to model, simulate, and predict weather, giving birth to 
the sophisticated meteorological predictions behind every TV weather 
reporter’s forecasts today. Modeling exploded in the 1960s, applied to 
everything from inventory control to industrial systems design to the 
Apollo moon missions. In the 2010s, the world couldn’t operate without 
simulations. Computer models test nuclear bombs without exploding 
any real ones, govern the traffic in the skies, and even keep Segway scoot-
ers from tipping over.
The Segway helps illustrate an interesting turning point in modeling. 
Modeling uses data to represent something that happens in the real world. 
Usually, it requires a lot of data, which means the simulation requires 
complex computations that, typically, take much longer than the actual 
event. When simulating a nuclear explosion, for instance, the simulation 
doesn’t happen as fast as a real explosion. And that’s OK for research. 
There’s enough time to run the computations and study the answers.
However, magic happens when you can compute a model at the speed 
of nature. Inside a Segway, a small computer runs a model of the physics 
involved in balancing the scooter on its two wheels. It can do this as 
fast as the physics happen in nature, constantly predicting exactly what 
the Segway’s machinery has to do to counter weight shifts and keep the 
scooter upright. The time to right answers is crucial— a split- second too 
late and the Segway’s rider would be flipped onto the pavement.
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As the next twenty- five years progress, technology will increasingly be 
able to compute accurate models of complex events in real time. One of 
the more stunning outcomes is that we’ll all be able to access a real- time 
model of our own bodies.
Scientists at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory are working 
with IBM to start down that path. The project, called Cardoid, is aimed 
at modeling the human heart. If we can accurately simulate the behavior 
of a heart down to the cellular level, we’ll be able to test surgical proce-
dures and medications on computers instead of on people. But the heart 
is so complex that until recently it took forty- five minutes of computa-
tion to simulate a single heartbeat. At that rate, the time to test a single 
drug would be years or decades— not a helpful span of time to get to a 
right answer.
Livermore tackled the problem by using a supercomputer with 1.5 mil-
lion computing cores that can operate in parallel. By 2013, it could repli-
cate nine heartbeats in one minute of calculations. It could model an hour 
of heart activity in about seven hours. That’s an astounding improvement.
The pace of development has taken off over just a couple of years, and 
it will not be long before a supercomputer will be able to model a heart 
in real time. Watching such a computer model react to a drug or surgical 
procedure will then be the same as watching a real heart. And you can 
see where this is heading. A heart model that today runs on a super-
computer in a research lab will soon be delivered as a service accessed 
through the cloud on a tablet or smartphone.
While the cost and computation time go down, the complexity, cus-
tomization, and accuracy will go up. In ten to fifteen years, your doctor 
will be able to access a model of your heart. You won’t wait until you have 
heart trouble to use it. You might even access your model to experiment 
with the impact of a daily two- mile run or a low- fat diet.
Advanced computer science and medical science are merging in myr-
iad ways. We’ll be able to marry such high- performance computing ca-
pabilities with the knowledge and learning power of cognitive systems 
like Watson to assist doctors in providing quick, detailed assessments of 
a procedure or a drug for a specific individual.
In parallel, DNA sequencing is getting faster and cheaper. Over the 
next decade, knowing your genetic makeup will become as common as 




zations such as the New York Genomic Center are already exploring the 
potential of cognitive systems to improve outcomes for the most aggres-
sive cancers— those that spread because they mutate rapidly.
This is all about the time value of insight. Understanding a patient at 
the genomic level and finding precise treatments among thousands of 
possible combinations will need to occur in a window of maybe a few 
weeks or a month, otherwise there is no value to the patient. We should 
be able to do such analysis in hours or minutes.
By 2040, all this varied work will have begun to come together. Re-
searchers will soon be able to economically and expediently explore the 
entire human body, collecting data that can inform simulations of par-
ticular brains, nervous systems, muscles, cells, proteins, and other body 
systems. We’ll have enough data and computing power to start to model 
the entire human body as a system.
And as with search engines and cell phones today, we will wonder 
how anyone lived without this capability.
Personal Lifelong Tutor
In the 1930s, in the worst of the Great Depression— at the same time 
that Ronald Coase was developing the ideas for which he would lat-
er win the Nobel Prize in Economics— a Columbia University profes-
sor named Ben Wood asked for a meeting with IBM’s longtime CEO, 
Thomas Watson Sr. Wood had been pioneering standardized testing as a 
way to measure students across schools and geographies. But scoring the 
tests by hand was a long and tedious process. Wood convinced Watson 
to donate IBM’s tabulating machines so Wood could greatly speed the 
test- scoring process and make standardized testing a reality. For the first 
time, machines could know what a student had learned.
Over the following eighty years, computer analysis of standardized 
tests has surfaced information that has been valuable for educational 
institutions. But because the information is not part of a true system— at 
least not one that senses and responds in real time— it has not mattered 
much to individual students’ actual learning or growth. It takes weeks or 
months to identify a student veering off track. Too often these insights 
are not fully grasped by the students or their support system when they 
have the most value.
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The insights generated by a cognitive system could tell us not just 
what a student is learning but how he or she is best able to learn, and 
how fast. Such a system might then help the teacher tailor lessons and 
support specifically for that student. In fact, a smart system could be-
come a lifelong educational adviser, guiding each student to courses, sub-
jects, colleges, even jobs, that are a good match.
In 2015, a couple of developments are merging to help create this ed-
ucation technology. A very important one is the rise of massive open on-
line courses (MOOCs)— digitized educational content widely available 
to anyone with an Internet connection. As more students use MOOCs, 
often as a supplement to classroom learning, the courses generate a tre-
mendous amount of data about student behavior, such as how long stu-
dents stay engaged with certain kinds of content or where and when they 
access content. This is the beginning of developing a more real- time data 
model of the way an individual student learns.
This is quite a flip in the world of education. Until now, students had 
to learn the courses; now we see courses beginning to “learn” the students.
In 2013, schools in Gwinnett County, Georgia— a district of 140,000 
students— started working to analyze digital learning of individual stu-
dents. The schools began to find, for instance, that the data can identify 
a student who is at risk of doing poorly before he or she takes a test. 
By intervening and helping, a student who might have failed a test and 
become discouraged would have a chance to correct course, get better 
grades, and have more positive feelings about school.
By 2040, this shift will have a more fundamental impact, altering the 
way we think about educational achievement in general. Learning to-
day is mostly time based— students get a diploma for completing twelve 
years of school, then a degree for completing another four, and so on. By 
2040, measures of achievement will be competency based. Students will 
get degrees or certifications that reflect not how long they have studied 
but what they know.
This, in turn, will change the role of the teacher. Instead of being a 
one- way delivery vehicle for information— or, even worse, a test proctor 
or disciplinarian— the teacher will be more like a tutor or mentor, valued 
as a source of wisdom and as a provider of individual counseling. The 





Finally, because the classroom is no longer an arena of regimented 
socialization or one- way information transfer, it will become a more col-
laborative space where teachers help and advise individual students or 
small groups and where the group itself creates positive feedback loops 
of mutual knowledge and support. In 2040, the one- size- fits- all class-
room lecture will seem as archaic as the twentieth- century television 
broadcast tower.
And because the system will “learn” along with you, it will not aban-
don you after college. If you want to go after a particular skill set or 
change careers, the digital assistant will help sustain focus on your objec-
tives, the core requirements, and alternative pathways to proceed. It will 
act as a guide— an adviser and advocate for skills and learning. In fact, 
it will become the embodiment of “lifelong learning.” By 2040, students 
will be surprised to find out learning wasn’t always lifelong.
Cognitive Business Apps
At IBM’s Thomas J. Watson Research Center, we built what we call the 
Cognitive Environments Lab. It’s a way for us to work on the interactive 
environments of the future and to create cognitive applications that will 
help people make better decisions.
The entire room is lined with ultra- high- resolution screens. With the 
wave of a wand, a user can move data around the room. A natural language 
system recognizes spoken questions. This is the beginning of embedding 
cognitive computing in the environments we inhabit (whether our offices, 
our meeting rooms, our cars, or our homes) and utilizing such capability in 
our daily lives. These new cognitive environments will improve the work 
flow of experts and teams engaged in complex decision making.
By 2040, a manager may walk into a cognitive room at his or her 
company. The manager’s personal cognitive agent will interface with the 
room, allowing him or her to plug into and interact with all the ele-
ments of the system. The personal agent will connect with other agents 
and people and help the manager generate hypotheses, gather evidence 
for and against, and generate possible answers when they are most 
valuable— before taking action.
Since the tabulating era of computers, machines have helped manag-
ers make decisions. They’ve tallied up financial numbers, analyzed per-
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formance, identified potential customers, and looked for trends in social 
media. Spreadsheets of old have given way to sophisticated analytics 
that can look for patterns no human would ever find. Hedge funds run 
detailed models of the global economy to spot risk and to try to know 
where to invest as early as possible. Computers have constantly marched 
toward providing enterprises with better answers and more detailed sce-
nario models, in shorter time frames.
The cognitive computing era will take decision support to an entirely 
new level. The kinds of cognitive systems that will build models of the 
human body could certainly build models of a lot of things businesses 
care about. By 2040, a company might build a model of a target market 
and test a product before manufacturing it. A company could even build 
a model of itself, constantly learning from all the company’s trial and 
error, success and failure, generating ideas and solutions unbiased by any 
individual human perspective or groupthink and giving the CEO a way 
to try out decisions before implementing them.
As in education, a company’s cognitive system will be able to get to 
know individual employees, understanding their strengths and weak-
nesses and work patterns, intervening before failure, and helping guide 
their careers. By 2040, an employee’s human resources file will likely be a 
sophisticated model of that employee’s work and knowledge.
Ultimately, by 2040 we believe an executive will have a readily avail-
able, naturally interactive set of tools to model his or her business— a 
digital model always evolving as new information is drawn in. We call 
this emerging idea cognitive business apps, or “cogs.”
A personal cog will “learn” from our experience and even anticipate 
what we need. It will “learn” through interacting with other people, other 
cogs, and other data sources, becoming more helpful, capable, and precise 
over time. It will “understand” and model its user. The personal cog will 
interact with many other domain- specific cogs that specialize in market 
information, news feeds, supply chains, patents, and regulations, and in 
the organization itself. It will interact with these other cogs as needed to 
answer questions, explore strategies, and anticipate issues.
We picture a businessperson in 2040 walking into a meeting space in 
which cogs that reside on a phone or tablet can be deployed in the room. 
Meetings will have another dimension, whether in a cognitive room or 




access to data and expertise, along with a better understanding of the 
alternatives.
This will no doubt lead to new kinds of corporate structures and strat-
egies, just as lowering transaction costs led to the development of the 
vertically integrated company in the mid- twentieth century.
It will also give rise to a new kind of executive. In a world of cogs and 
sophisticated computer models, the most successful decision makers will 
always be exploring. They will differentiate themselves not by knowing 
all the answers, but by knowing the right questions to ask. It will be easy 
and economical to bring in new perspectives, to challenge intuition and 
raise evidence. You can imagine that the economics and speed of insights 
and answers will drive a new kind of creativity in questioning, a bias to-
ward agile approaches and openness to continual transformation.
2040
It remains daunting to make predictions about technology twenty- five 
years out. But, extrapolating from what we know now, I can be quite sure 
that by 2040 we’ll be well into the era of cognitive systems that will fuel 
incredible innovation, just as the first computers and then the Internet 
did before them.
The technology will impact almost every facet of life and work.
We’re quite sure the technology will completely change the way we 
approach health care, education, and management. We’ve already begun 
working on applying cognitive technology to those fields.
The real- time nature of these cognitive models will play out even 
more in purely digital domains. One such area is a very current concern, 
cybersecurity. In protecting people and assets, these systems watch over 
networks that operate at speeds limited often only by physics. In 2040, 
these systems will be targeted and even personal, adept at detecting pat-
terns buried in billions of network log files and emerging models, devel-
oping, in a sense, “gut instincts,” so they can react to a threat in a split 
second— the way a human instinctively ducks when an object comes at 
him or her.
When scientists in our labs at IBM think about the coming era of an-
swers, we can think of a wide variety of other ways cognitive computing 
could be applied. This is not about “perfect” knowledge— whatever that 
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might be. It’s about good- enough confidence with appropriate timeli-
ness. This is what we mean by “the right answer”: the medical treatment 
that can halt a cancer before it metastasizes; the educational intervention 
that can set a young child’s learning on the most individually tailored 
path at a point when the child’s brain is still being formed; the business 
decision about an emergent market space that can anticipate and avoid 
“the innovator’s dilemma.”
But how exactly this will play out is, frankly, a bit of a challenge for 
a technologist. Perhaps it is better suited to the imaginations of science 
fiction writers, particularly as the application of technology becomes less 
and less linear. This era of systems will always be questioning, adapting, 
and changing, such that no model will be frozen in time. In fact, time 
will be a rich dimension in cognitive systems, as it is in the natural world. 
And the nature of prediction itself will change.
How will such cognitive systems and data models emerge in our lives? 
How will they be monetized? How will such a rich world of readily 
available insight and answers change the economy, society, and standards 
of living? Will it change how we actually think? Will it open a door 
to more fluid, imaginative, emergent— more fully intelligent— habits of 
mind? This goes beyond the familiar idea that technology throughout 
human history has freed us from lower- level physical or routine work, 
has freed us to apply ourselves to higher- order thinking. This suggests a 
change in what we mean by “higher- order thinking.”
Technology always affects the global economy and society. Cognitive 
technology will be no different. From where I sit, the time value of an-
swers and insights will drive the most profound changes. We’re entering 
an age when raw information will be a resource, a commodity. The most 
valuable thing on earth will be knowing what to ask.
Notes
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Our planet is at a critical inflection point. The standard of living of the 
world’s seven billion people has significantly improved and is projected 
to get better. But, as we reach nine billion people and three billion new 
middle- class consumers in the next twenty- five years, society will ex-
perience an unprecedented increase in the demand for food, water, and 
energy. We will need to produce 50 to 100 percent more of these necessi-
ties from environments that are already strained. Our increased demands 
have the potential to push fragile, natural systems beyond the brink to 
collapse.1
Yet there is reason for cautious optimism. Thanks to advances in sci-
ence, technology, and communications, we know more about the envi-
ronmental challenges we face than ever before. And for the most part, we 
know how to address these challenges, barring unforeseen catastrophes 
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from the climate system, infectious diseases, or human violence. The 
state of our environment in 2040 will largely hinge on one critical ques-
tion: can we create the governmental institutions and processes needed 
to take full advantage of what we know needs to be done, and get it done 
before it is too late?
In this chapter, we answer this question with a tentative yes. By com-
bining smart science with smart new systems of governance, we should 
be able to close the gap between knowing and doing and put ourselves 
on a path toward a diverse and sustainable planet in 2040, one that inte-
grates conservation values and human development.
Living in the Anthropocene
Traditionally, threats to the environment have been viewed as singular 
events— isolated by geography, as with Love Canal, or tied to an event, 
such as the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill. These types of threats will 
always remain. However, nature is increasingly at risk from ongoing 
human activity and the “by- products” of economic development. Agri-
culture, fishing, forestry, mining, energy production, manufacturing, and 
urban development are now the dominant forces shaping virtually every 
natural system across the earth. Population growth, wealth, trade, and 
technology will continue to accelerate the rate of change in fundamental 
natural processes affecting our climate, our food, our freshwater, and our 
oceans.
Human impacts may be magnified by tipping points, time lags, or 
feedback loops that are often unanticipated. For example, increases in 
temperature and sea level rise caused by carbon dioxide emitted this year 
will continue to be experienced for many decades or even centuries into 
the future. Loss of sea ice in the Arctic amplifies the warming impacts 
of the greenhouse gases that first caused the ice to melt, as newly open 
waters absorb rather than reflect the sun’s energy. And if a warming Arc-
tic releases the billions of tons of methane— a potent greenhouse gas— 
stored under its permafrost, our climate system could rapidly shift to a 
radically new equilibrium.
Complexities such as these and changes in technology and society 
make it hard to predict the future of our environment. For example, 
few people expected the shale gas revolution— and the associated risks 
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and opportunities of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing (also 
known as fracking)— even five years ago.
The geographic scope of environmental challenges adds further com-
plexity. The impacts of some of our activities are global in reach and 
will require global solutions. Warming and ocean acidification caused 
by carbon dioxide emissions from power production, transportation, and 
deforestation will not be prevented unless we work together globally in 
some way.
On the other hand, environmental impacts such as water scarcity, 
biodiversity loss, and overfishing occur in similar form in many places 
around the globe but require primarily local actions to fix. Although 
national and international institutions may provide knowledge and lead-
ership in addressing these threats, it will be the people farming in the 
watershed, cutting the forest, or fishing the bay who must find the path 
to sustain the resources upon which their livelihoods depend.
Finally, our capacity for harmful impact on nature is increasing dra-
matically. The global population has nearly doubled since 1970. At the 
same time, rising global incomes and increased consumption have com-
bined to further magnify our impact as global economic output has 
quadrupled over the same period.
But there is good news. Our scientific capacity to anticipate the envi-
ronmental impacts of our actions has increased even more dramatically. 
As the following case studies on ozone protection and global fisheries 
illustrate, developments in science and environmental governance allow 
for a future where we can better anticipate and avoid the threats to nat-
ural services essential for human well- being.
After describing these two cases, we examine three of the greatest 
threats from human activity: water scarcity, biodiversity loss, and climate 
change. Surely good science and new technology will play major roles 
in understanding and addressing each of these threats. But an equally 
important challenge in each case is governance. Can we apply the les-
sons learned from addressing the ozone crisis and the collapse of some 
fisheries to develop and implement new institutions that will guide our 
behavior so that these threats can be avoided?
In this chapter, the concept of environmental governance reaches well 
beyond the regulations of governmental agencies and regimes based 
on international treaties. It includes mechanisms and institutions that 
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make use of market incentives and consumer information. It includes 
cooperatives and trade groups where industry participants help design 
regulations and monitor compliance. And it includes long- standing 
community institutions, especially in developing countries, that use so-
cial norms to cooperatively manage rangelands, irrigation and drainage 
systems, and small fisheries.
These new forms of governance may take shape as water funds that 
pay fees collected by cities to farmers to keep drinking water reservoirs 
clean; forest and bioenergy certification systems that ensure the use of 
sustainable practices in fiber and feedstock production by providing 
information to consumers; fisheries cooperatives that manage catch 
share systems; industrial trade associations that develop best practices 
and codes of conduct; and networks of nongovernmental organizations 
that play major roles in shaping national policy and international trea-
ties.
Two hallmarks of success among the new environmental governance 
institutions are adaptive management— learning by doing— and network 
maintenance. An adaptive institution may change its form and function 
over time to reflect the changing nature of environmental threats and 
the most successful strategies to protect human and natural systems. 
Success also depends on “bridging” organizations that foster communi-
cation across stakeholder communities and across government agencies 
at various levels.2
We Can Get It Right: Two Case Studies
Lessons from the Ozone Crisis
In 1974, Mario Molina and Sherwood Rowland published a paper the-
orizing that chlorine and bromine in some widely used chemicals could 
damage the ozone shield— the layer of oxygen molecules in the upper 
atmosphere that prevents most of the sun’s harmful ultraviolet radia-
tion (UV- B) from reaching the earth’s surface. The main culprit: chloro-
fluorocarbons (CFCs), nontoxic, highly stable, and relatively inexpensive 
chemicals used in refrigeration, aerosol sprays, and a number of indus-
trial applications.3
Molina and Rowland’s theory of ozone destruction was controversial. 
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There were no measurements showing that ozone in the stratosphere 
was declining. And there was no evidence that UV- B radiation reaching 
the earth’s surface was increasing. Nevertheless, the nature of the poten-
tial risk was extraordinary. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) projected that ozone depletion could lead to 150 million cancer 
cases with three million deaths and twenty- five million cataract cases 
over the next century, if Molina and Rowland proved right.
In 1978, the EPA and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
banned the use of CFCs as propellants in aerosol sprays. There was broad 
public support for this step, and many major personal care and house-
hold products manufacturers quickly moved to alternative formulations. 
But only Sweden, Canada, and Norway followed the U.S. lead; some 
governments, including that of the United Kingdom, expressed doubts 
about the science.
The EPA continued its study of CFCs and persuaded President Ron-
ald Reagan to press for international action, resulting in the 1985 Vienna 
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer. The treaty called for 
monitoring, additional research, and the development of a protocol at 
some point in the future that might regulate the production and use of 
CFCs.
That same year, the ozone hole was discovered. The hole— a decrease 
of 40 to 60 percent in the amount of stratospheric ozone extending over 
a very large region (10.6 million square miles at its largest in 2006) of 
the Southern hemisphere— quickly captured public attention.4 The hole 
and the subsequent science proving that industrial chemicals were the 
culprits in its formation quickly built support for the regulation and 
phaseout of CFCs. The companies that made and used the chemicals 
promised to develop substitutes on an expedited schedule.
The promised protocol came quickly and was negotiated in Mon-
treal in 1987. It called for a 50 percent reduction in all CFC production 
by 1998. It has been modified many times since to reflect new science, 
to accelerate production bans, and to add other chemicals. Today, 197 
nations— virtually the entire world— have ratified the protocol. Global 
production of ozone- depleting substances has been reduced by 98 per-
cent.5
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• Developing countries with low levels of ozone use were granted 
a ten- year grace period during which use could actually increase 
before the phaseout period would begin.
• A multilateral fund was created to assist developing countries in 
converting their industries to substitutes.
• A trade regime was set up to prevent importation of CFCs from 
countries that declined to join the protocol.
In 1989, the U.S. Congress enacted an excise tax on ozone- depleting 
substances. As the tax rate increased over time, it eventually tripled the 
cost of CFCs and made substitutes economically competitive. Congress 
put a price on ozone depletion. The European Union also imposed its 
own excise tax.
The ozone crisis is not only a story of good science but of rapid tech-
nological innovation and new mechanisms of environmental governance 
that made the solution to a potentially catastrophic environmental dis-
aster relatively painless.6 Though it will take many decades for the ozone 
shield to heal— CFCs may stay in the atmosphere for up to one hundred 
years— the risk has been averted. By the mid- twenty- first century, ozone 
depletion will be a threat of the past.
Fixing Our Fisheries
Marine fisheries are an important part of today’s global food system. 
They provide 20 percent of the animal protein in the diets of more than 
three billion people. They are also a significant part of the global econo-
my. In 2010, fisheries and aquaculture produced 148 million metric tons 
of fish and shellfish worth $217 billion. Capture fisheries provided direct 
fishing jobs for an estimated thirty- eight million people in 2010, with 
another seventeen million employed in fish farming (aquaculture). The 
industry also includes processers, distribution systems, gear manufactur-
ers, and vessel construction and maintenance workers. An estimated six 
hundred million people— 10 percent of the world’s population— depend 
on the industry for some part of their livelihoods.7
Overfishing has been a chronic problem. It occurs when the catch 
of a particular marine species in a specific geographic area is so large 
that the population cannot recover. The problem can be so severe that 
the fish stock collapses to near extinction and the ecosystem changes 
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in ways that prevent recovery even if the fishing pressure is removed. 
Overfishing prevents fishers from realizing the full economic reward 
for their efforts. One estimate puts the global revenue loss at $50 billion 
per year.8
A key factor that has contributed to overfishing since the 1960s 
is improving technology. The size and power of vessels in the global 
fishing fleet has increased dramatically. More powerful vessels can pull 
more gear, and sonar has made finding fish easier. As fish populations 
decline, fishers have responded by further increasing capacity, often 
with subsidies from governments that are estimated at nearly $30 bil-
lion per year.9
Perhaps the most dramatic example of overfishing is the collapse of 
the cod fishery off the coast of Newfoundland. Overfishing in this three- 
hundred- year- old fishery began in the 1960s when foreign factory fleets 
entered the coastal waters of the United States and Canada and the fish-
ery was severely damaged. When the foreign vessels were banned, the 
Canadian government provided significant subsidies to launch a fleet 
of Canadian- owned vessels fishing for cod. Scientific projections for the 
amount of fish that could be caught sustainably were overly optimis-
tic, and the fishery soon began to decline. In 1992, the Newfoundland 
cod fishery collapsed. The region took a huge economic hit requiring $1 
billion in government assistance to those who lost their jobs. Despite 
removal of the fishing pressure, cod have not recovered.10
Today, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that 
57 percent of all assessed fisheries are fully exploited— meaning that no 
growth in harvesting is possible. Approximately 30 percent of assessed 
stocks globally are overfished— up from 10 percent in 1974. And the 
outlook may be worse than the assessments imply. Only 450 stocks are 
regularly assessed out of an estimated ten thousand fisheries globally. 
A recent paper suggests that unassessed fisheries (which account for 80 
percent of the global catch) are likely to be poorly managed and more 
likely to be overfished.11
Yet there is reason to hope that the trends have begun to reverse. Re-
cent changes in fishing regulations in several countries are showing signs 
of success. Some of the most promising measures for avoiding economic 
and environmental disasters like the collapse of New England’s cod fish-
ery include the following:
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•  Comanagement brings fishers into the decision making and 
implementation of fishery regulations. Not only does this give the 
fishers a heightened sense of ownership, it also makes good use of 
their local knowledge.
•  Marine protected areas take a wide variety of forms. Some areas 
are closed for a time to some types of fishing to let stocks recover. 
Marine parks and reserves are permanently set aside to protect 
important features such as coral reefs or spawning grounds.
•  Ecosystem- based management sets total allowable catch by 
considering potential impacts of fishing on the entire marine 
system. In the past, government regulations have ignored the 
impacts of fishing on other aspects of the ecosystem such as food 
web interactions and the destruction of seafloor habitats.
•  Catch shares give each licensed fisher a specific portion of the 
total allowable catch for a fishery. The fisher is guaranteed a right 
to catch that amount and can match the capacity of his or her 
gear to a sustainable level of fishing. If the right is permanent 
and transferable, the fisher has an interest in seeing the fishery 
managed sustainably because success will increase the market value 
of his or her share.
Just as we solved the global threat of ozone depletion, smart science 
combined with improved governance offers the prospect of dramatically 
better management of marine fisheries in the coming decades.
Global Challenges and Opportunities
Water Scarcity
Before looking to the future, it is important to note that today more than 
a billion of the world’s poorest people lack access to safe drinking water 
and perhaps twice that number do not have access to sanitation services 
(safe toilets and sewage disposal). Illnesses caused by microbes in drink-
ing water kill two million children each year and are the principal cause 
of infant mortality.12
The water we drink is only a fraction of the water we use. Agricul-
ture accounts for approximately 71 percent of water withdrawals. En-
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ergy production and other industries account for another 16 percent, 
and municipal water supply systems withdraw the remaining 13 percent. 
While most of the water used by industry and municipalities is returned 
to surface water courses after use, much of the water used in agriculture 
evaporates from irrigation systems or transpires to the atmosphere from 
crops before people can use it again.13
The Challenge
Driven by a growing population and the changing diets of billions of 
people moving from rural poverty to urban prosperity in developing 
countries, global freshwater withdrawals are expected to increase by 40 
percent over the next three decades. Meeting these new demands will 
be further complicated by changing precipitation patterns caused by cli-
mate change. The combined effects of population growth, urbanization, 
and climate change may soon subject a large portion of the global pop-
ulation to water shortages.14
Water scarcity takes three forms:
1. Physical scarcity is an imbalance between the size of the human pop-
ulation in a region and its annual freshwater resources. There is simply 
not enough water to meet human needs.
 2. Economic scarcity occurs in regions where investments in water in-
frastructure such as reservoirs or groundwater pumping could meet hu-
man needs but the investments have not been made because they are not 
affordable. The world’s poor, whatever their rainfall endowment, will be 
more likely to experience water scarcity than the rest of us.
 3. Environmental scarcity can occur even in areas with adequate water 
flows to meet human needs. However, that supply comes at the expense 
of nature, including dams that block fish passage, withdrawals that cause 
rivers to dry up, and groundwater pumping so extensive that streams and 
wetlands no longer recharge in summer months. Although few regions in 
developed countries would be categorized as physically or economically 
water stressed now or even in the next few decades, many of these regions 
(e.g., the western United States and Mediterranean Europe) are already 
experiencing environmental scarcity.15
Today, two billion people live in regions with dry, fragile climates that 
are threatened by periods of water scarcity. One often cited measure of 
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water scarcity developed by Falkenmark and others16 finds that meet-
ing all human needs including water for agriculture requires seventeen 
hundred cubic meters of water per person per day. By 2040, two- thirds 
of the global population will be in areas suffering from water stress (be-
tween five hundred and seventeen hundred cubic meters of water flow 
per person per day) and 1.8 billion people will live in areas of absolute 
water scarcity (less than five hundred cubic meters of water flow per 
person per day). Regions most likely to suffer water scarcity in 2040 
are northern Africa and the Middle East, South Africa, India, Mexico, 
northern China, Chile, Australia, and small island nations, especially in 
the Caribbean.17
Many regions follow a similar pattern to meet the water demands 
of a growing population. First, either a river or a groundwater aquifer 
is tapped to meet needs. As demand begins to approach the limit from 
those supplies, the water agency will create storage reservoirs by dam-
ming local rivers and streams. If demand continues to outstrip supply, 
the supplier may look to transfer water from distant reservoirs to meet 
local needs.
These infrastructure investments are often subsidized by governments 
to keep water and food prices low. The subsidies mask the true cost of 
water, spurring even greater demand. Only when demand finally exceeds 
the capacity of storage and interbasin transfers will users begin to adopt 
water conservation practices.
Many of the steps along this pathway have negative consequences 
for nature. Areas rich in aquatic wildlife habitat such as wetlands and 
river deltas may shrink in size as water is diverted to human use. Some 
rivers— even great rivers such as the Colorado— are taxed so completely 
that water no longer reaches their deltas in most years. As underground 
aquifers are depleted and water tables drop, the water that would nor-
mally discharge to springs and seeps is lost. Dams may alter a river’s 
cyclical rise and fall necessary for the breeding and reproductive be-
haviors of fish, wildlife, and plants. Dams also block the movement of 
fish, closing off spawning grounds and segmenting species into small 
populations that may not survive other threats. As flows in streams 
and rivers are reduced to build reservoirs, pollution concentrations and 
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It’s no wonder that aquatic species face a greater risk of endangerment 
and extinction than comparable organisms living on the land.
The Opportunity
A majority of the regions that will experience water shortages in the 
next few decades have one thing in common. If there is more water 
available to prevent scarcity, it will most likely be found in agriculture. 
Although the most effective water conservation strategies will vary 
widely across regions, reducing agricultural water demand will be key 
to meeting growing water needs. Strategies include more efficient irri-
gation systems, changes in tilling practices so that less soil moisture is 
lost through evaporation, shifts to crops requiring less water, and the 
development of new hybrid plants that can produce good yields in drier 
conditions.
One of the most promising ways to reduce agricultural water use in-
volves new partnerships that channel payments from city water agencies 
and other large industrial water users to agricultural producers who put 
water back into the river. Freshwater is the most valued service that na-
ture provides. Users are willing to pay for it, if institutions can be created 
that allow agriculture producers to deliver reliable water supply to cities 
and industries.
Market institutions like this now exist, especially in South America, 
to prevent pollution of urban water supplies. More than a dozen cities, 
including New York, Quito, Bogotá, and São Paulo, have created wa-
ter funds that pay farmers upstream to adopt agricultural and ranching 
practices that reduce sediment pollution in the river. Cleaner water al-
lows the city to avoid expensive investments in treatment that would 
otherwise be necessary to remove pollutants.
We should fully expect that similar voluntary and market- based ar-
rangements between farmers and cities will be developed to meet water 
supply needs as cities struggle with growing scarcity. Properly structured 
voluntary institutions could avoid a great deal of human conflict as scar-
city moves in. Complex questions related to water ownership and assur-
ing that the needs of the poorest are met will require further innovations. 
New forms of environmental governance— in addition to new science 




140 mark r. terCek & jimmie Powell
Biodiversity Loss and Alteration
Biodiversity is the variety of living things on earth. Most people think 
of biodiversity as the wide range of plant and animal species. But biodi-
versity also includes genetic variations within a species— think about all 
the different kinds of dogs— as well as the variety of natural communi-
ties that form ecosystems such as tropical rain forests, coral reefs, prairie 
grasslands, and mountain meadows. Diversity makes these biological 
communities and their members more resilient, better able to survive 
disturbances such as changes in climate or the introduction of invasive 
species and new diseases.
Human well- being is highly dependent on biodiversity, especially in 
rural areas of the least developed countries. As mentioned earlier, the 
value of global fisheries exceeds $200 billion per year. The insects and 
birds that pollinate our crops provide nearly $200 billion per year in 
value. Forests provide timber for construction and firewood, capture and 
filter drinking water, and provide food for rural populations. Wetlands 
and coastal mangrove forests protect human communities from storm 
surges and river flooding. People living in the poorest nations receive 
as much as 30 percent of their livelihood from local biodiversity. And 
everyone benefits from the innate wonder of nature. Imagine what life 
would be like if there were only a few species that existed everywhere 
and all places looked the same.19
The Challenge
Human activities are having a profound effect on biodiversity; its loss 
is one of the major environmental challenges of this century. There are 
many drivers of this loss, including the conversion of natural areas such 
as forests and grasslands to urban and agricultural use; the unsustainable 
use of resources such as fisheries and freshwater as discussed previously; 
the intentional or accidental transfer of species from one region to an-
other; overuse of nitrogen fertilizers that create imbalance in freshwater 
ecosystems; and the growing threat of carbon dioxide pollution causing 
changes in climate, sea level rise, and ocean acidification.
Of the roughly 1.9 million known species, the International Union 
for the Conservation of Nature has listed sixteen thousand species as 
declining, threatened, or endangered. Among those, 30 percent of am-
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phibians, 23 percent of mammals, and 12 percent of birds are threatened 
with extinction within the next century. Those depending on freshwater 
and tropical rain forest habitats generally face the greatest risks.20
Some scientists believe that human activities are causing extinction 
rates to increase to more than one hundred times the natural background 
rate. Some predict that over the next few centuries that number may 
increase to one thousand or even ten thousand times the natural rate. 
These projections are based on models that relate drivers such as habi-
tat conversion and climate change to estimates of species abundance. If 
these trends are correct, a huge percentage of species may be lost in a few 
millennia. Over the past five centuries a few hundred species are known 
to have been lost. Fortunately, many species on the brink of extinction 
have actually been recovered through human intervention.21
Extinction is usually a slow event. Large areas of forest cover may 
be lost to agriculture, but some remnant of the species population that 
depended on the forest habitat may hang on for many generations in 
the altered habitat, may evolve and adapt, or may relocate to new areas. 
We may be setting in motion an extinction crisis that will occur over 
the next few millennia, but it is not occurring in the next twenty- five 
years. We still have an opportunity to change the narrative on species 
extinctions.
Two major trends will affect that narrative. Although habitat 
conversion— most importantly from forests to croplands— has been the 
major source of biodiversity loss over the last century, the pattern is likely 
to change in the coming decades. Conversion of natural systems to crops 
and pasture will continue to be the most important driver in the least de-
veloped African and Asian countries, but it will no longer play the dom-
inant role in Europe and North America nor in emerging economies 
including China, Brazil, Russia, South Africa, India, and Indonesia. In 
some of the most developed countries, agricultural land will continue to 
be abandoned, and ecosystem recovery and regeneration will occur on 
a significant scale. In addition, recent trends indicate that deforestation 
rates may be slowing in the Amazon and that some depleted fisheries 
are recovering.
The other major development will be the increasing role of climate 
change in biodiversity loss. It may account for 40 percent of the de-
cline in the population of many species by 2040.22 The impacts will reach 
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across both developed and developing countries. Unchecked, climate 
change will emerge as the major driver of global biodiversity loss in this 
century.
The Opportunity
Again, one key to protecting biodiversity is in the quality of human gov-
ernance institutions, whether global (i.e., the Convention on Biodiversi-
ty), local (e.g., parks, national forests, wildlife refuges), or in the private 
sector (individual business commitments to avoid or offset biodiversity 
losses). Although there are examples of tremendous success at each of 
these levels, our governance arrangements to protect biodiversity are fall-
ing far short of the need, and loss is likely to continue largely unabated 
over the next quarter century. Unlike water, where optimism for govern-
ance solutions is warranted, biodiversity is not currently treated as an 
urgent human need.
In response to global biodiversity loss, many governments have cre-
ated protected areas, parks and wildlife refuges set aside and managed 
for the benefit of biodiversity. The number of protected areas around the 
globe has exploded over the past forty years, increasing from approxi-
mately ten thousand in 1970 to more than one hundred thousand today. 
Twelve percent of the earth’s land area now has a protected designation, 
and 188 nations have committed to extend protection to 17 percent of 
all terrestrial habitats by 2020. Some countries have also created marine 
protected areas (although they cover only 7.5 percent of global coastal 
zones). Yet these formal commitments, while impressive, are not a pan-
acea. Many areas are not effectively managed due to a lack of resources. 
In fact, 14 percent of designated protected areas lack any management 
measures at all.23
Many nations have also adopted regulatory measures to protect bio-
diversity and human welfare. One important tool to protect habitat is 
land- use planning that requires formal environmental assessments be-
fore major new projects or policies are implemented. Nevertheless, many 
of the values associated with biodiversity are not properly accounted 
for in the market and policy decisions that drive biodiversity losses. For 
instance, some of the most serious threats to biodiversity are actually 
driven by governmental subsidies for economic sectors including agri-
culture, fisheries, and bioenergy development. In this case governance 
 
MORSON&SCHAPIRO_P4_143
 the environment 143
is the problem, not the solution. Repeal of some particularly harmful 
subsidies would be an important reform.
Another example is climate change policy. Many observers believe 
that the most effective policy to reduce greenhouse gas pollution would 
be to put a price on carbon dioxide emissions from burning fossil fuels. 
But the policy would be much more effective— both for reducing global 
warming and for enhancing biodiversity— if it also paid (or provided a 
tax credit) for the sequestration of carbon in soil, forest, and grassland 
systems. Although much of the discussion about sequestering carbon in 
natural systems has been about preventing deforestation and restoring 
forestlands that have been lost to agriculture and urban development, 
it is important to understand that much more of the carbon now caus-
ing global warming was originally stored in soils rather than vegetation 
and was lost to the atmosphere by conversion of forests and prairies to 
croplands. Returning these hundreds of billions of tons of carbon to soils 
through practices that are also good for agricultural productivity is a 
high priority.
Consumer information is another recent innovation in governance 
that is increasing attention to the value of biodiversity in the market-
place. Certification systems for forest products, fisheries, and bioenergy 
now encourage consumers to insist on sustainable practices including 
bio diversity protection in crop and harvesting activities. This new tool for 
governance that operates outside of formal governmental channels may 
be especially important to protect deep- sea fisheries that are located out-
side territorial waters and tropical forests in the least developed nations.
Finally, many businesses are beginning to consider the role of nature 
in their supply chains and the impact of their plant and capital invest-
ments on natural systems. Biodiversity offsets for development impacts 
have been included in the laws of some countries including Brazil, Can-
ada, China, France, Mexico, and South Africa. In addition, many leading 
global corporations, especially in mining and oil and gas production, are 
implementing biodiversity offsets to ensure that their activities have no 
adverse impact on land and water habitats. Public policies and grassroots 
activism should encourage these new practices to expand rapidly across 
many industrial sectors and should insist that biodiversity values get in-
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Climate Change
Human activities— principally the combustion of fossil fuels and the 
conversion of forests to other land uses— are increasing the concentra-
tion of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases in the atmos-
phere. CO2 concentrations are now more than 40 percent greater than 
they were in 1750.24 This trend has already led to warmer temperatures, 
more severe storm surges, and changes in rainfall patterns, weakening 
the natural systems on which we all depend. Yet despite an array of po-
tential strategies, the world has yet to tackle CO2 emissions in a coor-
dinated fashion.
The Challenge
There is some uncertainty about the impact of greenhouse gas concen-
trations on temperature increases. The best current estimate is that each 
doubling of CO2 concentrations will increase temperatures by approxi-
mately three degrees Celsius (or 5.2 degrees Fahrenheit). CO2 concen-
trations in the atmosphere at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution 
were approximately 275 parts per million (ppm). If current emissions 
trends continue, a doubling to 550 ppm would occur by 2050. Some 
observers fear that CO2 concentrations may double again by the ear-
ly 2100s, producing a temperature increase of more than ten degrees 
Fahrenheit— but not immediately and not everywhere.25
Those are average temperature increases, and they will only develop 
over the long run. There will be great variability in temperature changes 
around the world; some areas may even get cooler before heating up. 
Regions in high latitudes such as the Arctic will see much greater tem-
perature increases than tropical regions. Temperatures in winter seasons 
and at night will increase more than temperatures in the summer and 
during the day. And temperatures over land surfaces will increase more 
than temperatures at the surface of the ocean.
Global warming will also alter patterns of precipitation, as a warmer 
atmosphere can also hold more water vapor. Again, high- latitude areas 
may see increased rainfall while some areas in the subtropics and tem-
perate zones may experience drier climates.
Although we can already measure some of these changes— global 
average temperatures have increased by 0.8 degrees Celsius over the 
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twentieth century26 and severe precipitation events are 5 percent more 
frequent in the United States27— the changes over the next twenty- five 
years are not likely to be dramatic. So why the urgent need for action?
For a variety of reasons, global warming is a very slow event. First, 90 
percent of the sun’s energy captured by the earth is stored in the plan-
et’s massive oceans, which take a long time to heat up.28 Once heated, 
they will release that excess energy back to the atmosphere and land for 
millennia.
Second, positive feedback loops such as sea ice loss described previ-
ously may add to the warming caused directly by CO2 pollution— even 
if carbon pollution is greatly reduced.
Third, while a large portion of the CO2 emitted today will be absorbed 
by the oceans over the next century, as much as 20 percent of today’s 
emissions will be in the atmosphere for centuries.29 This long atmos-
pheric residence will continue to push temperatures higher and higher 
each decade for many centuries into the future.
And finally, the investments that we make in power plants and indus-
trial facilities have long lives of their own. Some coal- fired power plants 
in operation in the United States today are more than sixty years old. 
Hundreds of additional coal- fired power plants are expected to be con-
structed in the rapidly developing countries, especially China and India, 
over the next twenty- five years. They are likely to continue emitting bil-
lions of tons of carbon dioxide each year for many decades.
Once the climate change train is fully in motion, it may rumble down 
the tracks for centuries no matter what we do; thus the urgency to act 
now. Pundits have often used the “boiling frog” metaphor to shine a light 
on human behaviors that fail to act on gradually developing catastrophes 
until it is too late. Presumably, if you put a frog in a pot of cold water, put 
the pot on a burner, and heat it up gradually, the frog will fail to jump 
and will eventually be boiled to death. In the case of our impact on the 
climate system, the pot has long been on the burner. If we do not dra-
matically change our ways in the next twenty- five years, it will no longer 
be possible to remove the pot or turn the burner off— even if the water is 
yet to boil and the frog is still alive. Our planet is the frog.
In another respect, global warming may also be too sudden. If current 
trends in emissions continue for many more decades, the rate of tem-
perature increase may become so rapid by the end of the twenty- first 
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century or early in the twenty- second that a large portion of the earth’s 
biodiversity would not be able to adapt fast enough to survive. The rate 
of temperature change is already greater than at any time in the last five 
hundred thousand years; a significant acceleration may leave species with 
slow reproductive cycles or with small populations trapped in isolated 
patches with nowhere to go.
Beyond the loss of biodiversity, continued carbon dioxide pollution 
will have far- reaching effects on human well- being. If current trends 
continue, by 2040 we can expect to see more frequent severe weather 
events with loss of life and property, sea level rise, growing water scar-
city, lower agricultural productivity, and the spread of diseases into new 
regions.
The Opportunity
We know what we need to do. Global greenhouse gas emissions need 
to peak before 2020 and be reduced by at least 50 percent below 1990 
levels by 2050.
And we know how to do it. In the developed world more than 60 per-
cent of greenhouse gas emissions come from two sources— power plants 
and vehicles.30 As industrial production and household wealth increase 
in the rapidly developing economies, emissions are likely to assume 
the same pattern there. We need to reduce CO2 emissions from coal 
combustion at power plants and petroleum combustion in cars, trucks, 
planes, and ships.
Over the next twenty- five years, emissions reductions will be far more 
likely and more cost- effective in the power sector than in transporta-
tion. Although there will be some benefit from greater fuel economy 
associated with extensive use of hybrid technologies in cars and trucks, 
this is likely to be overwhelmed by the rapid growth in ownership and 
use of personal vehicles in developing countries. It is unlikely that zero- 
carbon- emissions technologies such as fully electric or fuel- celled vehi-
cles will make any substantial penetration in the transportation sector 
even in highly developed countries by 2040.31
But significant changes are possible and would be cost effective in the 
power sector. Some combination of these four options is most likely: (1) 
increases in the efficiency of lighting, heating, and insulation of appli-
ances, motors, and compressors in residential and commercial buildings; 
 
MORSON&SCHAPIRO_P4_147
 the environment 147
(2) substantial power generation from wind and solar energy sources, 
accompanied by new technologies to store the intermittent power from 
these sources; (3) the conversion of coal- fired power plants to natural 
gas, drawing on the new abundance of shale gas resources; and (4) the 
use of carbon capture and storage systems that reduce emissions by up to 
90 percent at fossil- fueled plants.
Some observers assert that it would be possible to generate a signif-
icant portion of our electricity from renewable sources such as wind, 
solar, geothermal, and biomass. But in many countries seeking rapid de-
velopment, use of their domestic fossil resources will continue to be the 
preferred source of power. A large portion of the world’s coal reserves 
are concentrated in a few countries, including Russia, China, India, Aus-
tralia, the United States, and Kazakhstan.32 Other countries have other 
high- carbon fossil resources such as heavy oil and tar sands that they 
would also like to use or export. It is unlikely that we will persuade these 
countries to turn away from their dirty fuels. Therefore, research and 
demonstration on carbon capture and storage systems for the continued 
use of fossil fuels must be an urgent priority.
The most efficient way to drive changes in the power sector would be 
to impose a price on carbon. This could be accomplished either through 
a carbon tax or with cap and trade programs such as those implemented 
by several states in the U.S. Northeast and in California (that includes 
credit for sequestering carbon in natural systems). Although partisanship 
has undermined climate policy at the national level in the United States, 
more than forty countries and many state and provincial governments 
have adopted and are successfully implementing carbon pricing policies.
Because the need for coordinated global mitigation policy, at least 
among the developed and rapidly emerging economies, is so urgent and 
because carbon pricing policies make so much sense from so many dif-
ferent perspectives, we should be confident that they will be in almost 
universal use by 2040. But it is harder to envision the diplomatic and 
governmental mechanisms needed to bring trade harmony and full par-
ticipation in an international carbon pricing regime. It is unlikely to look 
like the Kyoto Protocol, with a cap on every nation’s emissions. And 
unlike the Montreal Protocol, it may come too late to prevent significant 
damage. As noted earlier, a pricing system that fully incorporates the 
value of carbon sequestered in natural systems would help compensate 
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for weaknesses in international policies— and would be of tremendous 
benefit to biodiversity.
Global warming is the most important challenge of our time. Science 
has already made a compelling case for the goals we must adopt. New 
technologies to get us there affordably are emerging every year. What we 
lack are the leaders, organizations, and governing instruments that will 
let us act effectively, confidently, and together across the globe. Whether 
and how we solve this problem in governance will define our environ-
ment in 2040 and for many centuries after.
The Reason for Hope
Without much attention, there has been a tremendous change in the 
structure of global environmental governance over the past forty years. 
It has moved out of regulatory bureaus and international tribunals into a 
legion of organizations and informal arrangements that have become the 
essential glue that holds the agenda for nature protection together and 
moves it forward across the globe. The new forms of governance involve 
actors of many types, including landowner associations, resources user 
groups, indigenous communities, nongovernmental advocacy organiza-
tions, academics and scientists, and philanthropists and foundations.
These new institutions are important and effective not so much be-
cause of their legal authority or their size but because of their shared 
knowledge, the trust built from long- standing personal interactions, 
their reach across scales to achieve local, national, and global coordina-
tion, and their commitment to transparency to maintain legitimacy.
This new environmental governance is what we do at The Nature 
Conservancy. We are a “bridging” organization. Our job is to build and 
maintain the connections between players— governments, scientists, 
investors, users, producers, and consumers— who have more traditional 
roles. We facilitate outcomes across scales, using new tools and adapt-
ing to new information to achieve change that would otherwise not be 
possible.
There are many examples of this work in our portfolio: creating wa-
ter funds in South America; developing certification schemes for forest 
products and bioenergy; supporting fisheries comanagement; creating 
markets for investment in forest carbon; designing biodiversity offsets 
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for energy and mining development; and mapping marine protected ar-
eas in coastal zones around the world.
It is necessary to have good science on environmental trends and the 
technologies offering sustainable alternatives. But that is not enough. 
What we more often need today is better understanding of the govern-
ance and institution- building processes at all scales so that we can turn 
science and technology into nature protection.
None of us can predict the new environmental challenges we will ex-
perience between now and 2040. But we can be sure that we are getting 
better at building and managing the governance institutions necessary to 
sustain nature on a planet now defined by our development.
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There is a long- standing tradition of making bold, and spectacularly 
mistaken, predictions about U.S. higher education. So it is with caution 
and modesty that we hazard a few of our own.
While economists tend to be overly optimistic about growth and 
prosperity, education experts tend toward unjustified pessimism. Around 
1900, the founding president of Stanford, David Starr Jordan, predicted 
the imminent demise of the liberal arts college as research universities 
took their place. Tell that to Williams, Amherst, Pomona, and other top 
liberal arts colleges, now more selective and richer than ever. For other 
forecasters, the Great Depression portended the end of higher education 
as they knew it, with crumpling endowments and reductions in state 
funding and private giving supposedly leading to long- term educational 
disaster. The GI Bill, now celebrated as one of the most important pieces 
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of legislation, was at the time resisted by some prominent university 
presidents who feared the end of excellence associated with educating 
the masses. Next, educators warned that the large baby boom generation 
would threaten the nature of institutions unable to expand enrollment 
quickly enough without wreaking havoc. After that, baby bust pessimists 
foresaw massive excess capacity leading to fiscal disaster. In fact, college 
enrollment rose.
Today you can’t open the paper without hearing about impending 
doom. There are no jobs for college graduates; loan burdens are prohib-
itive as graduates or dropouts struggle to pay off $100,000 in college 
loans on barista- level salaries; and new technologies are driving the tra-
ditional four- year, nonprofit, residential model into oblivion. Either ten-
ure will bankrupt the few institutions retaining it or “contingent” faculty 
with short- term contracts will replace tenured faculty. Exorbitant sticker 
prices have created a bubble resembling the tulip market of seventeenth- 
century Holland. Only the foolhardy will major in anything other than 
science, engineering, math, business, or economics. What’s more, the 
days of substantial federal research support are numbered. Public flag-
ship universities will continue to lose stature, while the United States 
will surrender its domination in rankings of the world’s universities.
In short, if this is the golden age of American higher education as 
some say, by 2040 it will be long gone.
To address these points, we first establish today’s facts, some of which 
will likely prove surprising.
Higher Education Today
Higher education in the United States is a big business.1 There are around 
forty- seven hundred “firms”— about sixteen hundred public institutions, 
seventeen hundred private nonprofit ones, and fourteen hundred private 
for- profit schools. Because public institutions are typically much larg-
er than private ones, they enroll almost three quarters of all students. 
The annual budgets of these forty- seven hundred institutions add up 
to around $500 billion, 3 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product 
(GDP). These schools attract a total of twenty- one million “customers,” 
eighteen million undergraduates and three million in graduate or pro-




the United States (half from China, India, and South Korea), making 
the United States the world’s largest net exporter of higher education 
services. Various international rankings agree that the most prestigious 
institutions are disproportionately in the United States.
Nevertheless, the United States is falling behind other industrialized 
countries in college attainment. Each fall the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) releases its ranking of 
the percentage of twenty- five- to thirty- four- year- olds with a higher 
education degree, and each year the United States seems to lose a spot.2 
At 42 percent, we are at our all- time high, but because other countries 
have been increasing attainment rates more quickly, the United States 
currently ranks only fourteenth among thirty- seven developed countries. 
South Korea, the OECD leader, is at 65 percent.
It may be surprising to learn that of the forty- seven hundred schools 
in the United States, fewer than 10 percent could be considered “selec-
tive.” At most institutions, students are free to enroll having met limited 
(if any) requirements. Consumers are used to being able to buy a product 
without proving their worth as potential purchasers. It is thought that 
colleges and universities are different— with a much larger group of will-
ing purchasers than are allowed to buy. But except for a few schools, that 
is untrue.
Many of the 150 or so “national” colleges and universities (those 
drawing from the top students in the United States and abroad) have in-
creased their draw— and their pricing power— over the past few decades. 
Some are major research universities, including the sixty U.S. members 
of the Association of American Universities (the AAU), the exclusive 
group of universities receiving the lion’s share of federal research dollars. 
Some are prestigious liberal arts colleges.
Also surprising is that the “$50,000 a year price tag” is far from the 
norm. The latest count shows that only 149 of the forty- seven hundred 
charge that amount, including room and board.3 They enroll fewer than 
six hundred thousand of the eighteen million or so undergrads— with 
more than half receiving a substantial discount. That leaves at most three 
hundred thousand students and their families actually paying $50,000 a 
year, far fewer than media attention suggests.
Why pay such an amount? Another surprise is that the return to a 
college degree is at or near record levels.4 There used to be a cycle of high 
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returns inducing an oversupply of college- educated workers, thereby re-
ducing the college premium (the ratio of earnings of college graduates 
to those whose highest degree is a high school diploma) until market 
adjustment led to a new rise in the premium. The nadir of the cycle took 
place in the mid- 1970s, but then the college premium took off. Even 
after decreasing in the wake of the massive economic downturn of 2008, 
it quickly rebounded. By 2012, it reached a new high for women and 
was only slightly behind the 2008 record level for men. So even after 
the worst of economic times, the college premium recovered and set out 
again on its long- term upward path.
Clearly, the transfer of blue- collar jobs offshore has contributed 
mightily to this new phenomenon. More than half the increase in the 
college premium over the past several decades results from a decline in 
the denominator (wages for high school graduates). But even if a college 
education has become more of a defensive move, it is still an extraordi-
nary financial investment.
There are unfortunate people with $100,000 or more in college loan 
debt working away at jobs that pay little and do not require a college 
degree.5 But around 30 percent of college students graduate with no loan 
debt at all, and the rest average around $30,000, an amount the college 
premium covers before long. Sure, there are exceptions, but the data speak 
for themselves. And at the most selective private colleges and universi-
ties, the majority graduate without any loans at all, while the rest average 
under $20,000. We repeatedly hear that total college loan debt exceeds a 
trillion dollars, more than credit card debt! But credit card debt usually 
reflects consumption choices, while a college degree is an investment— 
for most, the best of a lifetime. Moreover, there is lots of evidence that 
college leads to more satisfying and healthier lives. Well- educated people 
tend to exercise more, vote and volunteer more often, and engage in more 
activities with their children. The graduate benefits, and so does society, 
one reason for government to cover some of the expense.
Finally, students who attend a top private institution might wind up 
paying less than they would at a public institution closer to home. The 
San Jose Mercury News reported in March 2012 that a family of four 
earning $130,000 a year would be asked to pay— taking into account 
financial aid grants— $24,000 a year at California State University at 




only $17,000 at Harvard.6 At institutions with the resources to enroll the 
most qualified students regardless of ability to pay— or at other schools 
that discount according to “merit”— the sticker price does not come 
close to indicating what the actual cost would be. In fact, only 29 percent 
of all undergraduates pay the sticker price, a number that falls below 15 
percent for those attending private four- year colleges and universities.
Nevertheless, some significant headwinds may mean more difficult 
days ahead.
For three decades public universities have been receiving a declining 
share of state expenditures (with those dollars diverted mainly to health 
care). Most of the for- profit sector operates under increased govern-
ment scrutiny because of high student loan default rates. And private 
nonprofit higher education is more stratified than ever— with the most 
prestigious colleges and universities benefiting from increasing cachet in 
global markets, while, at other privates, rapidly rising discounts off the 
sticker price have eroded tuition revenues, their principal income source.
Predicting the Future
So, where does higher education go from here?
We focus on seven topics relating to the pedagogy underlying the 
educational experience and to the economics governing it.
We categorize our predictions based on Supreme Court Justice Felix 
Frankfurter’s 1957 classic ruling in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, laying out 
the four essential freedoms of a university— “to determine for itself on 
academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be 
taught, and who may be admitted to study.”
Who May Teach?
One trend is clear: the prevalence of tenure in American higher educa-
tion has been reduced dramatically. In 1975, 57 percent of all full- time 
and part- time faculty (other than graduate students) were in the tenure 
system, but by 2011 there were only 29 percent.7 Following the end of 
mandatory retirement for faculty on January 1, 1994, non- tenure- track 
professors at Ph.D.- granting public universities went from 24 percent 
of all full- time faculty to 35 percent and from 18 percent to 46 percent 
at private nonprofit ones.8 Some discern a potential blow to academic 
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freedom; others anticipate declining efficiency resulting from a changed 
distribution of authority.
Do undergraduates taught by faculty outside the tenure system learn 
as much? A recent analysis based on Northwestern data indicates that 
faculty outside the tenure system (most of whom are full-time) actually 
outperform tenure- track/tenured professors in the classroom, at least 
when considering introductory classes taken during freshman year.9 
Non- tenure- line faculty not only inspire undergraduates to take more 
classes in a given subject but also lead the students to do better in sub-
sequent coursework. We applaud the increasing attention being paid to 
the work conditions of non- tenure- line professors, especially those with 
full- time positions. Should they be treated in a manner commensurate 
with their value, the rise of designated teachers at U.S. colleges and uni-
versities may be less of a cause for alarm than some people think.
That gets us to our first question:
In 2040, what percentage of American faculty will be  
in the tenure system?
Some observers predict that tenure- track/tenured professors will bottom 
out at 15 to 20 percent of all faculty, with tenure largely limited to flag-
ship public and private research universities and the wealthiest liberal 
arts colleges.10 A key question concerns attempts to institute post tenure 
review. The University of Texas Board of Regents, for example, has pro-
posed that tenured faculty members be evaluated annually, with two un-
satisfactory reviews leading to possible dismissal. Not surprisingly, the 
American Association of University Professors regards this proposal as 
an assault on tenure.
Unless such resistance abates, or Congress restores a mandatory re-
tirement age for professors, the downward trend is sure to continue. Nei-
ther change is likely. As tenured professors retire, they will continue to 
be disproportionately replaced by faculty outside the tenure system. By 
2040, our guess is that only around 10 percent of positions will be held 
by tenure- track/tenured professors.
Where will professors teach? Will the financial problems inflicting 
public colleges and universities finally abate, or will more and more pro-




That leads to our second question:
Will public research universities continue to be able to  
attract a world- class faculty and student body?
Will the federal government restore the growth rate in sponsored re-
search at public and private universities? And will states restore the his-
toric percentage of their expenditures to higher education?
While some observers think that the current decrease in research 
support marks a new reality, we believe we are merely at a down part 
of a long cycle. There have been downturns before, but then federal re-
search support resumed its long- term upward trend, with Congress and 
the public recognizing the contribution of research to scientific break-
throughs and economic growth.
On the other hand, public universities will still struggle to replace 
state appropriations with other revenues. The days when public higher 
education attracted a stable share of state expenditures— once 7 percent, 
now 5 percent— are long gone. These two lost percentage points amount 
to $30 billion, more than a third of current state appropriations to higher 
education.
If we expect the federal government to see the light, why wouldn’t 
states? Almost all of that $30 billion has gone to health care, specifically 
to Medicaid. Harvard economist Tom Kane concluded that the future of 
public higher education depends on the containment of Medicaid costs. 
Our best hope is that the 1990s repeat themselves and state budgets rise 
faster than the higher education share of the pie declines. That would 
take robust economic growth along with reining in not just health ex-
penditures but also state pension obligations.
Around three out of four college students attend public institutions, 
and we don’t expect that to fall much by 2040. But we do expect that re-
cent funding troubles at public institutions will not go away. Top public 
research universities have been losing stature and, regrettably, we foresee 
that trend continuing.
What May Be Taught?
Understandably, in times of uncertain economic growth prospects, pol-
iticians focus on skills translating fairly directly to employment. The 
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STEM fields (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) are 
today’s darlings, with the humanistic social sciences, the arts, and the 
humanities either forgotten or worse. Several governors have expressed 
skepticism about the wisdom of states supporting students studying the 
humanities given their presumed poor earnings prospects.11
This approach is shortsighted. No one should confuse starting salaries 
with ultimate earnings. Looking a decade or so out beyond graduation, 
humanities majors generally have low unemployment rates and, in some 
cases, salaries mirroring those of workers with more technical training.12 
To be sure, data from the U.S. Census Bureau show that the lifetime 
earnings of engineering majors exceed those of arts majors by $1.4 mil-
lion. But work- life earnings of students who study the arts are nonethe-
less a robust $1.9 million. And, of course, the payoff to higher education 
isn’t limited to finances.
Still, the market test is whether students themselves are leaving the 
humanities in increasing numbers. Humanities skeptics are quick to 
point out that in the late 1960s nearly 18 percent of all bachelor’s degrees 
were earned in the humanities. By 2010, it was only 8 percent.13 How-
ever, that decline took place many years ago, with the percentage in the 
humanities being quite stable since the early 1980s. On the other hand, 
a recent study of Harvard undergraduates shows a continuing downward 
trend, from 1954, when 36 percent of all majors were in the humanities 
(including history) to 20 percent in 2012, with the slide showing no 
signs of ending. At Stanford, around 45 percent of faculty members in its 
main undergraduate division are in the humanities; but only 15 percent 
of its students are.
Some observers cite the fact that student demand in the humanities 
is adversely affected by the disproportionate share of non- tenure- track 
instruction in those fields (the Northwestern results call this hypothesis 
into question). Others point out that the gap between professorial sala-
ries in the humanities and other academic disciplines has been growing, 
leading perhaps to declining relative quality among faculty. Still others 
say the lack of student interest reflects changes in the field itself.
That brings us to question three:
Will anyone ever major in the humanities, arts, and  




The decline in interest in the humanities likely reflects, at least in part, 
what humanists themselves have been doing. For the last three decades, 
predominant trends in critical theory have been teaching that there is 
no such thing as objective literary value and that Shakespeare is consid-
ered to be better than John Grisham (or a laundry list) only because of 
social power relations. (Of course, not everyone subscribes to this view 
of value.) As the editors of The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism 
observe when paraphrasing the position of cultural studies, “Literary 
texts, like other artworks, are neither more nor less important than any 
other cultural artifact or practice. Keeping the emphasis on how cultural 
meanings are produced, circulated, and consumed, the investigator will 
focus on art or literature insofar as such works connect with broader 
social factors, not because they possess some intrinsic interest or special 
aesthetic value.”14 In that case, why should great literature be studied at 
all? Students who come to this conclusion can hardly be said to be irra-
tional. It has also become common to teach literature by measuring how 
enlightened the author was in terms of current values, which are pre-
sumed correct. But if current beliefs can only be confirmed, why should 
students put in the considerable effort to read difficult texts?
The future of the humanities would seem to depend on a shift, which 
may already be under way. Great literature does what no other university 
subject can. Sensitively read, it offers practice in empathy with people 
unlike oneself.15 When readers identify with a character from another 
social class, period, culture, or gender, they experience a new sense of the 
world. To do so, they must bracket, not presume, the values and social 
beliefs usually taken for granted. Other disciplines may recommend em-
pathy, but only great literature offers constant practice in it.
In retrospect, it seems obvious that critical theory’s doctrines compro-
mise the very reasons for studying the humanities. Within the profes-
sion, dynamics leading to status have gone one way, while external pres-
sures have led in the contrary direction, toward making the humanities 
ever more important. Increasing globalization and social diversity put a 
premium on being able to understand other people from within.
Both trends will continue, but, at least for a while, the trend toward 
empathy will grow in relative strength. One sign this is happening will 
be a different understanding of “world literature,” a term that now usu-
ally means Western literature plus the literature of other countries re-
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sponding to Western dominance and oppression. It is as if non- Western 
cultures were producing nothing of value before they encountered Euro-
peans. Instead, world literature will include not primarily “postcolonial” 
literature but demand more attention to earlier non- Western classics, 
such as A Dream of Red Mansions, the Bhagavad- Gita, and The Tale of 
Genji. The Persian Shahnameh (Epic of Kings) will be widely known, 
along with classics from the Arab world when it was the hegemonic 
power invading Europe. To be sure, it requires more effort to grasp Con-
fucius and Lao- Tzu than a contemporary English or French novel from 
the Third World, but the study of such authors, along with Shakespeare 
and Dostoevsky, will indicate that it is important to transcend the per-
spectives American academics easily take for granted. In that case, the 
future of these fields will be brighter.
Other nations are figuring out what some here want us to ignore— 
that training in the liberal arts does create economically viable citizens.16 
Why did Singapore invite Yale to open a liberal arts college? Why in 
China and India is the adoption of a liberal arts curriculum very much 
on the table? How ironic if in our panic to match those countries in the 
production of engineers, they pass us by in the education of students 
with broader, less technical backgrounds!
That leads us to our fourth question:
Even if those subjects are still taught at research universities 
in 2040, will there be liberal arts colleges around to teach  
them as well?
More than two decades ago, the economist David Breneman made the 
startling discovery that the number of “liberal arts” colleges was far smaller 
than popularly believed.17 In 1990, schools without large numbers of grad-
uate students were lumped together as liberal arts colleges. But Breneman 
took a close look at the 540 private schools with few or no graduate pro-
grams and found that fewer than half— only 212— had even a large minor-
ity of students majoring in the traditional arts and sciences fields. A recent 
study applying these criteria found that number had fallen to only 130.18
The others had not closed but had added more and more preprofes-
sional subjects, and graduate programs, to their curriculum. This is not 




small baccalaureate colleges might not benefit from seminar- size classes 
and an undergraduate focus, but don’t think that there are large numbers 
of philosophy and English majors at these schools.
The elite of the 130 remaining liberal arts colleges are stronger than 
ever, but others are undergoing substantial economic distress. Will they 
go under? Absolutely not. But they will probably introduce business 
majors and the like. Majoring in philosophy or art history at a world- 
renowned college (or research university) may not be thought to be all 
that risky in terms of job prospects. But elsewhere, market changes will 
make the true “liberal arts college” more of a rarity.
How Shall Courses Be Taught?
Massive open online courses (MOOCs) will supposedly replace the 
pedagogical model of a faculty member giving a lecture to, or leading 
a discussion with, physically present students. Some educators feel that 
soon most students will learn microeconomics— or Russian literature— 
from the world’s greatest experts, signing up as one of hundreds of thou-
sands who access the lectures at their leisure, relying perhaps on local 
instructors to answer their questions and run discussion sessions. There 
is something attractive about being taught by the very best and going at 
your own pace, and that model might supplement traditional pedagogy 
in a productive way. But replace it?
Think of it like this: could you do psychotherapy this way? Or learn 
to play the violin? If the humanities teach a skill such as empathy, they 
will require presence. For the student and professor, it will be important 
to put oneself on the spot (in all senses) with someone who is actually 
there. To be sure, if the humanities devolve into memorizing approved 
interpretations or confirming already held beliefs, MOOCs may play a 
relatively large role. But if the humanities change from current trends, 
they will not. Experience with MOOCs trying to teach literature may 
itself provide impetus for change in the humanities.
Even in a large lecture class, successful professors can truly engage 
and put themselves on the spot. Then they don’t just provide information 
but model the process of thinking about literature, much as a physically 
present violin instructor or musician differs from a recording. After all, 
if presence did not matter, and a mere recording of a great performance 
would do, why do people still go to live concerts?
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Whatever their use as a supplement, online technologies will not re-
place traditional courses. Despite their rhetoric, top colleges and univer-
sities act as if they agree. The premier schools are active MOOC pro-
ducers. And yet, they seldom give the same credit for such courses to 
their own students. Such courses usually qualify for “alien” credit, the 
sort given to high school advanced placement courses and classes taken 
at summer or study- abroad programs run by other institutions. MOOCs 
rarely count toward the major, go toward the college residency require-
ment, or figure in a student’s overall grade point average. In short, there 
is something of a bait and switch here.
Even the most traditional of teachers— and that includes us— use 
technology in meaningful ways. There are excellent classroom manage-
ment platforms that save teaching time while enhancing student learn-
ing. Long gone are the days when ten minutes of every eighty- minute 
class were spent on course mechanics. Plus, what a joy it is to be able to 
show a short video illustrating an important point or to bring in an off- 
campus expert for a real- time contribution to a class. But these changes 
enhance, rather than replace, the traditional course. They do not alter the 
very nature of learning, as MOOCs usually do.
This discussion suggests question five:
Will the residential undergraduate experience be replaced  
by MOOCs and other online teaching?
We don’t see the residential experience much imperiled by remote learn-
ing, especially at the nation’s selective colleges and universities. Faculty 
may be blissfully unaware that much learning takes place outside of the 
classroom: during discussions in common rooms or cafés; with friends 
on a team; or while running a community service organization or an a 
cappella group. Students reflecting on their treasured educational expe-
riences cite favorite courses and the camaraderie of an intramural team. 
It is hard to believe they will ever cite beloved MOOCs.
Who May Be Admitted to Study?
College enrollment rates in the United States are the highest ever: 70 
percent of high school graduates enroll at a two- or four- year college 




and race have persisted. OECD data show that the enrollment prospects 
for children of parents with educationally disadvantaged backgrounds 
are worse here than in almost all other developed countries.19
Moreover, not all college attendance is the same. Of students from 
families with income below $60,000 who attended college in 1999, only 
6 percent enrolled at elite institutions, compared with 26 percent from 
families earning above $200,000.20 More recent data suggest this dispar-
ity has been growing.
While college access for black and Hispanic students has been in-
creasing, it has primarily been at open- access institutions. The sad news 
is that there are significant numbers of academically qualified minority 
students who would thrive at selective colleges if they chose to enroll 
there. A small subset of Chicago Public Schools (CPS) high school 
graduates have the records and standardized test scores for access to a 
very selective college.21 But only one in three of these match appropri-
ately. The others wind up attending underresourced, nonselective insti-
tutions, where they cannot develop their talents as well and where their 
graduation rates are less than half as high as they would have been had 
they attended elite schools.
That leads us to our sixth question:
Will college enrollment rates in the United States continue  
to rise and will gaps by income and race attenuate?
We must first ask: will the college premium remain at record levels? And 
how will sticker and net prices change?
Many jobs that provided good wages to workers without college de-
grees still exist but are now located in Bangalore, Jakarta, and Shanghai 
rather than in Atlanta, Chicago, and Cleveland. Some such jobs will re-
main in the United States, but not many. On the other hand, generations 
of college graduates could expect to become richer than their predeces-
sors, but those days may be over. Still, the college premium will continue 
to rise and so demand for higher education will grow.
That, however, will not translate into robust growth for college and 
university revenues. Tuition increases will continue to be eroded by in-
creases in financial aid. As mentioned earlier, only 29 percent of all un-
dergraduates pay the sticker price— with the percentage at private col-
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leges and universities now down to under 15 percent. The number of 
families paying the sticker price will fall further, especially without fed-
eral antitrust protection allowing college presidents to end highly costly 
merit aid wars.
Even schools with the pricing power to increase sticker prices pro-
portionate to the richest Americans’ increase in income face increasing 
political pressure not to do so. For the past century, sticker prices have 
increased around three percentage points above inflation, but those days 
are about to end. Public scrutiny is putting the brakes on tuition in-
creases even if the market is not. We expect that schools at the very top 
of the pecking order will disrupt price increases even further. When you 
have a $4 billion operating budget and you only net $150 million from 
undergraduate tuition, you might eventually question the entire sticker 
price/financial aid model. Why not let anyone who can meet your ad-
missions standards come to college for free? That is already the norm in 
Ph.D. programs. If, say, Princeton did this for undergraduates, wouldn’t 
Harvard, Yale, and Stanford follow? How would this affect the many 
other schools who couldn’t possibly forgo all undergraduate tuition rev-
enue? While the current funding model is not a bubble about to burst, 
a range of economic, political, and competitive pressures imply that net 
tuition revenues will become a smaller and smaller portion of all insti-
tutional revenues.
Might that lead to greater enrollment by low- income students? Ev-
idence suggests that this is more a matter of sociology than economics. 
Recall the curious case of top CPS high school students eschewing se-
lective institutions in favor of open enrollment ones. It is as much about 
not wanting to leave the local community, and not recognizing that col-
leges differ from one another, as it is about not realizing the net price 
most would face would be well below the sticker price. The focus on 
“going to college” obscures the fact that college is not a commodity— 
that is, not a good undifferentiated by quality.
We saw that where you go to school has a profound effect on your 
graduation prospects. But assuming you do graduate, does the higher 
selectivity of a school increase earnings?
Some observers point to the well- known study showing that many 
students attending the University of Pennsylvania would have had a 




tion to earnings from attending a more selective institution is greater for 
students from low- income backgrounds and still greater for students of 
color. And don’t forget that Penn State is not your typical public— it is 
one of the nation’s thirty- four public universities in the AAU (out of a 
total of sixteen hundred public colleges and universities).
We think that the many college outreach programs put into place in 
recent years will begin to have a positive impact. More of those CPS 
students will take advantage of the opportunity to attend an elite insti-
tution. As it is, some changes in K- 12 education are beginning to pay 
dividends. Longer school days, school choice, and charter schools are 
leading to higher graduation rates and at least modest increases in some 
test scores. Right now only 11 percent of the 130,000 undergraduates 
attending the most prestigious group of thirty- one private colleges and 
universities come from families in the bottom two- fifths of the income 
distribution, with fully 69 percent coming from the top fifth.23 We pre-
dict that by 2040 those numbers will change dramatically for the better.
We come now to our seventh and final question:
Will the United States continue to attract large numbers  
of students from throughout the world, enticed by the  
prominence of top colleges and universities?
The eight hundred thousand foreign students among the twenty- one 
million students studying at U.S. colleges and universities include both 
undergraduates and graduate students. International students bring to 
the most prestigious programs not only the best talent in the world but 
also tuition revenues. Even at the most heavily endowed schools, foreign 
students receive little or no financial aid either as undergraduates or as 
students in master’s degree programs. Those dollars are even more im-
portant, and in some cases critical, at the many less- prestigious colleges 
and universities that rely heavily on tuition. If foreign students stayed 
home, much of American higher education would feel the blow.
The trend is worrying. While the United States remains the global 
leader by attracting around 16 percent of all students who study abroad, 
ten years earlier the figure was 24 precent.24 As long as the overall num-
ber of students enrolling in a country other than their own continues 
its rapid climb, the declining share of the United States need not be a 
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problem. But as other countries create new colleges and universities, and 
increase the prestige of existing ones, the attractiveness of studying at 
any U.S. institution without a global reputation will be reduced, and full- 
pay foreign students will be increasingly scarce by 2040. The drying up of 
this income stream will be one more in a long list of reasons contributing 
to the growing stratification in U.S. higher education over time.
Conclusion
Careful readers might now understand the reason behind the parenthe-
ses in our title around the words “(and the World).” This is not a review 
of worldwide higher education. Even with our knowledge of U.S. high-
er education, based not just on studying its finances and its curricular 
offerings, but on having spent all of our professional lives teaching in 
this country, we predict the course of change with great trepidation. It 
would be reckless for us to pontificate on Germany, India, and China. 
We do, however, consider the United States relative to worldwide high-
er educational developments. Will U.S. institutions continue to attract 
foreign students in great numbers and dominate world rankings? Will 
the United States be alone in the world in terms of a focus on the liberal 
arts? Will the United States continue to be passed by other countries in 
terms of college attainment and lag even further behind other nations in 
educating students coming from low- income backgrounds?
Contrary to the tenor of past predictions, we are optimistic about the 
state of American higher education in 2040. The best of today’s liberal 
arts colleges will thrive— and will actually be teaching the liberal arts. 
Some faculty will still be in the tenure system, but the many others who 
are not will do a fine job with undergraduate teaching and be better 
appreciated and supported than they are presently. Public flagships will 
still be prominent, if not quite the world leaders they are today. U.S. col-
leges and universities will continue to predominate, even if international 
competitors take away some full- pay foreign students. Many schools will 
lose some pricing power, undermined by increased price responsiveness 
at all but the elite institutions, and all colleges and universities will face 
increasingly challenging political realities. But a college degree will con-





As knowledge grows, the need for those who provide it will grow as 
well. Pressure on the system will lead to changes and adaptations, but the 
United States will continue to provide the model for the world.
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Media of the Future
Arianna Huffington
Chair, President, and Editor- in- Chief,  
Huffington Post Media Group
When it comes to the way we tell stories, the defining factor in the next 
twenty- five years of media will be the hybrid nature of news. When I 
heard that Jeff Bezos was buying the Washington Post, one of the first 
people who came to mind was a fellow countryman of mine, the Greek 
philosopher Heraclitus, who around twenty- five hundred years ago said, 
“No man ever steps in the same river twice.”1 Or, as James Fallows put 
it, the sale was “one of those episode- that- encapsulates- an- era occur-
rences.”2 But even as the sale encapsulated an era that is passing, it also 
has the potential to expand the era we are in. The combining of the best 
of traditional media with the boundless potential of digital media repre-
sents the media of the future.
It’s time we move the conversation away from the future of newspa-
pers to the future of journalism— in whatever form it’s delivered. After 
all, despite all the dire news about the state of the newspaper industry, 
we are in something of a golden age of journalism for news consumers. 
There’s no shortage of great journalism being done, and there’s no short-
age of people hungering for it. And there are many business models that 




The future will definitely be a hybrid one, combining the best prac-
tices of traditional journalism (fairness, accuracy, storytelling, deep in-
vestigations) with the best tools available to the digital world (speed, 
transparency, and, above all, engagement).
Though the distinction between new media and old has become 
largely meaningless, for too long the reaction of much of the old media 
to the fast- growing digital world was something like the proverbial old 
man yelling at the new media kids to get off his lawn. Many years were 
wasted erecting barriers that were never going to stand.
Among the benefits the Internet has brought is the ability to relent-
lessly stay on a story long after a lot of the big, traditional outlets have 
moved on. The participation enabled by the Web allows people to engage 
with the story, contribute to it, develop it in small ways, take it deeper, 
and keep at it until it gets the attention it deserves. We’ve had too many 
autopsies but not enough biopsies (most notoriously over the invasion of 
Iraq and the financial meltdown), and we need to change that.
In the debate over new media versus old media, the lament is often 
heard that one of the things we’re in danger of losing from the heyday of 
old media is muckraking, crusading journalism. But by enabling partici-
pation, new media can actually help fuel stories that lead to real change.
Additionally, one thing that’s often missing from traditional journal-
ism is news about what’s working. Yes, it’s important to know what’s bro-
ken and what’s gone wrong, but if that’s all we get, we won’t have a true 
picture of what’s really going on in our lives and our communities.
Too often news about things that are actually working is looked down 
on or saved only for Thanksgiving or the last five, feel- good minutes 
of a local newscast. The reason most often given? Because news about 
what’s working isn’t popular. But I can definitely say this is not true. At 
HuffPost, we’ve made a commitment to report on what’s working in our 
communities and all over the world. Our experience shows that people 
are in fact hungry for these kinds of stories— they are always among our 
most shared, and we found out that advertisers love them too.
Truth 2.0
We may be drowning in spin, smoke screens, and lies, but people are 




So how can the Internet and technology help us find our way? By 
continuing to give people a place they can turn to uncover the truth. 
The Internet has shown great promise in this regard. YouTube, Twitter, 
email, and turbocharged search engines have made it easier to expose the 
lies our leaders continue to tell.
At the same time, this is a moment of economic anxiety. In times like 
these, people are more likely to be driven by their lizard brains and react 
in response to fear rather than facts, making it easier for demagogues to 
scapegoat and peddle conspiracy theories laced with violent undertones. 
In this kind of atmosphere, people sometimes refuse to believe their own 
eyes. And it becomes easier to perpetrate the latest big lie.
So, to fill this need, I would love to see a new online tool that makes it 
possible to instantly fact- check a story as you are reading it— or watch-
ing it on video. A companion tool in service of the truth would instantly 
provide historical context to a story you are reading or watching, as well 
as a narrative that helps put the facts into a larger framework.
In a compelling post, Jay Rosen writes about the need for journalists 
to revive the art of storytelling. The Internet has been great for putting 
masses of data at our fingertips, but it has too often sacrificed explana-
tion, context, and narrative on the altar of speed because, as Rosen puts 
it, “all the day- to- day rewards go to breaking news.”3
I would love to see a dot- com innovation that immediately provides 
a reader or viewer with the background knowledge needed to better un-
derstand the data and information being delivered as news. The powers 
that be— both political and corporate— have mastered the dark art of 
making information deliberately convoluted and indecipherable. For 
them, complexity is not a bug, it’s a feature.
Our future tool will also automatically simplify needlessly complicated 
laws, contracts, and linguistic smoke screens. Speech replete with verbal 
gymnastics in an attempt to befuddle and bamboozle us will immediately 
be translated into clear and precise language. It will be Truth 2.0.
And just as our instant fact- checking, context- providing, and transla-
tion tools will bring us more truth, new dot- com innovations providing 
greater transparency will deliver a return of trust— the other great need 
we are facing today. The institutions that hold our democracy together 
have taken crippling blows in the last few years, leaving our country 




iness. Though disheartening, given all that has happened over the last 
decade— an economic crash based on greed, a bank bailout with no 
strings attached, and a gridlocked legislative process beholden more to 
special interests than the public interest— this breakdown is hardly sur-
prising.
I would love to see an app that allows us to pull the curtain back on 
the corridors of power and see who is really pulling the levers. A great 
early iteration of this was provided by the Sunlight Foundation during a 
health care summit in 2010. During its live streaming of the discussion, 
the foundation offered a dose of transparency by showing, as each of our 
elected officials was speaking, a list of his or her major campaign contrib-
utors. It was simple, powerful, and it spoke volumes about the extent to 
which many players in the summit were bought and paid for.4
The future version of this kind of tech will allow us to see who is 
funding whom and who is carrying water for which special interest, in 
real time and across every imaginable platform. The Sunday shows will 
be a whole different animal when we are able to effortlessly and instantly 
follow the money— and connect the dots.
My final wish may at first sound counterintuitive, but my crystal ball 
shows that the future will bring us a dot- com innovation that allows us 
to disengage from the 24/7 connectivity that the first twenty- five dot- 
com years have led to.
Plotinus was a philosopher in the third century a.d. who studied 
the sources of knowledge, wisdom, and creativity. “Knowledge has three 
degrees,” he wrote, “opinion, science, illumination. The means or instru-
ment of the first is sense; of the second, dialectic; of the third, intui-
tion.”5
The Internet has contributed much to the first two kinds of know-
ledge— science (in the form of easy access to reams of data and infor-
mation) and opinion— but has in many ways taken us further away from 
illumination and our inner source of wisdom.
Hence the growing need to pull the plug on our hyperconnectivity. 
To disconnect from all our devices in order to reconnect with ourselves. 
There are already a plethora of Internet sites, mobile apps, and high- tech 
tools that make it easier to do just that— everything from yoga sites that 
let you take classes via your computer to mobile apps that provide guided 




And at HuffPost we have developed a course- correcting, free smart-
phone app called “GPS for the Soul.” It provides tools to help us return 
to a state of calm and balance. I know it’s something of a paradox to look 
to an app to help us reconnect to ourselves, but there’s no reason not to 
use technology we always have in our pocket or our purse to help free us 
from technology. Think of it as spiritual training wheels. “GPS for the 
Soul” connects you to a personalized guide, with music, poetry, breathing 
exercises, and pictures of your loved ones, which can help you destress 
and recenter and gives you access to the guides of experts, other users, 
or your friends.
Virality über Alles
Now that going viral has gone viral, social media have become the ob-
session of all media. It’s all about social now: What are the latest social 
tools? How can a company increase its social reach? Are reporters de-
voting enough time to social? Less discussed— or not at all— is the value 
of the thing going viral. Doesn’t matter— as long as it’s social. And viral!
The media world’s fetishization of social media has reached idol- 
worshipping proportions. Media conference agendas are filled with pan-
els devoted to social media and how to use social tools to amplify cover-
age, but you rarely see one discussing what that coverage should actually 
be about. As Wadah Khanfar, former director general of Al Jazeera, told 
our editors when he visited our newsroom in 2012, “The lack of contex-
tualization and prioritization in the U.S. media makes it harder to know 
what the most important story is at any given time.”
“We are in great haste,” wrote Thoreau in 1854, “to construct a mag-
netic telegraph from Maine to Texas; but Maine and Texas, it may be, 
have nothing important to communicate.”6 And today we are in great 
haste to celebrate something going viral but seem completely uncon-
cerned whether the thing that went viral added one iota of anything 
good— including even just simple amusement— to our lives. The truth 
is that sometimes it does, but often it doesn’t. It’s not even a very com-
plex question; the problem is that we seldom bother to ask this question 
before we dutifully hop on the algorithmic viral wave. We’re treating 
virality as a good in and of itself, moving forward for the sake of moving. 




as long as I’m moving, it doesn’t matter!” Not a very effective way to end 
up in a better place.
So, the question remains: As we adopt new and better ways to help 
people communicate, can we keep asking what is really being commu-
nicated? And what’s the opportunity cost of what is not being commu-
nicated while we’re all locked in the perpetual present, chasing whatever 
is trending?
Social media are a means, not an end. And going viral isn’t “mission 
accomplished,” regardless of what it was that went viral. As James DeJulio 
put it, “It seems that overnight, the viral video has become some sort of 
badge of honor within advertising communities. CMOs without them 
are beginning to feel like the only kid in second grade without a Cabbage 
Patch [doll].”7 Just Google “how to make a video go viral” and you’ll find 
a trove of tips on how to hit the sweet spot, along with reams of analysis 
on why this video lit up the Internet and why that one was dead on ar-
rival.
Fetishizing “social” has become a major distraction, and we’re clearly a 
country that loves to be distracted. Our job in the media is to use all the 
social tools at our disposal to tell the stories that matter— as well as the 
stories that entertain— and to keep reminding ourselves that the tools 
are not the story.
Someday, historians will likely look back at this virality- über- alles age 
and wonder what we were trying to accomplish. The answer will be: not a 
whole hell of a lot. Our times demand a much better response. All these 
new social tools can help us bear witness more powerfully or they can 
help us be distracted more obsessively.
Three Megatrends
So, when we consider the future of our media landscape, including the 
ways technology is rapidly transforming it, three trends stand out. The 
first is the seismic shift from presentation to participation. The second 
is the paradox of using technology to disconnect from technology. And 
the third is the game- changing shift from using social media as a way to 
make our lives more fun to using social media to make the world better.
The shift from presentation to participation means that the days of the 




have long since ended. People are tired of being talked to; they want to 
be talked with. Ours is a global conversation, with millions of new people 
pulling up a seat at the table— indeed, nearly three billion people will join 
the Internet’s community by 2020.8 That conversation has fueled revolu-
tions and allowed media to engage with readers in totally new ways.
The lines between amateurs and professionals are being crossed every 
minute. As Clay Shirky put it, the word “amateur” derives from the Latin 
amare— love.9 The secret of anyone who successfully connects with the 
public, be they professional or amateur, is that they love to create, pro-
duce, and share. And when you love what you do, other people will love 
what you do.
So, if the first trend is a Garden of Eden blooming with engagement 
and self- expression, the second trend is about the snake in the garden— 
the temptation to stay connected to our 24/7 digital world, which actu-
ally disconnects us from the world around us, from our loved ones, and 
especially from ourselves. And millions of people are paying a heavy 
price, in terms of health, creativity, and ability to solve problems, for 
always being hyperconnected.
According to the Flynn Effect, intelligence quotient (IQ) measure-
ments have been rising each decade since the early twentieth century.
So, our IQs are getting higher, but our problem- solving ability is not 
keeping pace. We are surrounded by leaders with high IQs who make 
dreadful decisions despite great degrees.
Luckily there is a powerful, countervailing force— using technology 
to get away from technology. Of course, I realize there’s a paradox in the 
idea that, of all things, an app can help deliver us from the snake in the 
garden, but the snake is very wily, so our solutions have to be just as clever.
The third megatrend is that people are going from searching for infor-
mation and data to searching for meaning. People are using technology 
to connect with others, not just around similar passions and interests but 
around the causes that most resonate with them. New means of com-
munication have given us the ability to widen the circle of our concern.
For all these reasons, I see the next twenty- five years of digital media 
as full of promise— combining the best of traditional journalism with 
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The Future of Fearmongering
Barry Glassner
Professor of Sociology and President of Lewis & Clark College
Americans will be fearful in 2040, often about matters of minor con-
sequence. I cannot predict which dangers will preoccupy the populace. 
I’m confident, though, that while the fears of that era will appear to be 
a random assortment, ranging from misjudgments about young people 
to disinformation about disease, in fact they will be part of a larger story 
about the state of the nation.
I also have little doubt that the scaremongers of 2040 will propagate 
their scares to the public largely through three means: repetition, trend 
claiming, and misdirection.
Purveyors of fear will continue to sell their wares the same way dis-
count stores make their profits: on volume. Consider a pair of statistics 
about crime from the late twentieth century. Between 1990 and 1998, the 
murder rate in the United States decreased by 20 percent. During that 
same period, the number of stories about murder on network newscasts 
increased by 600 percent. Frequent viewers of evening newscasts could 
be excused for mistakenly thinking the crime rate was skyrocketing.
This chapter is adapted from Barry Glassner, The Culture of Fear (New York: Basic Books, 
2010), and Barry Glassner, “Narrative Techniques of Fearmongering,” Social Research 1, 




More than repetition is involved, however, in successful fearmonger-
ing. Fearmongers of the future will need to deploy narrative techniques 
to normalize what are actually errors in reasoning. I suspect the most 
common of these techniques will continue to be the christening of iso-
lated incidents as trends, and misdirection.
Pervasive fearmongering about youth violence at the end of the twen-
tieth century provides an instructive case in point of how these discursive 
maneuvers magnify risks. Beginning in the mid- 1990s, the United States 
experienced a steep downward trend in youth crime, but in the face of 
comforting statistics year after year, fearmongers recast those statistics as 
“the lull before the storm,” as a Newsweek headline in 1995 put it. “We 
know we’ve got about 6 years to turn this juvenile crime thing around, 
or our country is going to be living in chaos,” President Bill Clinton 
asserted in his 1997 State of the Union address, even though the youth 
violent crime rate had fallen 9.2 percent the previous year.
Six years later the nation was not living with chaos, at least as a result 
of youth violence, but the bipartisan fearmongering that went on about 
juvenile crime had demonstrable effects on public perceptions. In sur-
veys conducted during the second half of the 1990s, adult Americans 
estimated that people younger than age eighteen committed about half 
of all violent crimes, when the actual number was 13 percent.
The misperceptions were fueled largely by isolated incidents of school 
shootings that got portrayed as trends. After a sixteen- year- old in Mis-
sissippi and a fourteen- year- old in Kentucky went on shooting sprees in 
1997, killing five of their classmates and wounding twelve others, fear-
mongers spoke of “an epidemic of seemingly depraved adolescent mur-
derers,” as news commentator Geraldo Rivera put it. And three months 
later, in March 1998, when two boys, ages eleven and thirteen, killed four 
students and a teacher in Jonesboro, Arkansas, Time magazine declared 
that it was no longer “unusual for kids to get back at the world with live 
ammunition.” When a child psychologist on NBC’s Today Show advised 
parents to reassure their children that shootings at schools are very rare, 
reporter Ann Curry “corrected” him. “But this is the fourth case since 
October,” she said.
In point of fact, during the previous academic year (1996– 97), 
violence- related deaths in the nation’s schools had hit a record low— 




public schools reported any serious crime. Yet Time and U.S. News and 
World Report both ran headlines that year referring to “teenage time 
bombs,” and William Bennett, the former U.S. secretary of education, 
proclaimed in a book, “America’s beleaguered cities are about to be vic-
timized by a paradigm- shattering wave of ultra- violent, morally vacuous 
young people some call the superpredators.”
The superpredators never arrived, and over the next several years, 
although school shootings were rare, they made big news. In May 1998, 
when a fifteen- year- old in Springfield, Oregon, opened fire in a cafe-
teria filled with students, killing two and wounding twenty- three oth-
ers, the event felt like a continuation of a “disturbing trend,” the New 
York Times reported. The day after the shooting, on National Public 
Radio’s All Things Considered, criminologist Vincent Schiraldi tried to 
explain that the recent string of incidents did not constitute a trend, 
that youth homicide rates had declined by 30 percent in recent years, 
and more than three times as many people were killed by lightning than 
by violence at schools. But the show’s host, Robert Siegel, interrupted 
him. “You’re saying these are just anomalous events?” he asked, audibly 
peeved. The criminologist reiterated that “anomalous” is precisely the 
right word to describe the events, and he called it “a grave mistake” to 
imagine otherwise.
To speak of these events is to bring to mind for many adult Americans 
an incident of horrific school violence; namely, the killings at Columbine 
High School in Littleton, Colorado. Fourteen students and a teacher 
died, and twenty- four more students were injured. The Columbine in-
cident, and its public reception, are worth reconsidering in the present 
context because they bring to light two realities that I suggest will per-
sist well into the future: in a culture of fear, the perceived importance of 
extraordinary events diverges from their empirical reality, and so do the 
causal explanations for those events.
Nearly twelve months had passed between the killings in Oregon and 
the Columbine disaster. Yet after the shootings in Littleton, reporters, 
politicians, and pundits spoke as if the tragedy there were the continu-
ation of a trend and further evidence of an epidemic, when in point of 
fact, the Columbine incident was unprecedented in American history. 
Moreover, the number of students killed in U.S. schools that academic 




journalists and politicians seldom talked about school violence. During 
the period of the so- called epidemic of school violence, fewer than 1 
percent of all homicides of school- age children occurred in or around 
schools. Most of the remainder occurred in homes and other domestic 
settings, a story seldom told on newscasts or in other public discourse.
In attributing causes to the Columbine shooting, journalists, politi-
cians, and pundits employed another tool as well in fearmongering about 
youth violence, one that, as I have suggested, I expect will be prevalent 
for decades to come: misdirection. The term comes from the world of 
magic. If a magician wants to make a coin appear to vanish from his 
right hand, he may try to direct the audience’s attention to his left hand 
while he gets rid of the coin.
A comparable form of misdirection occurs in political and media 
venues. Following the Columbine shootings, the public’s attention was 
directed away from real trends and persistent dangers that confronted 
children and adolescents, such as the fact that tens of millions did not 
have health insurance, were malnourished for parts of each month, and 
attended deteriorating schools. There was misdirection as well from the 
most proximate and verifiable factor in the deaths at Columbine and 
elsewhere; namely, the ready availability of guns to people who should 
not have access to them.
A study published in the Journal of the American Medical Associa-
tion the same year as the Columbine shootings documented that even 
though the number of youth homicides had been declining, guns were 
responsible for an increasing proportion of the killings. Yet, instead of a 
clear, focused discussion on keeping guns out of kids’ hands, following 
the Columbine shootings, the public was treated to orations about all 
sorts of peripheral matters such as the Internet, video games, movies, 
trench coats, and recordings by Marilyn Manson (a musician popular 
with adolescents at the time), each of which pundits implicated in the 
Columbine tragedy.
A New Story Line for a New Century
The three techniques for fearmongering I have discussed— repetition, the 
depiction of isolated incidents as trends, and misdirection— continued to 




within a different story line. I anticipate the same will hold in 2040: the 
methods employed to exaggerate dangers and educe panic will remain 
reasonably constant, but the specific fears and the broader cultural nar-
rative will change.
Radical changes in narrative and in choices of bogeymen can occur 
almost overnight in response to weighty events. The period following the 
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 
11, 2001, demonstrate as much. In the weeks immediately following the 
far- too- real horrors of 9/11, counterfeit horrors that had occupied much 
of the popular media almost completely disappeared from public dis-
course. No longer were TV news programs and newsweeklies obsessed, 
as they had been just prior to the attacks, with dangers to swimmers 
from shark attacks and to Washington interns from philandering poli-
ticians. Gone were warnings about roller coaster accidents and coyotes 
prowling suburban neighborhoods.
Nor did the latest incident of violence in a school make headlines and 
provoke pundits to decry the sorry state of America’s youth. Part of the 
reason is plain: the loss of thousands of lives and the threat of more ter-
rorism overshadowed any such stories. Even producers at local TV news 
programs and cable news channels could not fail to understand that for 
some time, stories about bioterrorism, airport security, and hate crimes 
against Arab Americans would hold more interest and importance for 
viewers than the usual fare.
But I suggest there was a more important, longer- lived, and foretell-
ing reason that some of the old scare stories did not occupy the public 
discourse post- 9/11: a powerful and pernicious narrative of the previous 
decades largely lost its usefulness for fearmongers in the news industry 
and for the politicians and pundits they quote— what might be dubbed 
the “sick- society” story. In that account, the villains are domestic, heroes 
are hard to find, and the story line is about the decline of American civ-
ilization. Post- 9/11, a new narrative came to the fore, one about national 
unity, villains from foreign lands, and the greatness of American society.
One result of this change was a shift in the putative dangerousness of 
some categories of people and behaviors. The demise of the sick- society 
narrative augured especially well for young American males in their late 
teens and twenties, who were portrayed in the media throughout the 




Fire Department and in the military or, alternatively, as campaigners for 
world peace. The change marked a striking departure from how this age 
group was characterized in the 1990s. Post- 9/11, talk of adolescent su-
perpredators didn’t fit the celebration of American society and its citi-
zens or the appeals to young Americans to make wartime sacrifices. Nor 
did the supposed causes of youth violence I noted earlier fit into the new 
narrative. Suddenly it was no longer fashionable to disparage our popular 
culture. On the contrary, the culture was referenced not as an infectious 
agent that turns kids into killers but as a feature of American society that 
is wrongly reviled by our enemies. “We are battling a bunch of atavistic 
ascetics who hate TV, music, movies, the Internet (except when they’re 
planning atrocities), women, and Jews,” New York Times columnist Mau-
reen Dowd put it.
The predominant foci for fearmongering following September 11, 
2001, were foreign terrorists and dangers to the American homeland. I 
doubt there has been a phrase, at least in recent times, that was more ef-
fective at exploiting Americans’ anxieties than “the war on terror.” From 
late 2001 until they left office in early 2009, the Bush administration, 
their allies, and many people in the news media repeated the phrase 
incessantly. As former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski 
noted in the Washington Post in 2007, “The little secret here is that the 
vagueness of the phrase was deliberately (or instinctively) calculated by 
its sponsors. Constant reference to a ‘war on terror’ did accomplish one 
major objective: it stimulated the emergence of a culture of fear. Fear 
obscures reason, intensifies emotions and makes it easier for demagogic 
politicians to mobilize the public on behalf of the policies they want to 
pursue.”
In the first weeks after 9/11, when the homegrown scares of the 
previous three decades seemed trivial, obsolete, or beside the point, 
the nation’s collective concern sensibly coalesced against a hard target: 
Osama bin Laden and his organization, Al Qaeda. The administration 
of President George W. Bush quickly redirected that concern, however, 
to what it dubbed the “worldwide war on terror,” a war and associated 
enemies similar in their vagueness to those denoted in previous decades 
by the “war on drugs” and the “war on crime.” From those earlier wars, 
American journalists and their audiences had been conditioned to treat 




explained or verified, dire warnings that flared and faded, isolated inci-
dents depicted as ominous trends, and testimony from self- appointed 
experts with vested interests in whipping up anxieties. Following 9/11 
and throughout the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the same 
patterns ensued, only this time the statistics, warnings, and testimony 
came predominantly from the administration. A study found, for exam-
ple, that more than 90 percent of news stories about Iraq on NBC, ABC, 
and CBS during a five month period in 2002 and 2003 came from the 
White House, Pentagon, or State Department.
Wearing flag lapel pins and crying on camera, journalists suspended 
even the pretense of objectivity as they affirmed the administration’s 
claim that the attacks of 9/11 constituted a fundamental turning point 
in human history. “The world is different,” another phrase repeated often 
in late 2001 and 2002, became a kind of password that opened the door 
for an extraordinary degree of fearmongering, as did its corollary, “9/11 
can happen again.”
From the beginning, the language of the administration was apoca-
lyptic. “Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign 
unlike any other we have ever seen,” President Bush proclaimed in late 
September 2001. The following January, in his State of the Union ad-
dress, he announced that our enemies were not only bin Laden and Al 
Qaeda, but an “axis of evil” consisting of Iraq, Iran, and Korea, as well as 
any nation that harbored terrorists. At home, Americans should brace 
themselves for attacks by members of Al Qaeda sleeper cells who lived 
among us, as the 9/11 terrorists had, and could strike at any moment.
The administration began warning of a far more distant danger as 
well. Throughout 2002, it claimed that Iraq had aided bin Laden and was 
building weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Those claims proved 
false, but the administration used them to garner broad support from 
Congress, pundits, and the public for its 2003 invasion and occupation of 
Iraq. And over the next five years, as casualties mounted and the finan-
cial costs of the president’s self- described “crusade” soared, it was crucial 
to the administration that Americans remain frightened about possible 
terrorist attacks on U.S. soil so that they would continue to support the 
Iraq war and the broader “war on terror.”
As time passed and such attacks did not occur, skeptics began to 




bridges? Poisoned the water supply? Grabbed an automatic weapon and 
shot up a mall? Americans with no connection to foreign terrorist or-
ganizations do such things in their own homeland, but it became in-
creasingly evident that sleeper cells full of impassioned, highly trained 
terrorists did not exist.
How, then, to keep the fears alive? In large measure, the Bush admin-
istration relied on an ingenious repetition device, a color- coded terror 
alert chart created by the newly established Department of Homeland 
Security that reflected what the department deemed the degree of risk at 
any given time. The color chart reminded the populace, graphically and 
continuously, that they were in danger. Sometimes the risk was greater, 
sometimes lesser, but always there was danger.
Government officials repeatedly issued “code orange” (high- risk) ter-
ror alerts. In each instance, a public official such as the attorney general 
or the director of Homeland Security appeared before the press, prom-
ised that the alert was based on “credible” or “reliable” sources, and of-
fered no further information. No attacks occurred, but the Bush admin-
istration benefited from the scares. A study published in 2004 found that 
when the terror warnings increased, so did Bush’s approval rating— an 
effect that was not lost on the administration. In a memoir published 
after Bush left office, Tom Ridge, the first director of the Department of 
Homeland Security, reported that senior members of the administration 
had pressured him to raise the terrorism threat level at key moments 
during Bush’s reelection campaign of 2004.
Some of the warnings were laughable from the start, as when the gov-
ernment advised citizens in late 2001 to stockpile duct tape and rolls of 
plastic to seal their homes against chemical weapon attacks— despite the 
fact that experts knew these measures were probably pointless. (When 
chemical agents are released outdoors, they are almost immediately di-
luted by the wind.) Since the risk of dying in a chemical weapon attack 
is far less than a million to one, an American was more likely to die in a 
car accident en route to purchase the duct tape.
Therein lies a lesson from this era worth keeping in mind in future 
panics: when it comes to sustaining fear, one scare supports another, 
and risk assessment by the frightened populace gets distorted. When 
fearful people buy guns, drive instead of fly, or isolate themselves in their 




as a result of the attacks of 9/11, the number of deaths from terrorism in 
the United States was the highest in the nation’s history. Yet even during 
that eventful year, relative to other hazards, the danger from terrorism 
was low. According to figures published by the State Department, the 
number of deaths from terrorist attacks worldwide was 3,547, more than 
three- quarters of which were on 9/11 in the United States. By compari-
son, nearly three times as many Americans died from gun- related hom-
icides that year, and five times as many died in alcohol- related motor 
vehicle accidents.
Continuity and Change
The war on terror did not bring an end, however, to worries about all 
low- level domestic dangers. Even as some groups, such as young Amer-
ican males, received a partial reprieve, the culture of fear, rather than 
narrowing, expanded to include new scares along with such enduring 
ones as child snatching.
Consider a little experiment I conducted just months after the attacks, 
in the summer of 2002. Over the course of a couple of weeks, whenever 
I had the chance, I turned on the TV and flipped between MSNBC, 
Fox News Channel, and CNN to see what they were covering. Rarely 
did I have to wait more than twenty minutes to hear a report about one 
or more child abductions. Editors and journalists defended spending so 
much air time on child abductions through declarations of a “trend” or 
“epidemic,” even as child abductions remained extremely rare, and they 
threw out bogus numbers. On his Fox News Channel show, Bill O’Reilly 
talked of “100,000 abductions of children by strangers every year in the 
United States,” though an exhaustive study from the U.S. Office of Juve-
nile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) that year found only 
115 cases a year of “stereotypical kidnappings” (children abducted by 
nonfamily members and kept for long periods or murdered). “The ma-
jority of victims of stereotypical and other nonfamily abductions were 
teens— not younger children— and most were kidnapped by someone 
they knew somewhat— not by strangers or slight acquaintances,” a sub-
sequent report in 2006 from the OJJDP noted.
The obsession with kidnapped kids showed no signs of slackening 




birthday, went missing in May 2007 from a resort in Portugal, the story 
drew attention for a couple of years, well after the Portuguese police 
had closed the case. After another child, Caylee Anthony, disappeared 
in June 2008, her case also attracted extensive coverage. Combining two 
archetypes that have been frequently featured, and are likely to con-
tinue so, in the U.S. media— the missing child and the monstrous mom 
(Anthony’s mother was eventually arrested for the murder)— Anthony’s 
story became nearly an obsession for some cable TV hosts. Most no-
table, perhaps, was Nancy Grace, a former prosecutor who has relent-
lessly covered missing children on her nightly HLN (CNN’s Headline 
News Network) program. CNN might as well rename HLN “CAN, as 
in Caylee Anthony Network, because HLN has been riding the toddler’s 
demise for hours each day,” Los Angeles Times media critic James Rainey 
noted after watching the network for a few days in 2009.
In public lectures and media interviews, when I mention examples 
such as those and the actual statistics about missing children, I am often 
asked: other than appealing to our baser appetites, what harm is there 
in the news media obsessing over missing children? My answer is, con-
siderable harm, ranging from needless restrictions on children’s ability 
to play and get exercise to expensive and ill- conceived legislation. The 
nationwide Amber Alert system, named for a child murdered in Texas in 
1996, costs the federal government $5 million annually, the states many 
times that amount, and produces frequent notices on roadways and in 
the media about kidnapped children. But “the system does not typi-
cally work as designed (i.e., to save children who are in life- threatening 
danger) and might be generally incidental to the safe return of most of 
the hundreds of children for whom the alert system is said to have been 
‘successful,’ ” researchers concluded from their study of Amber Alerts 
over a three- year period.
As we look to the future, it behooves us to ponder long- term ramifi-
cations of recurring scares such as child abduction. Even were the Amber 
Alert system and others like it to become more successful than the re-
search suggests, crucial questions would remain. As criminologist James 
Alan Fox of Northeastern University noted in an op- ed in the New York 
Times, “More important than the risk of ineffectiveness is the danger of 
misuse. What should the criteria be for determining reliable informa-




curate leads and wrong suspects? What might happen, for example, if an 
incorrect license plate of a suspected abductor is displayed on electronic 
highway signs? Might some poor motorist be pulled over by authorities 
or, worse, chased down by a group of vigilantes? These concerns are es-
pecially salient in the climate of fear and hysteria that surrounds what 
many have accurately called a parent’s worst nightmare.”
For children, too, fear and hysteria about stranger danger are harmful 
in ways that can have lasting effects on individuals and the larger soci-
ety. While children should certainly be taught commonsense rules about 
interacting with strangers, too many warnings can lead to what some 
scholars have dubbed the “mean world syndrome.” Children raised to 
view every adult with distrust might have little desire to become engaged 
in civic life when they are adults.
Here, as in other instances I’ve reviewed, a focus on bizarre and 
uncommon cases misdirected attention from common dangers. In a 
UNICEF study in 2007 that looked at factors including poverty, health, 
safety, and education, children in the United States were found to be at 
greater danger than anywhere else in the developed world.
America’s Most Serious Social Problem?
For some scares— child kidnapping being a case in point— the particu-
lars do not vary much from one year to the next. In others, the specific 
behaviors, subpopulations, alleged causes, and purported effects differ 
over time. Fearmongering about teen motherhood is an illustrative ex-
ample, as a quick comparison of two recent periods— the 1990s and the 
years following September 11, 2001— point up.
Within the sick- society narrative of the 1990s, teen mothers were 
portrayed as much more ominous and plentiful than they were. Al-
though only about one- third of teen mothers were younger than eight-
een years old, and fewer than one in fifty was fourteen or younger, one 
would not have imagined as much. Numerous TV programs and print 
media promulgated the fiction of an epidemic of pregnancy among very 
young teens. These included not only hyperbolic programs of the Ricky 
Lake and Maury Povich genre but also more highbrow fare. In an inter-
view on National Public Radio’s Morning Edition in 1995, for example, 




was not many years ago in this country when it was not common for 
thirteen- year- olds and fourteen- year- olds to be having children out of 
wedlock. I’m enough of an optimist to believe that we can re- create that 
kind of a culture.” The interviewer, NPR’s Bob Edwards, failed to correct 
this misleading statement. Nowhere in the segment did he indicate that 
it remained extremely uncommon for thirteen- and fourteen- year- olds 
to have children. Nor did Edwards note that, until relatively recently, 
most thirteen- and fourteen- year- olds were unable to bear children. As 
recently as a century ago the average age for menarche was sixteen or 
older, whereas today girls typically have their first menstrual period by 
age thirteen, and some as early as age nine.
Scores of journalists, politicians, and social scientists gave intricate ex-
planations for why adolescents get pregnant and ignored the obvious. As 
the British sociologists Sally Macintyre and Sarah Cunningham- Burley 
noted in an essay, “Ignorance about contraception, psychopathology, de-
sire to prove adulthood, lack of family restraint, cultural patterns, desire 
to obtain welfare benefits, immorality, getting out of school— a host of 
reasons are given for childbirth in women under 20, while ‘maternal in-
stinct’ is thought to suffice for those over 20.”
The causes of teen motherhood had to be treated as distinct and 
powerful during this period. Otherwise, it would have made no sense 
to treat teen moms themselves as distinct and powerful— America’s 
“most serious social problem,” as President Bill Clinton called them 
in his 1995 State of the Union address. Nor would it have made po-
litical sense for legislators to include in the 1996 Federal Welfare Law 
$250 million for states to use to persuade young people to practice 
premarital abstinence. In what may well qualify as the most sweep-
ing, bipartisan, multimedia, multidisciplinary scapegoating operation 
of the late twentieth century, at various times during the decade of 
the 1990s, prominent liberals including Jesse Jackson, Joycelyn Elders, 
and Daniel Patrick Moynihan and conservatives such as Dan Quayle 
and William Bennett accused teen moms of destroying civilization. 
Journalists, joining the chorus, referred to adolescent motherhood as 
a “cancer,” warned that teen moms “breed criminals faster than soci-
ety can jail them,” and estimated their cost to taxpayers at $21 billion 
a year. Newspaper and magazine columnists called out- of- wedlock 




pathologies— crime, drug abuse, mental and physical illness, welfare 
dependency” ( Joe Klein in Newsweek) and “an unprecedented national 
catastrophe” (David Broder in the Washington Post). Richard Cohen, 
also of the Post, asserted that “before we can have crime control, we 
need to have birth control” and deemed illegitimacy “a national secu-
rity issue.”
That an agglomeration of impoverished young women, whose collec-
tive wealth and influence would not add up to that of a single Fortune 
100 company, do not have the capacity to destroy America seemed to 
elude the scaremongers. So did the causal order. Teen pregnancy was 
largely a response to the nation’s educational and economic decline, 
not the other way around. Girls who attended rotten schools and faced 
rotten job prospects had little incentive to delay sex or practice contra-
ception. In the mid- 1990s at least 80 percent of teenage moms were 
already poor before they became pregnant. Journalists put up astound-
ing statistics such as “on average, only 5 percent of teen mothers get 
college degrees, compared with 47 percent of those who have children 
at twenty- five or older” (People, in an article bleakly titled “The Baby 
Trap”). Yet the difference is attributable almost entirely to preexisting 
circumstances— particularly poverty and poor educational opportunities 
and abilities. Studies that compared teen moms with other girls from 
similar economic and educational backgrounds found only modest dif-
ferences in education and income between the two populations over the 
long term.
The panic over young mothers points up another enduring reality 
about a culture of fear. Warnings can become self- fulfilling, producing 
precisely the negative outcomes that the doomsayers warn about. Exag-
gerations about the effects of unwed motherhood on children stigma-
tize those children and provoke teachers and police, among others, to 
treat them with suspicion. Why do so many children from single- parent 
families end up behind bars? Partly, studies find, because they are more 
likely to be arrested than are children from two- parent households who 
commit similar offenses. Why do children from single- parent families 
do less well in school? One factor came out in experiments where teach-
ers were shown videotapes and told that particular children came from 
one- parent families and others from two- parent families. The teachers 




While fearmongering of the 1990s about young women focused 
largely on low- income adolescent mothers, after September 11, 2001, 
the targets expanded to include young women from other income groups 
and even nonpregnant girls— indeed, even girls who had yet to have in-
tercourse. Rather than the predominant metaphors being about a sick 
society, now they were about rapidity and about sexual practices adults 
found disturbing. As Katie Couric put it in 2005, the trouble was “kids 
growing up way too fast, having oral sex at ridiculously young ages.”
Among the most widely reported teen sex stories in the news media 
in the first decade of the twenty- first century was a supposed “pregnancy 
pact” at Gloucester High School in Massachusetts. First publicized by 
Time magazine, the tale was about a group of seventeen girls, none older 
than age sixteen, who, Time reported, “confessed to making a pact to get 
pregnant and raise their babies together. Then the story got worse. ‘We 
found out one of the fathers is a 24- year- old homeless guy,’ the principal 
says, shaking his head.” Numerous media outlets repeated the story, call-
ing it “shocking” (CBS) and “disturbing” (CNN), wondering “shall we go 
to the mall— or get pregnant” (Salon.com headline) and “what happened 
to shame” (Fox News).
“The pact is so secretive,” CNN said, “we couldn’t even find out the 
girls’ names,” a difficulty that may have resulted from there being no such 
pact, as reporters who dug an inch deeper learned from other officials at 
the school and in the town, as well as from one of the pregnant students. 
The notion of a pact arose from stories about girls who had promised to 
help one another care for their children, she suggested. It was only after 
they’d learned they were pregnant, the student explained, that they made 
the promise.
In an op- ed after the pregnancy pact story had been roundly de-
bunked, sociologist Mike Males proposed that politicians, reporters, and 
social scientists abandon the term “teenage pregnancy” altogether. Con-
trary to the misimpression that phrase conveys, in the majority of cases, 
the mother is not “a child herself,” she’s in her late teens, and the father 
isn’t a teen at all. He is in his twenties.
That the term “illegitimacy,” having largely disappeared from the lex-
icon, made a comeback at the end of the twentieth century, when nearly 
one in three children was born to an unwed mother, is not only paradox-




While neither the targets of the predominant scares of 2040 nor the 
cultural narrative within which they’ll be placed can be foretold, the 
culture of fear will thrive; the tools I have reviewed in this chapter for 
amplifying risks will be at play; and many of the bogeymen and bogey-









The World To Be
Gary Saul Morson and Morton Schapiro
In an article in the September 1934 issue of Everyday Science and Me-
chanics magazine, Walter Dill Scott, president of Northwestern Univer-
sity, was quoted as saying that technology would transform the college 
experience in dramatic ways: “The university of twenty- five years from 
now will be a different looking place, says President Scott of North-
western. Instead of concentrating faculty and students around a cam-
pus, they will ‘commute’ by air, and the university will be surrounded by 
airports and hangars. The course will be carried on, to a large extent, by 
radio and pictures. Facsimile broadcasting and television will enlarge 
greatly the range of a library; and research may be carried on by scholars 
at great distances.”
The accompanying cartoon depicted a student in bed studying in 
front of a large screen, with a loudspeaker blaring away. The caption 
reads: “The radio- television scholar of 1960 attends a morning lecture.”
Apart from making library materials available much more widely, that 
turned out not to be the Northwestern of 1960, and despite the advent 
of the Internet and of the massive open online course (MOOC), it is not 
the Northwestern of today. If you believe our chapter on education, it 
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is unlikely even to be the Northwestern of 2040, a century after Scott’s 
bold prediction.
It wasn’t that President Scott was some starry- eyed mystic; by all ac-
counts, he was a serious and innovative thinker. But just as some of the 
smartest and most influential Americans as selected by Fortune maga-
zine in the 1950s imagined a world in 1980 that was so different than 
the one we experienced, he was largely mistaken.
Will the predictions in this volume fare any better than the one writ-
ten sixty years ago? At the risk of trying to appear wiser than our pre-
decessors, there are reasons for us to hope. For one, compared with the 
Fortune book, our list of authors is considerably more diverse. A volume 
that more closely reflects the multiplicity of today’s thinking might just 
turn out to more accurately anticipate the world to come. And while 
there is certainly less optimism about the future, history seems to suggest 
that a more balanced view of some things getting better and some worse 
makes sense.
Above all, there is less of a certainty that this, of all times, is the 
most critical one in world history. The one thing that does not change, 
in Marcel Proust’s view, is that it always appears there have just been 
great changes. Sure, the next twenty- five years will be important in many 
regards— but the most important ever, in every single area? We doubt it, 
and compared with the earlier volume, so do our authors.
What will the world look like in twenty- five years? In what way do 
the predictions from our authors converge, and in what ways do they 
differ?
One of the gloomier forecasts in the book isn’t about war, religion, or 
the environment— it is about the economy. A 2 percent annual growth 
rate (which has been the norm for some time in the United States) im-
plies a doubling in economic output every thirty- five or so years; Robert 
Gordon’s 0.8 percent annual growth rate in the U.S. future would mean 
it would take ninety years. The headwinds of demographic change, poor 
education, rising inequality, and soaring debt would make economic life 
in 2040 much worse than many observers expect and substantially poorer 
than a simple extrapolation of historical trends would imply. What a dif-
ferent world that would be, as for the first time in many generations, a 
large number of Americans would achieve lower levels of material well- 




We suppose that the good news is that, according to Richard East-
erlin, personal satisfaction is largely unrelated to economic growth. So 
even if the economy were to continue to grow at historic rates, people 
wouldn’t necessarily get any happier. For Easterlin, changes in satisfac-
tion have much less to do with increases over time in household or in-
dividual income and much more to do with meaningful employment 
and the presence of a social safety net. Unfortunately, other chapters 
cast doubt on whether these and other noneconomic factors are likely to 
improve, bringing higher levels of satisfaction with them.
Eileen Crimmins fears that any ongoing increases in life expectancy 
are more likely to produce long years of physical and mental infirmity 
rather than golden years full of meaningful activity and pleasure. Perhaps 
new technologies will lead to a rosier health picture, but Robert Gal-
lucci worries that technological change may also create unexpected vul-
nerabilities among nations, as countries lacking the ability to engage in 
large protracted fights may instead wreak havoc through cyber and space 
warfare. And if a newly intensified competition for resources leads to 
even faster climate change, environmentally challenged nations may be 
pushed into conflicts in greater numbers. And that isn’t even considering 
the most destructive of the black swans— surprising events that could 
destabilize the world. The impact from a new plague, the disintegration 
of China as a national state, or the detonation of nuclear bombs in major 
world cities, for example, could make slow economic growth seem the 
least of our problems.
The emergence of new technologies could have other negative effects as 
well. Wendy Kaminer questions freedom’s future. The diminution of pri-
vacy is a fact today, and what is left will be under assault in the coming 
years. Fear plus technology equals unprecedented surveillance and a gutting 
of the Bill of Rights. Mark Ratner foresees that the last bastion of privacy 
will disappear when our very thoughts can be read from outside, a truly 
horrifying prospect. We doubt this is what Easterlin had in mind when he 
hoped for a growth in nonmaterial sources of personal satisfaction.
But all is not gloom and doom.
Religion, according to Eboo Patel, could lead to increased respect and 
cooperation, at least in the United States. Interfaith activities will blos-
som and religious communities will work together to address great issues 
such as climate change and poverty.
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Ratner points hopefully to an increase in the diversity of those prac-
ticing science, arguing that the breakdown in barriers of gender, race, 
age, residence, and social standing bodes well for the future of scientific 
success. While Kaminer worries that universal connectivity may trample 
human rights, Ratner optimistically expects that these connections will 
lead scientists and policy makers to work ever harder to conquer pov-
erty and malnutrition. And when he talks of universal connectivity— he 
means just that, not just of the earth but life outside as well.
John Kelly is also hopeful that radical changes in technology in the 
years to come hold great promise, as we enter the age of insight. Eco-
nomic, medical, educational, political, and other implications are as-
tounding, and much of the news is good. Cognitive systems will fuel 
innovation and potentially transform the human condition. Further, 
according to Mark Tercek and Jimmie Powell, advances in science, tech-
nology, and communications might also help us understand and address 
environmental challenges in a new way. With the environment in dan-
ger, they are cautiously optimistic that we might just put ourselves on a 
path toward real sustainability. This depends on the quality of govern-
ance institutions, both globally and locally, and on the commitment of 
the private sector to protect biodiversity.
Education will continue to play a critical role, perhaps in a more tra-
ditional form than Kelly (and President Scott) assume. If successful, es-
pecially in using new technologies to enhance lifelong learning, perhaps 
one of the headwinds expected by Gordon will be countered, and the 
threat with regard to the demise of personal liberty feared by Kaminer 
will be thwarted by a better informed citizenry. And maybe a resurgence 
in the humanities, arts, and humanistic social sciences will not only en-
hance “subjective well- being” in Easterlin’s terms, regardless of the dis-
mal path of economic growth imagined by Gordon, but will also provide 
a cultural literacy and sense of respect that will bode well in terms of 
Patel’s religious tolerance and Gallucci’s prospects for world peace. Well, 
one can hope.
Will we ever address climate change, the dwindling of individual 
rights, and other great issues if we never even hear about them? Arianna 
Huffington points to a revolution in communication technology as a way 
to better uncover the truth. How nice would it be to be able to instantly 




like, it is easier than ever to perpetrate the latest big lie. According to 
Barry Glassner, focusing on the wrong fears has a long history in the 
United States and abroad, predating the recent revolution in communi-
cations. Fearmongering is a way of life, and while the particular worries 
will change, the methods employed to exaggerate dangers are expected 
to remain reasonably constant over the next quarter century. No won-
der, as Kaminer argues, so many of us are scared to the point where we 
enthusiastically trade in civil liberties for the sake of “national security.” 
If only Huffington’s “Truth 2.0” app would be brought to market. In the 
meantime, we will likely obsess on topics that scare us needlessly, while 
spending insufficient attention on those that are worthy of our concern.
In sum, the optimistic contributors to this volume, while not as over-
whelmingly dominant as in the earlier one, are still in the majority.
Will that better world they foresee actually come into being?
Almost forty years ago, one of us studied econometric forecasting in 
graduate school with Lawrence Klein, who went on to win the 1980 
Nobel Prize in Economics for his work in creating models that predict 
economic trends. One day Professor Klein joked in class that the secret 
to successful forecasting is either to go very short, simply assuming that 
tomorrow will look very much like today, or to go very long, far enough 
in the future that when your bad predictions come to roost, you are but 
a distant memory.
Sage advice, which the authors here have bravely— or perhaps 
recklessly— ignored.
The year 2040 doesn’t seem all that far away, but twenty- five years is 
ample time for the world to embark on dramatic new paths in health, 
economics, politics, religion, science, and the like. Will readers one day 
marvel that this volume contains Nostradamus- like predictions of the 
world to be? The Fortune book suggests that most of what we say here 
will be wildly off the mark. But perhaps, like the forty- handicap golfer, 
if you swing enough, one of your shots will inadvertently go straight, and 
readers will be amazed that someone actually got something right.
In any case, our most confident prediction is that if this book is read 
in 2040, people will learn less about how they got to that time and 
place and more about the world twenty- five years earlier— our greatest 
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